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Bonum est homini ut eum veritas volentem, quia malum est homini ut eum veritas vincat invitum. Nam ipsa vincat necesse est, sive negantem sive confitentem.

S. AUG. EPIST. CCXXXVIII. AD PASCENT.

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VOL. X.—JULY, 1885.—No. 39.

THE SYNTHETIC PHILOSOPHY OF HERBERT SPENCER.

A System of Synthetic Philosophy. Vol. I. First Principles. By Herbert Spencer. New York: 1883.

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Herbert Spencer. What praises are not lavished on him? He has, it is said, reduced agnosticism to a perfect system. All its conclusions have been drawn by him from first principles and united under one general aspect; by him all its tenets are shown to be in full agreement, to illustrate and uphold one another. In his writings the whole positive knowledge thus far attained by mankind seems to be enlisted for the defence of the agnostic view. Nay, all philosophical systems contrived by modern thought, if purified of misconceptions, if considered in their general tendency, are proved by him to result in the one philosophy of the unknowable. He is, on this account, admired as the greatest and clearest thinker of the age, as the apostle of the understanding, as the restorer of true philosophy, and the champion of universal truth.

Such being his renown, who would not be desirous of becoming acquainted with Mr. Spencer's ideas? Enhanced must this desire be if we not seldom hear that his speculation is not hostile to Christianity, but rather, if well understood, leads back to God, the First Cause; being, in reality, as it purports to be, a reconciliation of science and religion. The outlines of his entire system are laid down in "The First Principles." From this first volume of his work on synthetic philosophy we may both obtain an insight into the foundations and the intrinsic connection of this extensive structure, and observe the whole in all its bearings and consequences. To attain this end by the shortest way, we put the following questions: I. What, in Mr. Spencer's opinion, can we know, and what can we not know? II. What is the nature of the unknowable? III. What is the nature of the knowable? IV. In what does the whole system result, and by what method is that result reached?

I.

The first and most fundamental position held by Mr. Spencer is, that we cannot know but what manifests itself to us by experience, and that this itself we do not know as to its essence or nature, but only as to its relation; not as to the entity it has without us, but as to the impressions it produces within us. He did not start that idea. It had already been conceived by the Grecian philosophers; it had been wrought into a whole philosophical system by David Hume; it is adopted by all agnostics and positivists as the basis of all their assertions. Mr. Spencer is but one of the many interpreters of the relativity of knowledge, as this theory is termed. The object of our direct perceptions, he says, is not the thing without us, but the impression produced on our faculties, namely, the sensation of heat or pressure, and not the body that is hot or hard. But impressions are relative. Into thought and consciousness the various impres-

sions enter only by being compared as to their likeness and unlikeness. Relative, therefore, is the form under which anything is apprehended and known by us. Take away the relations from the object, and it becomes by that very fact *unthinkable;* just as a body, as soon as its color has vanished away, is rendered invisible. The relative, consequently, is the knowable; the absolute, the unknowable.[1] Not even science can give us a higher or a deeper knowledge; for its task is but to compare the phenomena or impressions, and, by discovering the traits in which they resemble one another, to reduce them to common laws and classes. Beyond the highest generalizations thus attained it cannot go. By no scientific researches can we grasp the origin or nature of things outside us; nor can we form universal notions by conceiving the essence of objects, and derive from them universal principles from which to reason *a priori.* For universals are nothing but images that faintly resemble the average of the objects of a certain class; they are, therefore, but symbols of the latter, and have no validity unless verified by experience (§ 9).

That such is the nature of our cognition Mr. Spencer attempts to prove, chiefly from two reasons: First, from what he takes for an undeniable fact, that our ultimate ideas concerning the causes of things, both intrinsic and extrinsic, are self-contradictory (§ 11). A self-existent being is inconceivable; for it would be necessary to think of its existence as endless and beginningless. But this would imply a past time of infinite length, which is an evident impossibility. Hence the self-existence of the world, as well as its creation by a self-existent being distinct from it, is *unthinkable*, because both involve marks no less contradictory than those of a square fluid. The theistic, pantheistic and atheistic hypotheses are, therefore, alike absurd, all being based on the same illegitimate and illusive conception. To the same impossibilities we find ourselves reduced, when we inquire into the causes of our impressions. A cause, he grants, and even a first cause of them, we are compelled to assume. But how conceive of it? Is it limited? Then it supposes the infinite which surrounds it. Is it unlimited? Then we give up the principle of causality, admitting an existence without a cause. Is it dependent? Then it is not first. Is it absolute and independent? Then nothing can be besides it, nothing can exist by it, because by action the absolute would undergo a change and would become relative. Nay, these three conceptions, as he imagines he proves from Mansel, imply contradiction to one another, if considered as attributes of one and the self-same being. The passage he approvingly quotes from the late

[1] See "First Principles," Part I., Chapter IV.

Dean ends with the following words: "The conception of the Absolute and Infinite, from whatever side we view it, appears encompassed with contradictions. There is a contradiction in supposing such an object to exist, whether alone or in conjunction with others; and there is a contradiction in supposing it not to exist. There is a contradiction in conceiving it as one; and there is a contradiction in conceiving it as many. There is a contradiction in conceiving it as personal; and there is a contradiction in conceiving it as impersonal. It cannot, without a contradiction, be represented as active; nor, without an equal contradiction, be represented as inactive. It cannot be conceived as the sum of all existence; nor yet can it be conceived as a part only of that sum."[1]

No less self-destructive are the proximate causes reached by science. Time, space, matter, motion, action, the *ego*, which we are compelled to regard as existing without our conception in themselves, are, if analyzed, all found to teem with contradictions (§§ 15–22).

To show that we know nothing but relations, Mr. Spencer advances a still deeper reason; he resorts to the very nature of the cognitive act. Our vital faculties he considers as not distinct from the material forces. Life, in general, he says, consists in counteraction on exterior impressions or influences, in a correspondence between outer and inner actions, in an adjustment between internal and external relations in order to keep the being in balance. Intellection falls under the same notion. Is not intellectual truth guiding us to successful action and to the consequent maintenance of life, and, according to its very definition, simply the active correspondence between subjective and objective relations? What conclusion is to be drawn from this is apparent. "If every act of knowing is the formation of a relation in consciousness parallel to a relation in the environment, then the relativity of knowledge is self-evident—becomes, indeed, a truism. Thinking being *relationing*, no thought can ever express more than relations" (§ 25).

Thus far Mr. Spencer is in harmony with all other agnostics. Neither the principles from which he reasons nor the conclusions which he draws are unlike to theirs. But, having arrived at this point, he begins to frame a structure of his own. The relativity of knowledge, he maintains, whilst it excludes a definite conception of the absolute, necessarily implies an indefinite one of it. The noumenon, everywhere named as the antithesis of the phenomenon, is throughout necessarily thought of as an actuality. It is altogether impossible to conceive that our knowledge is a knowledge of

[1] Page 42.

appearances only, without conceiving, at the same time, a reality of which they are appearances, a knowledge of impressions without conceiving a power or cause by which they are produced. Nor can we conceive of the relative without something to which it is opposed, or something in which the relations are and from which they can be abstracted. Now this something is evidently the absolute. The thought, however, of the absolute is altogether vague and indeterminate. We conceive some cause of the impressions, some reality under the relations. Yet what and how that cause or that reality is in itself, we cannot at all conceive. Accordingly we call the absolute the unknowable; the phenomena or impressions, both singly and reduced to classes, the knowable, understanding by knowledge a clear and definite perception (§ 26).

The unknowable is the object of religion, the knowable the object of science. Religion is concerned with the ultimate verity, the inscrutable origin of the visible universe; or rather, it consists in the consciousness and awe of that mystery. Herein all religions agree, and that into which they all converge must be their nature and their common soul of truth. Religion, therefore, in general, is based on a true foundation. Yet, in particular, every religion has become erroneous and irreligious by attempting to represent the incomprehensible in a comprehensible manner, and to render the ultimate cause knowable, the mysterious unmysterious. It was science that showed the inconsistency of the arguments made use of by religion, in order to unravel the nature of the absolute. Science has purified religion. But science, in its turn, has become unscientific by adopting untenable hypotheses and substituting for the agencies and causes which it proved to be absurdly believed in by religion, others not less absurd and self-contradictory. Both science and religion, however, have always been progressing in the pursuit of their real object; religion has become ever more conscious of the incomprehensibility of the absolute; science has ever more cleaved to experience and ceased to consider causes and forces as knowable. All conflicts between science and religion were the consequence of either one's outstepping its own sphere in contravention to its own end and interest. Perfect reconciliation between them will be obtained, if science will confine itself to the knowable, the relative; religion to the unknowable, the absolute.

Nor is it to be feared that religion will suffer by the division. For the confession of the unknowableness of the absolute is the true religion, the acknowledgment of the limitation of our intellect the true religious position. "May we not," says Mr. Spencer, "without hesitation affirm that a sincere recognition of the truth that our own and all other existence is a mystery absolutely and

forever beyond our comprehension, contains more of true religion than all the dogmatic theology ever written?"[1] (§ 27–35).

The line of distinction being drawn between that which we can know and that which we cannot know, let us now at once proceed to examine the nature of the unknowable.

II.

As we have seen above, the unknowable is the absolute, the unconditioned, the ultimate cause of all impressions and phenomena, and is, for this reason, frequently termed the eternal, universal, infinite creative power or energy. But how shall we reconcile all these appellations with the very name of the unknowable? How can eternity, infinity, omnipresence, causation be predicated of it at the same time that any definite notion of it is emphatically denied to be possible, and that all those attributes are regarded as inconceivable? Mr. F. Harrison, indeed, charges Mr. Spencer, on that account, with palpable self-contradiction. It will be necessary carefully to reconsider the respective notions and definitions. In Mr. Spencer's opinion, the irrelative or absolute is that which is clothed with relations; and the infinite is that which underlies the limits, that from which limits may be abstracted, but not that which positively excludes all limits. The universal power or eternal energy is that which is always in our mind whenever we think of impressions as produced. So conceived, the absolute is a generalization or abstraction, it is universal being, not distinct from particular existence, but common and intrinsic to all that exists and is conceived, not determinate, but altogether undetermined. If such, of course, the absolute is apprehended only by a vague and indefinite conception. To convince the reader that this is Mr. Spencer's train of thought, we shall let him speak for himself. "We are conscious," he says, "of the Relative as existence under conditions and limits; it is impossible that these conditions and limits can be thought of apart from something to which they give the form; the abstraction of these conditions and limits is, by the hypothesis, the abstraction of them *only;* consequently there must be a residuary consciousness of something that filled up their outlines; and this indefinite something constitutes our consciousness of the Non-relative or Absolute. Impossible though it is to give to this consciousness any qualitative or quantitative expression whatever, it is not the less certain that it remains with us a positive and indestructible element of thought."[2]

"When we are taught that a piece of matter, regarded by us as existing externally, cannot be really known, but that we can know only impressions produced on us, we are yet by the relativity of our

[1] Page 112.

[2] Page 90.

thought compelled to think of these in relation to a positive cause —the notion of a real existence, which generated these impressions, becomes nascent. If it be proved to us that every notion of a real existence which we can frame is utterly inconsistent with itself—that matter, however conceived by us, cannot be matter as it actually is, our conception, though transfigured, is not destroyed : there remains the sense of reality, dissociated as far as possible from those special forms under which it was before represented in thought. Though philosophy condemns successively each attempted conception of the Absolute—though it proves to us that the Absolute is not this, nor that,—though in obedience to it we negative, one after another, each idea as it arises; yet as we cannot expel the entire contents of consciousness, there ever remains behind an element which passes into new shapes. The continual negation of each particular form and limit simply results in the more or less complete abstraction of all forms and limits, and so ends in an indefinite consciousness of the unformed and unlimited."[1] "By fusing a series of states of consciousness, in each of which, as it arises, the limitations and conditions are abolished, there is produced a consciousness of something unconditioned. To speak more rigorously —this consciousness is not the abstract of any one group of thoughts, ideas, or conceptions; but it is the abstract of *all* thoughts, ideas, or conceptions. That which is common to them all, and cannot be got rid of, is what we predicate by the word existence. Dissociated as this becomes from each of its modes by the perpetual changes of those modes, it remains as an indefinite consciousness of something constant under all modes—of being apart from its appearances. The distinction we feel between special and general existence is the distinction between that which is changeable in us and that which is unchangeable."[2]

After this we ought not to be astonished if Mr. Spencer most energetically refuses to attribute to the absolute personality, intelligence, and will (§ 31). For attributes of that kind suppose the Supreme Being to be distinct from the visible universe, and to be of a determinate nature; whereas the absolute he speaks of is quite indeterminate, common and intrinsic to all things that exist, being only their highest generalization and abstraction.

However, though Mr. Spencer's absolute being is indefinite and void of all determination, he has learned from the German idealists to look upon it as self-determining. It so becomes the universal cause, immanent in its effects. It thus develops out of itself the whole existing world, and manifests itself by the phenomena of the universe. That this is the view he takes is evident from his reply

[1] Page 93.

[2] Page 95.

to Mr. Harrison in the *Nineteenth Century*,[1] where he repudiates causation by which the creating power is separated from the created thing, and from his scornfully styling the Christian idea of creation "the carpenter's theory."

Viewed in this light, the absolute at once changes its character. Being the source and root of all, it appears superior in perfection to any other thing, and is the summit of all reality. Hence it is that Mr. Spencer in several places considers it as higher than nature, and as too great to be comprehended by us. "Is it not just possible," he says, "that there is a mode of being as much transcending Intelligence and Will as these transcend mechanical motion? It is true that we are totally unable to conceive any such higher mode of being. But this is not a reason for questioning its existence; it is rather the reverse. Have we not seen how utterly incompetent our minds are to form even an approach to a conception of that which underlies all phenomena? Is it not proved that this incompetency is the incompetency of the conditioned to grasp the Unconditioned? Does it not follow that the Ultimate Cause cannot in any great respect be conceived by us because it is in every respect greater than can be conceived? And may we not therefore rightly refrain from assigning to it any attributes whatever, on the ground that such attributes, derived as they must be from our own natures, are not elevations, but degradations?"[2]

From all we have said thus far it is to be inferred that the absolute in Mr. Spencer's philosophy is not God. The absolute he speaks of is not infinite, but indefinite; not being or existence itself, but abstract, indeterminate, universal being, intrinsic to the world and indistinct from it.[3] So he himself has unmistakably defined it at the very outset of his speculation. Whenever later on he elevates it to the supreme degree of perfection, he does so only by a strange confusion of the indeterminate and the infinite, borrowed from idealistic pantheism. At most, therefore, his absolute being may be a pantheistic divinity. Nobody is, in fact, louder than he in protesting against the one personal God adored by the Christians. Why should we say that he, in reality, does not hold what he constantly asserts and attempts to prove? We have no reason not to believe him; it is, on the contrary, to be acknowledged that in denying a personal Deity he is altogether consistent. Not to see this only those can fail who have not yet succeeded in distinguishing the infinite from the abstract and indefinite, the being on the supreme grade of perfection from that on the lowest, nearest to nothingness.

The judgment we have pronounced on the real value and in-

[1] 1884, page 832.
[2] Page 109.
[3] See St. Thom., Sum. c. Gent., lib. I., p. 26.

wardness of the unknowable or absolute will be greatly confirmed by the examination of the knowable, which is now to follow.

III.

The knowable consists of the phenomena or impressions. It concerns, of course, philosophy, but not under the same aspect as it does experience or even as it does science. Science, if we are to believe Mr. Spencer, reduces the phenomena to certain classes, philosopy reduces all the divers classes to one supreme idea; it is the unification of all sciences, the fusion of them into a whole by the integration of truth or by the highest generalization. Science is partly unified knowledge, philosophy is completely unified knowledge (§ 37). By such unification, it is thought, the true nature of the phenomena will, as far as it is possible, be revealed to us. Let us follow the renowned agnostic in his pursuit of unity; we shall then know at least what the knowable is in his opinion, and what has become of the universe under his magic wand.

Unification, we are first told, may be obtained in two ways; either by ascending from the particular to the universal by induction, or by descending from the universal to the particular by deduction. The latter way is taken in General Philosophy. But here at once a difficulty presents itself. How can agnostic philosophy, relying exclusively on experience, get into possession of universal truths from which to deduce its conclusions? There are, indeed, it is answered, no *a priori* truths known independently of experience, but there are certain intuitions forced on us by the very structure of our organs, a structure which is nothing else but the registered and accumulated experience of ourselves and much more of our ancestors from whom we have inherited the nervous system.[1] Such intuitions or fundamental views, without which we cannot think at all, are not really self-evident, they are data or postulates assumed questionably and as *provisionally* true. Yet they themselves, as well as the conclusions drawn from them, may be compared with experience, and if throughout congruity is perceived, both their truth is proved and the unification of the phenomena accomplished. "Debarred," says Mr. Spencer, "as we are from everything beyond the relative, truth, raised to its highest form, can be for us nothing more than perfect agreement throughout the whole range of our experience, between those representations of things which we distinguish as ideal and those presentations of things which we distinguish as real. If, by discovering a proposition to be untrue, we mean nothing more than discovering a difference between a thing expected and a thing per-

[1] See the foot-note of page 179.

ceived, then a body of conclusions, in which no difference anywhere occurs, must be what we mean by an entirely true body of conclusions. And here, indeed, it becomes also obvious that, setting out with these fundamental intuitions provisionally assumed to be true—that is, provisionally assumed to be congruous with all other dicta of consciousness—the process of proving or disproving the congruity becomes the business of Philosophy ; and the complete establishment of the congruity becomes the same thing as the complete unification of knowledge in which Philosophy reaches its goal."[1]

What, then, are the data required by agnostic philosophy? They are three in number : an unknowable power, the existence of knowable likenesses and differences among the manifestations of that power, and a resulting segregation of the manifestations into those of the subject and object, the *ego* and *non-ego*.[2] For each of them a few words of explanation are necessary. To begin with the second, consciousness mainly consists in the comparison of our mental states, the perception of likeness or unlikeness, of congruity or incongruity between them. This being the process that constitutes reasoned knowledge, philosophy, if it is not to destroy itself, must postulate the truth of consciousness in affirming the existence of such likeness or unlikeness. Nay, we must even take the evidence of likeness or unlikeness as identical with the permanent consciousness of it. "To say that a given congruity or incongruity exists, is simply our way of saying that we invariably have a consciousness of it along with the consciousness of the compared things. We know nothing more of existence than a continued manifestation."[3] But, manifestations which make up our mental states suppose something that is manifested, and impressions something that is impressed. That something, manifested to us and impressed on us whenever we have some cognizance, is the absolute unknowable power. Being the ultimate ground and cause of all, it is the first fundamental datum, and must, at the same time, be the most universal principle of unification. But these manifold manifestations, which are at once our cognitions and the existence we know, are reduced to order by classification. They are first segregated spontaneously, that is, by the very law of thought, into two great classes, the vivid ones, called also perceptions or impressions, and the faint ones, generally termed ideas, the latter being but copies or repetitions of the former. "The faint manifestations forming a continuous whole we call the *ego ;* the vivid manifestations indissolubly bound together we call the *non-ego.* Or, rather, each order of manifestations carries with it the irresistible implication of some power that mani-

[1] Page 139. [2] Page 157. [3] Page 142.

fests itself; and by the words *ego* and *non-ego*, respectively, we mean the power that manifests itself in the faint forms, and the power that manifests itself in the vivid forms"[1] (§§ 39–46).

So much about the origin of the three first data. On them we may base others, if we continue to classify the manifestations. For these, separated into the two divisions of self and not-self, are re-divisible, and next into the ultimate scientific ideas, time, space, matter, motion, and force. Yet, as above these ideas were proved to be self-contradictory, if considered as existing without us, a doubt may rise whether it is possible to base any truth on them. The difficulty will be solved, as soon as the genuine notion of reality is established. Reality is not a thing that is outside us, but corresponds to our impressions or ideas as their cause or object. This is the view taken only by the peasant and the metaphysician; reality is nothing else but the persistence of a manifestation in consciousness. Now, impressions or manifestations are in our consciousness as effects of the unknowable that underlies them as their immanent cause. Hence we distinguish a twofold reality, a relative one, which is the persistence in thought of relations under some definite form, and an absolute one, which is the persistence in thought of the common substratum of all relations, surviving them under all changes and under any form whatever (§ 46). The ultimate scientific ideas, as they persist in consciousness, no doubt have reality, but a relative one only. For that they are but relations is evident both *a priori* and from experience.

As relations are the form of all our thoughts, it is easily understood that the ultimate ideas must all be derived from them by division and analysis. Now relations are of two orders, of sequence and of co-existence. The abstract of all sequence is time; the abstract of all co-existence is space. So, in fact, this latter is experienced; we are conscious of it as of co-existent positions. It is not strictly an entity, a sensible existence, but the blank form left behind when the realities are taken away. Matter is the existence that keeps the position by resistance to our touch. "Our conception of matter," says Mr. Spencer, "reduced to its simplest stage, is that of co-existent positions that offer resistance, as contrasted with our conception of space, in which the co-existent positions offer no resistance. We think of Body as bounded by surfaces that resist; and as made up throughout of parts that resist. Mentally abstract the co-existent resistances, and the consciousness of Body disappears, leaving behind it the consciousness of space. And since the group of co-existing resistant positions constituting a portion of matter is uniformly capable of giving us

[1] Page 154.

impressions of resistance in combination with various muscular adjustments, according as we touch its near, its remote, its right or its left side, it results that as different muscular adjustments habitually indicate different co-existence, we are obliged to conceive every portion of matter as containing more than one resistant position,—that is, as occupying space. Hence the necessity we are under of representing to ourselves the ultimate elements of Matter as being at once extended and resistant."[1]

The conception of motion arises from that of space, time, and matter. "A something that moves ; a series of positions occupied in succession; and a group of co-existent positions united in thought with the successive ones—these are the constituents of the idea" (§ 49). Matter is thus prior to space, time, and motion, but it is not primary, being itself built up from the experience of force.[2] A single impression of force is receivable by the senses ; a multiplication of such impressions, differing in kind and degree and differently combined, gives the material of manifold relations ; and these, as they are diverse in their forms, as well as their contents, make up a body moving in space and time. Force, therefore, as impressed on our senses, is the ultimate element of matter. Being, as such, no more capable of being classified according to likeness and difference, it is inscrutable. Still it is not the absolute cause, but only its immediate effect, inherent in it, and not separated from it (§ 50).

The ultimate scientific ideas being explained, and their reality being evinced, we deduce from them seven primary truths, which so serve philosophy as further data that they also prove to be conformable to experience. The first truth is the indestructibility of matter ; it means that matter cannot be called out of non-existence, or be made non-existent. The *a priori* reason is, that did matter not at any time exist, we should not have the elements necessary to form a thought. Its non-existence, therefore, is *unthinkable.* Experience, too, shows that phenomena do not arise out of nothing, or vanish away into nothing, but are simply changes or transformations of substances. Such experimental perception, however, amounts merely to this, that the force which in a given quantity of matter exercises resistance remains always the same ; for it is by resistance that we become cognizant of matter (§§ 52–55).

The second truth is the continuity of motion. Motion, like matter, is never destroyed, but only transformed, the principle of activity implied by it always continuing the same. This property of motion is proved *a posteriori* by scientists, yet so that their estima-

[1] Page 166.

[2] In the Appendix (page 578) Mr. Spencer calls matter a localized manifestation of force.

tion is based on the indestructibility of force; and is demonstrated *a priori* by philosophers from our incapacity of suppressing in thought force, the cause of motion (§§ 55–60).

The third truth is the persistence of force. The indestructibility of matter and the continuity of motion rest on the unchangeableness or constancy of the units of force, and this, again, supposes the persistence of force, not of that which we are immediately conscious of in our muscular efforts, for this does not persist, but of that which we are always indefinitely conscious of as the ultimate, but immanent cause of all impressions and all phenomena. Thus the unknowable, in which religion and science coalesce, the ground underlying all experience, the eternal energy, the supreme principle which is the basis of all scientific unification, turns out to be the persistence of force.

From it the four other truths are deduced. Two of them regard force. According to the one, the relations among forces always persist the same, there being an invariable connection between every antecedent and consequent; according to the other, any force displayed in each surrounding change does, in that act of expenditure, undergo a metamorphosis into an equivalent amount of some other force. The two last truths refer to motion. All motion is rhythmical or periodical, and all motion follows the line of the greatest attraction or least resistance[1] (Part ii., Chap. iv.–xi.).

These seven laws, for such are the primary truths above expounded, Mr. Spencer finds everywhere in nature at work so as to see them throughout verified by experience. Not only in inorganic matter, in the formation of the universe out of a nebulous mass, and in the geological changes are they followed; they govern, likewise, the organic realms, the mind, the will, and society. Life, whether sensitive, intellectual, or moral, is nothing but the play of attractive and repulsive forces, transformed, exchanged, and tending to equilibrium. All mental phenomena are a transformation of physical impressions. "Various classes of facts," Mr. Spencer remarks, "unite to prove that the law of metamorphosis, which holds among the physical forces, holds equally

[1] For the two forces themselves from which the direction of motion results, Mr. Spencer accounts by the form of our experience. "Matter," he says, "cannot be conceived except as manifesting forces of attraction and repulsion. Body is distinguished in our consciousness from space, by its opposition to our muscular energies; and this opposition we feel under the twofold form of a cohesion that hinders our efforts to rend, and a resistance that hinders our efforts to compress. Without resistance there can be merely empty extension. Without cohesion there can be no resistance. Probably this conception of antagonistic forces is originally derived from the antagonism of our flexor and extensor muscles. But be this as it may, we are obliged to think of all objects as made up of parts that attract and repel each other, since this is the form of our experience of all objects." Page 224.

between them and the mental forces. Those modes of the Unknowable which we call motion, heat, light, chemical affinity, etc., are alike transformable into each other and into those modes of the Unknowable which we distinguish as sensation, motion, thought; these, in their turn, being directly or indirectly re-transformable into the original shapes."[1] Again, vital actions, even thought and volition, are motions along the line of greatest attraction, or least resistance, which, when, by frequent repetition, they have become movements set up in certain directions, widen the channels of operation within the organism. Social movements start, population increases, commerce is developed where the least resistance is met with, where the greatest result is to be obtained with the least labor. Undulation is nowhere more striking than in the organic processes both of individual living beings and of species, in consciousness, in feelings and emotions, in national developments, in religion, and in science.

Important as the results thus far attained may seem to be for agnostic speculation, Mr. Spencer is conscious of not yet having solved the problem set before him. The ultimate scientific ideas have been considered but singly, each in its peculiar sphere. But force, matter, motion, do not stand apart; they form one well-connected whole. What law do they follow in their joint action? What rule, common to all the single agents, regulates their co-operation throughout the universe? Only by answering this question will philosophy accomplish the unification of all knowledge.

The idea which thus completely explains and unifies all phenomena of the world as a whole is, in Mr. Spencer's opinion, that of evolution and dissolution. These two processes include all changes ever observed, and make up the entire history of the world, comprising as they do its appearance out of the perceptible into the imperceptible, and its disappearance out of the perceptible into the imperceptible; though we ought not to imagine that first the one and then the other takes place, because every transformation implies both of them, yet so that either of the two is predominant. Evolution, in its general aspect, is concentration, or rather condensation of matter with concomitant dissipation of motion, whereas dissolution is the absorption of motion with concomitant disintegration or diffusion of matter. However, evolution is scarcely ever seen in that single and primary form. It is, in general, not single, but compound; such at least it is in a slowly condensing body, which, during concentration, is exposed to many external influences and so undergoes many secondary changes,

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particularly if it retains a great deal of molecular motion. Hence in compound evolution there is, together with the transition from the less coherent to the more coherent form, a passage also from the uniform to the multiform, or from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous. For while there is a progressive concentration of the aggregate, the parts into which the whole divides and subdivides are also condensed and become unlike. So the same process is exhibited by the whole and by its members; as the mass is *integrating* (condensing) and at the same time *differentiating* (being rendered different) from other masses, so each part of it is *integrating* and simultaneously *differentiating* from other parts.

Consequent on differentiation is a change from the indefinite to the definite, or in other words, an increase of the distinctness of its parts. For as the whole gains density, it becomes sharply marked off from the space or matter lying outside of it; and as each separated division draws by concentration into its mass the first imperfectly disunited segments from other divisions, it acquires a precise outline. But matter is condensed only as far as motion is dissipated. Accordingly, as there is, besides the primary redistribution, a secondary redistribution of matter, so there must be both a primary and a secondary redistribution of motion; and as the material parts of the whole become more unlike and definite so also motion is rendered more multiform and distinct. If concrete matter arises by aggregation of diffused matter, then concrete motion arises by the aggregation of diffused motion. The formula, therefore, of the whole process stands thus: *Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion; during which matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity; and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation*[1] (P. ii. Chapt. xii., xvii).

It remains still to reduce evolution itself, so manifold in its partial processes, to one common cause. For that purpose it will be retraced to four *factors*, and each *factor* will be retraced to the persistence of force, which so becomes the absolutely ultimate principle that transcends all experience by underlying it, and furnishes a common basis for the widest generalizations. The first factor of evolution is the instability of the homogeneous. Any finite aggregate must, owing to unequal exposure of its parts to incidental forces, soon lose its homogeneity. The relations of inside and outside and of comparative nearness to neighboring agencies imply the reception of unlike influences, which must necessarily produce unlike changes in the parts dissimilarly acted upon. Nor does this hold true only of the whole; the process must, for the

[1] Page 396.

same reason, repeat itself in each of the subordinate groups of units. Hence another factor is inferred, the multiplication of effects. "Every differentiated unit is not only a seat, but also a cause of further differentiation, since, in growing unlike to other parts, it becomes a centre of unlike reactions on incident forces, and by so adding to the diversity of forces at work, adds to the diversity of effects produced," because each differentiated force must produce, throughout the aggregate, a further series of differentiations. Whilst the two factors just mentioned account for differentiation, segregation is the factor that works the increasing distinctness of parts which accompanies homogeneity. Mixed units or unlike groups of units of which the aggregate consists, if under the influence of a force acting indiscriminately on them all, part from each other and segregate into minor aggregates. Mixed units of the same kind must be moved differently by different forces, and consequently separate from one another. Units of the same kind, if impressed with the same movement, will cluster together in the same place. After such segregation the several groups of unity must of necessity be sharply marked off. The fourth factor is the tendency to equilibrium. Forces, being counteracted, continually divided and subdivided, are at last stopped. Motion then ceases. In all stages and in all cases of evolution there is a progress to equilibrium ever more perfect. First the various motions which an aggregate possesses are separately equilibrated; then, when the aggregate has a movement of its parts with respect to each other that encounters but little resistance, an *equilibrium mobile* is established; and this at last will lapse into complete equilibrium.

That of these four factors each one is deducible from the persistence of force, Mr. Spencer thinks to have shown to evidence. If forces are not destroyed, but always persist in their equivalents, the homogeneous cannot be stable; its parts must be differently acted upon, because either they themselves or the surrounding agencies are different. Forces, if indestructible, must, when differently counteracted and divided, become differentiated causes of ever more different effects. The elements or units diversely moved and modified must separate and reunite according as they have become like or unlike in kind, unless we are to say that the effect produced is not equivalent to the amount of power expended. Lastly, forces encountering and resisting each other, yet not destroyed, will work an arrest of motion in which as in their effect they continue to exist (P. ii. Chapt. xvii.–xxiii).

Evolution, therefore, with all its laws, is inferable from one supreme principle, the persistence of force. But does experience verify it? Is it universal as in theory, so also in fact? Is the history of the universe but a realization of it? Only then its truth is

proved, and the unification of all science is based on a solid foundation. Mr. Spencer, in treating of the several processes and laws of evolution, every time goes through all the realms of nature, to evidence the congruity between theory and experience. It is chiefly in this attempt that the real tendency of his speculation manifests itself. Space does not allow us to follow him into details; we can reproduce his ideas only in their general outlines.

Attraction and repulsion, the two constituents of matter, never destroyed, yet always transformed, differentiated, subdivided, and balanced, are, in his opinion, the only cause of the passage of the universe from the nebulous form into its present state so wonderful in its order and beauty. Organic development is but a highly compound evolution, an organism being a combination of matter under a form embodying an enormous amount of molecular motion (§§ 103, 110). To ever progressing differentiation and distinction of matter is due the division of species and varieties, as well as the growth of a perfect organism consisting of many different and precise parts out of the uniform mass of an ovum (§§ 119, 120, 121, 132, 133). To the differentiation of motion are to be attributed the different, though integrated functions which are performed in any organic system (§ 142). From the instability of the homogeneous and the multiplication of effects by the subdivision of the forces result the perpetual changes of structure and activity, the destruction of an organism by seemingly insignificant causes, the different development of specifically the same germ, the rising of organization out of unorganized seed, the distinction of sexes, the extinction of the existing and the origin of new and higher species, and divergence of the human races (§§ 159, 166). By segregation the various species of plants and brutes are formed and preserved. Life, in general, is a tendency to establish equilibrium between external and internal relations, a moving equilibrium, fitted to preserve itself during a certain period. "Every living body exhibits in a fourfold form the process of equilibration, from moment to moment in the balancing of mechanical forces, from hour to hour in the balancing of functions, from year to year in the changes of state that compensate the changes of condition, and finally in the complete arrest of vital movements at death"[1] (§ 173).

Mental activity is derived from no other laws and forces. "The phenomena," says Mr. Spencer, "subjectively known as changes in consciousness, are objectively known as nervous excitations and discharges, which science now interprets into modes of motion. Hence, in following up organic evolution, the advance of retained

[1] Page 498.

motion in integration, in heterogeneity, and in definiteness, may be expected to show itself alike in the visible nervo-muscular actions and in the correlative mental changes."[1] Consequently, the redistribution of motion, too, accompanying the redistribution of matter, may be supposed to be exhibited in the divers muscular and nervous actions, and in the transformations of the same, the mental changes. In confirmation of all these assertions, he recalls to the mind of the reader how both in man and in *brutes* intelligence is developed by degrees, and how objects are perceived and judgments formed, first confusedly, and only at a later period with clearness and distinction (§ 143). Later on, he ascribes this gradual evolution also to the instability of the heterogeneous. "In every infant might be traced the analogous transformation of a confused aggregate of impressions of surrounding objects, not recognized as differing in their distances, sizes, and shapes, into separate classes of objects unlike each other in these and various other respects. And it might be shown that the change from this first indefinite, incoherent, and comparatively homogeneous consciousness, to a definite, coherent, and heterogeneous one, is due to differences in the actions of incident forces on the organism"[2] (§ 153).

To exemplify the multiplication of effects in intellectual life, Mr. Spencer reminds us how differently one and the self-same exterior object, for instance, an unusual bird, acts on minds differently developed, on that of a shepherd or of a cow-herd, on that of the village bird-stuffer, of a naturalist of the old school, and of a comparative anatomist. The same is observed in emotions. Quite different feelings are produced by the anger of the father in the younger and in the elder child, and in the wife. The difference of the effects is owing to the greater or lesser difference of structure in the respective persons, and the different structures themselves are slowly accumulated results of the functional changes, of thoughts, and of emotions (§ 160). Segregation accounts for the establishment of classifications. Sensations are molecular modifications in some part of the organism. By like things similar groups of impressions and sensations are produced, which are combined and superposed. From unlike things divers groups of forces or impressions pass through the organs, and they must be decomposed, like being separated from unlike. Hence species and genera result, which, as often repeated actions work structural changes, are registered and embodied in the organs. In a similar manner are connections of sequence and co-existence grouped in the mind simultaneously with the impressions. When

[1] Page 391. [2] Page 421.

several phenomena that have been experienced in a given order are repeated in the same order, those nerves which before were affected by the transition are again affected; and such molecular modification as they received from the first motion propagated through them, is increased by this second motion along the same route. Every such motion works a structural alteration, which involves a diminution of the resistance to all such motions that afterwards occur. Meanwhile, phenomena that are recognized as different from these, and hence affect different nervous elements, will have their connections severally represented by motions along other routes, and along each of those other routes the nervous discharges will take place with a readiness proportionate to the frequency with which experience repeats the connection of phenomena. This sorting and grouping together of changes or motions, whilst it gradually forms our nervous structure, is the cause and the measure of the mental connection between impressions (§ 167). The moving equilibrium to be maintained between internal and external relations is the cause of the never stopping flow of thoughts and emotions in the mind, of the alternation of mental activity and rest, of facility or difficulty in thinking, of the rapidity or slowness of feelings, of the oscillation of emotions, of joy and grief, of excitement and paroxysm. On account of the same equilibrium, each outer connection of phenomena which we perceive generates, through accumulated experience, an inner connection of mental states. The result in which the process ends is the formation of a mental connection having a relative strength that answers to the relative constancy of the physical connection represented. Such equilibration between the two orders of relations is ever progressing, and will reach its end only when each relation of things has generated in us a relation of thought, so that on the occurrence of conditions the relation in thought arises as certainly as the relation in things. No doubt, the whole is intended to be a theory on reasoning (§ 174).

In the continual approach to equilibrium between the emotions and the kinds of conduct necessitated by surrounding conditions moral adaptation consists. To render this definition of morality intelligible, and to convince us that moral equilibration is as truly physical as any other, Mr. Spencer thinks it sufficient to point out "that what we know subjectively as states of consciousness are, objectively, modes of force; that so much feeling is the correlate of so much motion; that the performance of any bodily action is the transformation of a certain amount of feeling into its equivalent amount of motion; that this bodily action is met by forces which it is expended in overcoming; and that the necessity for the frequent repetition of this action implies the frequent recurrence

of forces to be so overcome. Hence, the existence in any individual of an emotional stimulus that is in equilibrium with certain external requirements, is literally the habitual production of a certain specialized portion of nervous energy, equivalent in amount to a certain order of external resistances that are habitually met."[1] Morality or perfect moral adaptation is thus the limit towards which evolution carries us; for it is a state "in which the kinds and qualities of mental energy daily generated and transformed into motions are equivalent to, or in equilibrium with, the various orders and degrees of surrounding forces which antagonize such motions." It should, however, not be forgotten, that such a state of perfection is tended to and attained not so much individually, as by the joint action of the whole human race; since the habits acquired, or, rather, the structural changes effected by repeated actions are transmitted from one generation to another together with the organism. In this sense, Mr. Spencer, like many other agnostics, speaks of organic morality, just as above he treated of experience registered in our organs. He concedes to the different religions, though false in their views and irreligious, a necessary influence on the formation of these habits and organic structures, particularly among the lower and less cultivated classes of the people and in earlier stages of civilization, and he finds therein a reason for religious toleration (§ 32).

Nobody will now wonder, if he hears that arts and languages have come into existence and are perfected by the process of integration, differentiation, and distinction (§§ 113, 124, 125, 126, 136, 137), that society in all its classes and functions is the necessary outcome of redistribution of matter and motion according to the physical laws observed in all other realms, that it is a moving equilibrium of forces opposed and under constant oscillation ever more perfectly balanced, until at last complete rest will ensue. In this ideal state the individual will have no desires but those which may be satisfied without exceeding his proper sphere of action, while society maintains no restraints but those which the individual voluntarily respects (§§ 111, 122, 134, 144, 154, 161, 168, 175).

Yet if the process of evolution is going on everywhere, and necessarily ends in equilibrium, "are we not manifestly progressing to a state of universal quiescence, of omnipresent death?" Mr. Spencer, without any hesitation, answers in the affirmative. But death is not the end of all. After evolution comes dissolution. All molar motion having been arrested by equilibrium, and having been converted into molecular motion, the opposite process begins to predominate. When the whole is, when all the parts of

[1] Page 506.

the mass are, reduced to rest, any influence from the environment is sufficient, by causing an excess of motion, to disturb the equilibrium between the molecules. The latter, then, must needs disperse. So dissolution is caused in civil society by the contact with other states or nations; so organisms fall victims to corruption. So, too, at a period beyond the stretch of imagination, the earth will be reduced to a gaseous state, when, in consequence of the resistance of the ether, it will collide with the sun, and intense heat will be produced by the shock. Nay, a time will come when the whole solar system, when all heavenly bodies, will be dissolved, and the entire universe will return to a nebulous form. The molecules will be dispersed as widely as they were before the evolution, owing to the persistence of force and the equivalence of action and reaction. However, from the state of diffusion they will again be condensed as before, and for the same reasons, and go again through the same process of evolution. So the universe undergoes the same changes which are observed in particular bodies; consisting of matter that never came into existence, and will never go out of existence, it is in a perpetual transition from the imperceptible to the perceptible, and from the perceptible to the imperceptible, from evolution to dissolution and vice versa, in a perpetual rhythm of motion and transformation, produced, not by an external, but an immanent, cause, the absolute persistent force, which, different in its modes of manifestation, ever remains the same in quantity, and being at the root of all and intrinsic to all, becomes all that exists (P. II., chapt. xxiii.).

Summing up, at the end, his system, Mr. Spencer gives utterance to the confidence he has in the solidity of this system. The conclusions he drew from the first data he sees irrefragably confirmed by experience. The process of evolution and dissolution was understood to be a necessary consequence of the persistence of force, and nature exhibits it everywhere and always, invariably and according to the same laws. All *a priori* deductions flow from the necessity under which we are of conceiving the unknowable as the ground of the knowable; and, indeed, the reality and the persistence of the unknowable and absolute is manifested by the universal order and succession of all phenomena. Can a demonstration be more convincing? Can ever a more solid unification of knowledge and a more natural reconciliation of religion and science be attained? (P. II., chapt. xxiv.).

After we have heard what conclusion Mr. Spencer draws at last from all his reasonings, and what unity he is confident of having given to philosophy, it is now time for us also to review his theories and pass judgment on their merits. In what, then, does his system result, and by what method is it built up?

IV.

Shall we, considering his doctrine, admire in Mr. Spencer the greatest thinker of the age? Shall we, with so many of his followers, say that by him philosophy and civilization have been marvellously advanced, and the human understanding has been wonderfully developed? Can we agree with those who say that he has led science back to God, or has, at least, begun to reconcile it with religion? Is it true, as was said of late, that he and Mr. F. Harrison embrace each a part of truth, and that both united teach the worship of the God-man, our Saviour? Is his teaching, as the *Christian Spectator*[1] maintained, so profoundly, so intensely, so overwhelmingly religious, nay, so utterly and entirely CHRISTIAN, that its true meaning cannot be seen for its very glory? Let us briefly recapitulate the foregoing statements.

What is the knowable? Nothing but phenomena, impressions, and ideas copied after them. What are reality and existence? Manifestations persistent in consciousness; all we think of as being beyond them is self-contradictory and self-destructive. The world we imagine to see without us consists of sensations within us. There is no matter in which, as in their subject, qualities inhere; matter is posterior to forces, made up of them as of its components; and forces themselves, the ultimate elements reached by experience, are impressions on our touch. The world within us is distinct from that without us, only by its lower degree of vividness since it is the order of faint manifestations reproduced by transformation from the vivid ones in which things seem to be outside us. Both worlds, the outer and the inner, are a mechanical play of attraction and repulsion, a balance kept up between the one and the other, a division and exchange of them. Sensation, the first impression on our organs, is mechanically turned into thought, thought into emotion, and the discharge of this, that is, its conversion into muscular movement, is action and conduct. True and perfect knowledge is correspondence between impressions and ideas, congruity among the relations of vivid and of faint manifestations; morality is equilibrium between emotion and conduct. The normal state of social life is equipoise established between the actions of several individuals, of which each one strives to attain the greatest advantage by the least labor. Nor is there in all that any essential difference between man and brute; intelligence being in one, as well as in the other, both being but a complicated redistribution of matter and motion. The ultimate ground on which all these forces rest, or the ultimate cause from which all these phenomena proceed, is the absolute, the eternal power and energy.

[1] See Appendix, page 589.

But what is the absolute itself? A generalization or abstraction. It is the quantity of force that always remains, though variously transformed and manifested; force, therefore, as it is abstracted from its modes and particular relations; force, which is intrinsic to every energy impressed on our organs, immanent to every concrete existence, and identical with the impressions themselves; it is not a cause separated from its effects, nor a subject distinct from qualities, nor a soul different from thoughts and volitions. The reality of the absolute, too, consists in manifestation.

What name shall we give to a system ending in such a result? It is atheistical, inasmuch as it denies or ignores a personal Deity, a Supreme Being above the material universe and distinct from the same; it is pantheistical, inasmuch as it considers the abstract or universal as the absolute, eternal, and infinite cause or power; it is materialistic, inasmuch as it admits nothing besides material forces, and regards life as an evolution of matter; it is idealistic, inasmuch as in it all existence is manifestation in consciousness, a manifestation which has not an object distinct from itself which it represents, nor a subject or substance in which it inheres, and is, therefore, like Hegel's impersonal thought, identical with being; it is skeptical, inasmuch as, according to it, we can never know what the things or objects are in themselves, and can never grasp the ground or reality that underlies them; it is pessimistic, not unlike Buddhism, inasmuch as the highest degree of evolution it admits is omnipresent death, and inasmuch as the universe is perpetually tending to, and returning from, dissolution. Mr. Spencer's "Synthetic Philosophy" is a pantheon, not of truth, but of falsehood. As once into the temple built by Agrippa in Rome all false divinities were gathered, so in his system all idols of modern thought, all philosophical tenets of unbelief, doubt, and negation are embodied and united. Being of a chameleon-like nature, it does not professedly or exclusively teach the views of any particular modern school, but it contains them all, and glitters in the colors of every one of them.

The ultimate result is of itself an infallible test of the intrinsic value of the Spencerian philosophy. Judging by it, we are necessitated to condemn that system as erroneous and destructive, and are convinced beforehand of the unreality of the basis on which it rests, and the unsoundness of the method by which it is built up. Directly to prove the latter charge, we must restrict ourselves to few remarks, but they will suffice to unmask many a fundamental untruth.

First of all, the relativity of knowledge, the starting-point of Mr. Spencer's speculation, is not only assumed without any solid reason, but is also in open contradiction with his own principles

and method. The only sure and reliable knowledge, as he thinks, is experience. Now, if we consult our consciousness, what do we in reality experience? What do we directly and immediately perceive? Not, indeed, impressions within us, but the objects outside us as they are in themselves, qualities that act on us from without, and are inherent in material subjects. Nay, our own impressions, thoughts, and volitions we perceive as existing in ourselves, that is, in our self or substance, which is not a mere relation, but an absolute reality that stands in itself. And of these objects within us and without us we apprehend the nature and intrinsic constitution. True, we compare things according to their likeness or difference; but we do not rest content with the comparison as such; comparing them, we intend to know their very constituents, the marks which, in part common to all, in part peculiar to each one, are the roots, the intimate sources of their properties. By all means we want to know the real causes and principiants of their actions, of their origin, their growth and extinction. So Mr. Spencer himself reasons throughout his work. Everywhere he is inquiring into cause and nature, everywhere he assigns for effects sufficient reasons and proper agents, trying to give, not an indefinite, but a determinate notice of them. Nor is he unaware of all this. He grants that we are compelled to conceive of the ultimate realities as existing in themselves beyond the phenomena, yet maintains that the objects as thus viewed are delusions in which only peasants and metaphysicians believe. But if this be so, Mr. Spencer adopts a fundamental tenet certainly not upheld, but rather contradicted, by experience. And besides, by such an assertion is not experience itself declared to be false and illusive as to its main and substantial element? Are not our cognitive faculties thus stultified and rendered untrue? Mr. Spencer goes even farther; he positively denies our capacity of knowing an object as it is. For that reason he defines truth as, not conformity of the mind with the object, but congruity between mental states, or correspondence between the two orders of impressions and ideas.[1] Yea, he destroys cognition itself. For what has become of it in his system? Impression, or a faint copy of it, without a real object, which they represent, and without a subject in which they inhere. Mr. Spencer, then, not merely transcending, but rather altogether falsifying experience, begins, like Kant, his speculation with denying the truth of that very faculty of which he is constantly to make use, and with condemning that very method which he is to follow.

Of all the reasons he alleges for the relativity of knowledge, not

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one has any validity. They are nearly all based on a false conception of the infinite, which he supposes to consist of numberless finite parts, and on the confusion of incomprehensibility and inconceivability, as if anything which we cannot thoroughly and in every regard understand and explain were altogether *unthinkable* and self-contradictory; a confusion, indeed, which would disgrace even a beginner in philosophy. If from his definition of life he infers that all *thinking is relationing*, he simply moves in a vicious circle; for that life is, as he imagines, but an adjustment of the interior to the exterior relations, is just as questionable as the relativity of knowledge itself.

What shall we think of his first and supreme principle, out of which, in the ontological order, the whole universe is developed, from which, in the logical order, he deduces all conclusions by demonstration *a priori*, and to which he reduces all experience, all phenomena by induction? We have here touched the very soul of his theory. Nothing can be weaker, nothing more self-destructive than this ultimate foundation of synthetic philosophy. Considered in the ontological order, the first principle, which was shown to be the persistence of force, is the first cause of all existence by evolution. And yet Mr. Spencer cannot say whether it exists or not. For if it exists objectively, it is either self-existent or produced. It cannot be self-existent, for self-existence is, in his opinion, a self-contradiction; nor can it be produced, for then it would not be the first cause. Again, this absolute force or energy is altogether formless and indeterminate, a mere abstraction. Nevertheless, it develops from itself all forms, and manifests itself in all possible modes and shapes. It is, therefore, at once no determinate reality, and all reality whatever. Furthermore, this persistent force, being the generalization of all forces, is not really distinct from them, and is, consequently, as forces are but impressions, only impression in general, without any determinate mode. It is not the cause of impressions distinct from them and existent in itself, for such a transient cause is an abomination to Mr. Spencer; nor is it the subject in which impressions exist, for it is ultimate and prior to matter. Impression, then, vague and indeterminate, without a cause from which it is, without a subject in which it is, impression which is neither self-existent nor produced, is the ultimate principiant, the ultimate sufficient reason of all. We challenge any one to show a more startling self-contradiction uttered by any other philosopher. Such a chimera Mr. Spencer would like to be put in place of a personal self-existent, infinitely wise and perfect God, in whom he cannot see anything but absurdity; with such speculation he thinks to supplant theistic or Christian

philosophy, at which he sneers on every occasion with sovereign contempt.

No better does he fare with his first principle in the logical order, where he is to unify by it all knowledge, by deducing from it, and retracing to it, all our cognitions. From the very outset Mr. Spencer constantly repeats that the absolute is unknowable, and he is in the highest degree scandalized at the impious piety of those who dare predicate of it any determinate attribute. He even adds that the manifestations also of the absolute, at least the primary ones, are unfathomable mysteries. His entire "Synthetic Philosophy" is, therefore, a deduction of the knowable from the unknowable, and a reduction of the knowable to the unknowable. Ancient philosophy proceeded by the opposite way; it deduced the unknown from the known, and illustrated that which was not clear by that which was self-evident. And in that, no doubt, it harmonized with common sense, which will never understand how darkness may illume light. Yet, be it as it may, we must confess, and therein we agree with many of his critics,[1] that Mr. Spencer has carried out his plan. His entire synthesis is indeed a deduction of laws and phenomena, which we know very well by experience, from reasons which prove absolutely nothing, and a tracing back of well-known facts to principles which render them absolutely unintelligible. He begins with the absolute persistent force, the existence of which cannot be definitely conceived, and is only postulated by our organs, the living records of experience. Being without form, it manifests itself under two forms, that of attraction and that of repulsion. How these originate, Mr. Spencer cannot tell us; he but knows that they are postulates of our senses or our constitution. Nor can he say of what intensity they are, how far extended their existence is, and how they come to be combined; for force is itself inscrutable. This alone he knows, that they must be eternal and indestructible; for else we had not even the material or the terms necessary to think; and that they cannot annihilate each other, because else the absolute would not be persistent. From these two relative forces, attraction and repulsion, everything is to be understood. Hence the division of the outer and the inner world, of nature and mind, all laws of physics, of chemistry, of astronomy, of life, of morality, are to be derived. Hence results the formation of the universe; hence all the changes that ever have taken place or will take place in the whole sidereal system; hence arts, sciences, languages, political institutions; hence follow the regularity and constancy of the mundane order, the beauty, harmony, variety, and unity of nature. In a word, attraction and

[1] See the excellent criticism on the Spencerian Philosophy in the *Edinburgh Review*, January, 1884.

repulsion, of which we do not know anything at all but that they impress themselves on our sense of touch, have effected everything and account for all. This is in brief Mr. Spencer's demonstration *a priori*, as lucid and orderly as the nebulous mass out of which, in his opinion, the universe rose by itself into its present condition.

It might be expected that at least his *a posteriori* proof, his inductions, would be more solid and convincing. But in vain are such hopes entertained. Not one law, whether physical, mechanical, or chemical, has he legitimately inferred. That the universe was brought into its present shape according to his theory, he imagines to have sufficiently proved *a posteriori* by the mere possibility he can conceive that it was so. For the particular processes and laws implied in evolution as taught by him he alleges a few examples, and then at once leaps to the conclusion that they are in existence absolutely everywhere, and always, in times past, present, and future. He stands in no need of mathematical proofs, he is not embarrassed by intricate calculations; the first and most superficial observation is sufficient for him. That sometimes instances of the opposite kind could be put forth matters not. And still Mr. Spencer admits no universal notions that have objective validity, no self-evident *a priori* principles, by means of which he might from many and various instances infer a general law. By right, therefore, in order to attain a certain and unquestionable conclusion of universal truth, he is bound to make a careful inquisition into all individual cases; a task which no scientist can ever perform, and which he least of all has attempted to perform.

And what are the general laws to which he even so ascends? Do they explain the phenomena? Are they, perhaps, mathematical formulæ? or physical axioms, exact and well defined? Not in the least. They are vague, scarcely, if at all, intelligible, or truisms mystified by extravagantly abstract language.

Most offensive, however, is the manner in which he disposes of the gravest subjects that concern mankind, of life, mind, religion, morality, society. Who would not expect that Mr. Spencer, here at least, would carefully examine facts? That he does not will be at once evident. He lays it down as an axiom, that the element common to all religions must be true, and then goes on to say that the awe of the unknowable and mysterious is that which they all have in common. But soon after, when speaking of the reconciliation between science and religion, he very gravely remarks that all religions have become irreligious by endeavoring to render the unknowable known. Ought he, then, relying on experience, not to have inferred that the element common to all of them is the tendency to know the Supreme Being? This is in reality the

truth. Except him and his admirers, no one is willing to worship an absolutely unknowable being; men become religious in proportion as they progress in the definite and certain knowledge of a personal, infinitely wise, good, and perfect Deity. By such superficial reasoning, Mr. Spencer would like to overturn religion based on a solid and enlightened conviction,—a principle so important for the welfare of man, and productive of so much in the course of history,—and to replace it by the blind and inactive awe of an abstraction, or rather, to speak plainly, of an absurdity. Is such a religion not a hundred times worse and more irrational than any idolatry or fetichism ever practiced?

As to life, it is to Mr. Spencer *a priori* evident, though he elsewhere rejects any evidence *a priori*, that there are no spiritual beings. Life, in general, is for him but a play of attraction and repulsion, a tendency to equilibrium between the two orders of external and internal relations. Does this definition hold, at least of organic living beings? Of course, when there are material forces at work, some equilibrium must be established. But is this the essence, the distinctive characteristic of life? Equilibrium exists also in inorganic bodies, between their molecules, between their masses and their environments, and one that is much more perfect and more stable than that of organic bodies. If, therefore, the tendency of a being to keep itself in balance with the surroundings constitutes life, the bodies that are termed lifeless have life in a much higher degree than those which are considered as living. Does Mr. Spencer see no essential difference between a tube containing heated gas, in which, too, there is much retained heat, and man, between an artificial mechanism and himself? Is it not worth while for him to inquire whether, besides equilibration, there is any other activity, any other active principle in living beings? Whether they are governed by peculiar laws or not? Whence is that unity in them that strikes so forcibly every observer, that apparent design with which they work and develop themselves? It is not apparent. Living and not living beings have something in common, and, therefore, he concludes, they are all the same, notwithstanding all the discoveries of physiology, notwithstanding the mysteriousness of vital processes acknowledged by all scientists. He might have reasoned with the same right: A stone is heavy, and a watch is heavy; therefore they are one and the self-same thing.

The human mind, inventive of all arts, thirsty of truth and knowledge, uniting in its ideas the past, the present, and the future, and searching, with incessant activity, into the ground and foundation of all, extending far beyond experience to the eternal and necessary, satisfied only with the infinite, is but a complication of attractive and repulsive forces. The rational will, with its inborn

tendency to good, to unlimited good, free, generous, apt to sacrifice all self-interest for a higher end, aspiring to the highest perfection, is material emotion conformable to mechanical laws. For Mr. Spencer has observed that external or vivid impressions are followed by faint ones, and that these latter produce emotions, and emotions again muscular exertions. He has further seen that in the activity of mind and will there is some analysis and division of the objects thought of, some segregation of dissimilar conceptions and grouping together of similar ones, some connection between ideas and affections; hence, upon the whole, some slight resemblance to chemical and physical processes. No other reason does the greatest thinker of the age adduce for the identity of spirit and matter. Of freedom or power of choice he does not seem to know anything; it does not enter at all into his accounts. If morality is but equilibrium between feeling and conduct, as necessitated by the exterior circumstances, the holy, the charitable, the just, the merciful, the temperate man is a well-balanced mechanism; he that is unjust, lustful, intemperate, is a mechanism deranged owing to some complication; the order of the one as well as the disorder of the other being the consequence, not of any free action, but of a mere combination of forces and motions commenced already in our ancestors. The only difference will be that the moral mechanism will run smoothly, the immoral one like a rusty engine with many painful disturbances; yet both will alike, after a certain period of time, reach the same end, dissolution. This view of morality Mr. Spencer does not think necessary to support by any reasons; it follows, evidently, from his theory on the human mind. The same or similar reasons he puts forth when he says that the course of human history, of states, of nations, cultivated under the influence of science and Christianity, is a moving equilibrium, the constituent parts of which are set in motion along the line of the greatest attraction or least resistance.

Nobody, he tells us at last, ought to feel offended by these speculations, and think human nature to be lowered. Such sensitiveness is based on the underrating of matter, an error no less injurious to the Creator than the undervaluing of the spirit. His system is not a degradation of the so-called higher, but an elevation of the so-called lower. To console us fully, he adds that the controversy between the materialist and the spiritualist is a mere war of words, in which the disputants are equally absurd.[1]

Not to mention how destructive of the social and moral order such ideas must be, particularly if instilled into the mind of youth, we simply ask: Is this method of inquiry solid? Is it in keep-

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ing with the importance of the questions discussed? Is it worthy of a philosopher? Does it justify, or even in the least excuse, the utmost contempt shown by agnosticism towards the philosophy of former ages, towards theism and Christianity?

What final issue may we expect, and what mental development may be attained, if Spencer is to become the highest authority in philosophy, from which it is not allowed to appeal, and if, as the American editor says in the preface, among the young men of our country he is to find the largest and the fittest audience? Certainly the gravest fears should awake in any thinking mind and in any friend of youth, were the remark true which the same preface adds, that "there is something in the bold handling of his questions, and in the earnest and fearless appeal to first principles, and in the practical availability of his conclusions, which is eminently suited to the genius of our people."

When Mr. Spencer's synthetic philosophy is recommended in such terms, when the ideas developed in it begin to spread in all directions, and to pervade a great many literary productions, it is time to lay open not only its impiety, but also its absurdity.

MODERN USES OF WEALTH.

SOME men are born to wealth, some men "come into" wealth, and some men make wealth for themselves. How a man may use his wealth will depend, not a little, on the ideas he imbibed in early youth. It will depend on his family traditions. It will depend on his surroundings and friends. It will depend on the needs of his relations. It will depend on the accident of any particular sympathy being awakened by this or that cause. Yet over and above all such influences there will be one supreme autocrat, and that will be the natural temperament. Let us say that there are three things which mould a man: his temperament, education, and circumstances. His education may be varied from his fifth to his twentieth year; his circumstances may be varied through seventy years; but his temperament will not be varied, save only in degree; it will never be varied in kind. And therefore it is that in considering the question: "How will this rich man use his riches?" the answer must be looked for in his natural temperament, far more than in his education or circumstances. There are men in whom temperament is so marked that nothing which is external much affects them. Thus the intensely generous man will remain the intensely generous man, though he be crushed by hard poverty or even want; and the intensely mean man will remain the intensely mean, though he might put the Bank of England into his pockets. In the same way, there are prudent men whose prudence is so superlative that it is lord and master of all their graces of character; while there are other men who are so reckless that the "hospital for incurables" would be the best home for themselves and their fortunes. It may be replied that such examples are extreme. Yet, who will not admit that what is born in the nature is lord paramount through life over habit?

Obviously, the way a man *spends* his wealth must depend very largely on how he *got* it. Perhaps we may hazard these three *principia:* "traditions" will govern the man who was born to wealth; thought-out principles will govern the man who has made his wealth; and temptations will govern the man who has come into wealth. Yet such assertions are necessarily too general; they contain truth, but they are far from being all truth. Sometimes a man who was born to wealth will strike out new grooves of expenditure; sometimes a man who has made his wealth can never make up his mind how to spend it; and sometimes a man who has come into wealth will resist all temptations, and live rigidly. Yet

no matter *how* a man may spend his wealth, his "temperament," as we have said, will be his master. It will also be *felt* by all who know him. A man's temperament colors all that he does. His principles may direct him as to grooves, but his temperament makes him disliked or liked. We put disliked before liked, because rich men, as a rule, are personally, because socially, disliked. They are courted, from vanity or from interest, but the homage they receive is not personal. It is to their bankers that the world raises its hat. The same truth holds good in regard to noblemen. They are not liked by the general public, they are wondered at. It is the exception when a big man is liked. And the reason is, that temperament is what is liked in those we know; and the temperament of grandees is but little felt. Yet so wonderful is this influence of the temperament, that even as to the mighty few whom we know but by repute, or with whom we have superficial relations, we are conscious of attributing to them a "type." We do not know, but we strongly suspect, their "type." "I do not think he is a sort of man who would do that," is not said in regard to a man's principles, but in regard to his dispositions or bent. This bent may be roundly called "temperament." And just as it colors a man's actions all through life, so does it color our sense of them. Since we are attributing vast importance to this temperament—call it bent, call it type, or what you will—it will be instructive to view it closely in its twofold operation of influencing a rich man and his "circle." Every man has a circle, no matter what his caste, from the king down to the meanest of his subjects. But the circle of a rich man has a necessarily big circumference, unless he be a miser or a recluse. Now the temperament of a rich man will make every inch of his circle to respond more or less to his own pulses. His virtues, if he have any, will live all round it; and his vices, if he have any, will be felt everywhere. And this is a fact of grave importance. "The modern uses of wealth" are not ordinarily taken to include the pulsations of a man's character all over his sphere. That they do include them, and must include them, is that fact of primary moment which it may be useful to consider for all our sakes.

As to religion,—or its influences,—we will speak by and by; but for the present we will say only this much: Religion will, no doubt, have a good deal to do with the uses or misuses of wealth, but even religion will not much affect the "temperament." There are some severely religious men whose temperaments are most offensive, and most detractive from all the good which they try to do. And there are some few religious men, who, by the charm of their temperament, double all the good they do, and even sanctify it. Let us speak of that wonderful word "gentleman."

How many rich men are gentlemen? How many big men are gentlemen? Most rich men are educated, and have the veneer of politeness—the aspect of conventional good breeding. But a man is like a horse, in the sense that his "points" are born in him, and cannot be altered. You may as well try to make an aquiline nose a Roman nose as to make a man who is born vulgar become refined. You may veneer him, but you cannot get at his bones. A man is what he is and no more. Instinct is somehow germed by nature's will. It matters not one pin whether a man is born a duke, or born to the counter of a ham and beef shop; his mother instinct will be as impregnable to change as will the color of his eyes or his hair. Religion, if rightly learned, may direct him; and infused graces may soften his character; yet the man will remain the man in all the toilet of his nature, just as the flower remains the flower in all its tints and its perfume, or the sea remains deep, the puddle shallow. What then, it may be objected, is the use of treating of temperament, if we take away the owner's power of improving it? Nothing of the kind has yet been hazarded.

A man is necessarily a hot-house plant. He is not a wild weed on the prairies. He is subjected to certain atmospheres, from his cradle to his grave—the social, the religious, the domestic. His gardeners dig him, train him, and lop his twigs. It is in the hot-house of social career that he must live. And therefore, though he will never change his nature, it is perfectly marvellous if, in contact with a thousand thoughts, he does not modify a good many of his ideas. Yet a rich man, as a rule, has two difficulties to contend with in the endeavor to rise to the highest standard. He has the difficulty of living always artificially, and the difficulty of a comparative ignorance of worlds of care. The first difficulty makes him, personally, unreal. He adopts principles which are simply grooved in his own surroundings. And his second difficulty—his comparative ignorance of worlds of care—makes him, judicially, quite incompetent to feel with others.

In the word "sympathy" lie a thousand delicate secrets of the influence of every heart on every other heart, and of the influence of the rich classes on the poor classes. Sympathy is the very soul of a fine temperament. What is sympathy? Some persons speak of sympathy as if it were the giving of a bun to a person who is obviously in want of a bun; and it is certain that to do this is sound, practical sympathy, and entitles the bun-giver to our esteem. Some persons speak of sympathy as if it were a sensible realization of the extreme unpleasantness of the misfortunes of others; so that when they hear of such misfortunes, they heave a deep sigh, and try to look as though they were themselves suffering pain. Some persons fancy that sympathy must be demonstrative;

as when a man spouts benevolently on a platform, or "throws open his suite of rooms" to public philanthropists, or advertises a big cheque for some good purpose, or writes letters to the newspapers to plead a cause, or gets up a benefit concert for a fallen artist—or as in a thousand other ways of doing kindnesses. Nor can any one dispute that all such practical sympathies are measurably truthful and admirable. The defect in them all is—that they cost us nothing. The doers have their reward in cash homage. The sympathy, so far as it goes, brings honor to the sympathizer at least as great as is the benefit to the recipient. So that, just as "civility is the desire of being esteemed," such sympathy may be the desire of being praised. Shall we say that sympathy's merit is in the suppression of our own selves for the exaltation of the heart of those we benefit? Such suppression may be too delicate to be defined. Yet the absence of it is sufficiently sensible to be assured. Let us confess at once that the most exquisite of all pleasures—to the man of real refinement and generosity—is the constant giving of happiness to those who suffer, no matter in what groove, from what cause. If this be so, where is the merit of being sympathetic? Obviously in the suppression of the *egomet*. And how should we be sure of this suppression? It may be said of it that its true test, on the part of the sympathizer, is that he feels only the privilege of doing a service; while, on the part of the benefited one, he is treated with such grace that he does not feel himself to be humbled in the least. The highest test of a gentleman is, that he can confer a benefit in such a manner as to imply that he himself is the honored one. But what an instinct a man must have to do this; what a modesty and refinement of the temperament! You could never *teach* such an instinct to any person. You could never put into a man what is not there. You may train, you may direct, you may infuse, you may pitch precepts by the bundle into a man's head, but if nature has not made a man "an exquisite," Eton, Oxford, and a dukedom cannot do so.

Now relatively to our subject, "the modern uses of wealth," these uses depend, first, on the natural instinct; and since it is certain that most men misuse their wealth, or use it mainly for spasmodical gratification, it follows that most men's instincts guide them wrongly, or that they do not care a pin on the subject.

The uses of wealth must *begin* with the possessor; but, the beginning, like a river's source, may be a trickling, and the issue, twenty miles down, a roar. We may stride a river, without effort, in particular inches of its course, which river, in some reaches, is miles across. So, the uses of a man's wealth, most modest in their beginning, may grow into national benefit—long after. That

such results must depend chiefly on the "uses," as distinct from the mind or temper of the users, it would be totally impossible to deny. Of such "uses" we will speak as we go on: for the moment, let us linger on the "mind and temper"—yet only so as to sum up what has been said. Our argument is, that the spirit of a rich man, his own character or features of disposition, will be impressed on every one of his good works. It may be easier to trace this in private kindnesses than in the magnificent outlay of public deeds; yet no man can separate himself from his public deeds in such way as not to impress himself upon them. The impress of the founder will last forever. In the delicacy of the forethought, or in the roughness of the outline, as in the general scope or mental grasp of the plan, there will be a certain felt perfectness, or a certain felt want of it, which will elevate or which will lower the *in memoriam*. So that a rich man will teach perpetually by his own temperament. Not only the good thing which he does, but the "soul" with which he does it, will last as long as his memorial shall last. Just as a shilling given to a beggar may be given in such a way as to create an impression which shall never fade through his whole lifetime, so "endowed charities" may be made to teach lessons of tender grace, which shall be eloquent from generation to generation.

A rich man may make a choice between two grooves of outlay: the groove in which, bestowing his wealth, he ceases to interfere with its use, and the groove in which the management of his investment remains with himself all his days. We would consider *all* uses with reference to a man's relations to his own "circle," to society, and to the poor. As to a man's uses of wealth for his own personal enjoyment, the subject is not worthy of consideration. And yet, since *most* men who are wealthy think first of their own enjoyment,—or of their own "position" or grandeeism, which is the same thing,—it would be unreal to ignore what the whole world knows for certain—that wealth *makes* a man egotistic. It also has a tendency to make men lazy. We will assume that a man is his own master, or can spend his money in any way most agreeable to him. Will he cherish "sublime ideas and aspirations," or will he cherish what he likes best or values most? If his natural temperament dispose him to a career of pleasure, will he take up with travelling or horseracing, or will he devote himself assiduously to laziness? For, laziness, if pursued as a career, may take all a man's thought, all his time; and, even if it be pursued only as one grand object of life, it may make demands on health, strength, and even brains. Indeed, laziness is a profession of such magnitude, among a section of the children of fortune, that it is probable that more time is spent over it than would suffice to

build cities or conquer kingdoms. It is an approved, high vocation of some cultured classes. "He is a man of independence" means, relatively to a certain type, "he has no motive for working and he does not work." It is true that this "fashion" of wealthy indolence is, happily, passing away from good society; so that it is now thought bad form for a man to "do nothing"—to rise at ten, and then not rise any more. Laziness is now more formulated than it used to be, say, in the days of our grandfathers or great-grandfathers. It is pursued more artistically, with more method. Shall we say that there are three kinds of laziness,—that is, with a certain class of rich men,—that of the mind, which refuses to take the trouble to consider what are the best ways of spending money; that of the heart, which is too dull in its affections to care for the pains or the wants of other people; and a sort of physical laziness, which will not carry out the promptings of head and heart when in their sunniest mood? To this laziness is due the fact that many rich men spend their money as they smoke a cigar, step into a brougham, or sip claret. The grand object is to avoid everything that might "bore" one. Just as some rich men keep a secretary to write their letters for them, because they would be saved the trouble of personal relations with mere nobodies, so most rich men would be saved the trouble of thinking out anything, working out anything —unless it be the plans for a new house or a county ball. This disposition leads most rich men to prefer using their money-margins in such way as shall bring themselves least fatigue. And, happily, there are the most exquisite ways of doing this. What can be more beautiful, more enviable, than the power of giving a cheque to a public hospital? As we pass by the doors of those glorious institutions, do we feel most with the sufferers who are tended so tenderly, or do we long most to cart bank-notes into the treasury? And so of other institutions, less touching in their tenderness, but admirably designed and worked up; such, for example, as orphanges or refuges, or even workingmen's reading-rooms or concert-halls, or industrial schools, thrift societies, friendly societies; the rich man who devotes his margins to multiplying such blessings has a happy and an enviable vocation. Nor is it possible not to approve the wisdom of those who devote themselves to any of the grooves of real philanthropy; such as emigration, or the spread of temperance, or the lessening of labor-hours, or the enjoyment of the best art galleries by the humblest classes. It is a grand thing even to draw a cheque for any such purpose. Sitting in a cozy library, and ringing the bell for the butler, who may be intrusted with the lazy dignity of posting a cheque, is a happy task, after breakfast, for the rich man—and for the butler—and one that not a few of us would like to realize. It is more than

a happy task, it is a grand duty. It may not make any demand on the inventive powers; but there is no need to invent what is invented. To build a church, to build a market-place, to build a drinking fountain, are right things, deserving thanks, if not homage. A rich man who has got so far as to contribute largely to "the public good," is a "capital fellow," and deserves to be toasted at public dinners.

It must be remembered that there are two distinct classes of rich men,—the landed proprietors and the mere magnates of finance,—and that the duties of the two classes are quite distinct. Even the social position of the two classes is not identical. It is true that, in these days, money *is* position; it is worshipped more than is rank or official dignity. But money does not create those fixed spheres of social duties which are inalienable from landed proprietorship. In England, more perhaps than in any other country, these exceptional duties are exacting. The landed proprietor is compelled by his position to "keep up" every bit of property on his estate, whether it be the church, schools, parsonage-house, model farms, or the peasants' cottages, private roadways, gates or palings. So that most of the income from any estate must be returned to it. Then the landed proprietor, having a position in his county, is appealed to in every need of a public kind; the neighboring towns and nestling hamlets naturally looking to him for subscriptions, as well as for indirect, expensive aid. Add to such public demands all his private obligations, with the possibility that he is an M. P., or wishes to be one; that he is at the least a politician and leader of men; and it must be owned that, with a class of property which pays but two or three per cent.—three per cent. is very good interest for land—the landed proprietor has his expenditure "cut out" for him. It is true that a landed proprietor may have many sources of income besides farms, tenements, preserves, cattle, timber; but so far as land is concerned, he is a poor man. Possibly in many instances this is his own fault. He might farm his land to better account. And here we touch on a very delicate subject, and one which in England is of growing moment. Setting aside the rubbish talked by "social democrats" about "landed property being theft," or "all landowners being public robbers," it must be admitted that there are huge wastes of pleasure land, or land not even devoted to pleasure. This is not the place to enter into even an analysis of the arguments pro and con large estates. It is only relevant to observe that, in the event of a revolution, such arguments would come to the very forefront. It was the fashion before the great French Revolution to mock the popular sophistries about land; and Rousseau was much derided in the Paris drawing-rooms and in gay writings for his mild esti-

mate of what socialism *might* demand. His *contrat social* offended the landowners. True, the French landowners were mostly tyrants, who bled their tenants through the middle-men or speculators; whereas in England there is scarcely a tyrant among the landholders, though there are a good many selfish men or men of pleasure. The chief misuse of land, from a public-benefit point of view, is that landowners love it for pomp, not for service; preferring to increase their social dignity by countless acres of waste pleasure ground to benefiting themselves or their poor neighbors.

Yet in doing this they stand only on their rights. And so does the moneyed man stand only on his rights when he gives banquets night after night to rich people, who would be all the better for going without their dinners once a week; or spends a thousand guineas on ropes of pearls for a young lady who has got so many ornaments that her cabinets can scarcely hold them; or buys more carriages for his wife and daughters to loll their souls in, though they would be all the better for being made to walk or hoe the garden; or gives a cheque, that sounds like a thunder-clap, for some old china, while refusing the price of an earthenware teapot to a beggar. Who doubts that all such magnates are within their rights? or who doubts that when a man rents an opera-box, for which he pays perhaps the price of a good house, he is encouraging fine art, supporting elegant industry, besides helping the gas companies and the stage carpenters? or who doubts that if a man gives ten guineas for a bouquet, though its beauty is meant to charm only for one evening, he is encouraging the florists, paying the wages of honest gardeners, supporting many an early rising family? or who doubts that many a trade interest is advanced by selfish luxury; that the carriage builders live on laziness and on pomp; that the crest-painters, panelling carriages with pretty heraldry, earn an honest as well as a charmingly made livelihood; that countless milliners—no, we will not even allude to the ladies; that ten thousand journeymen live honorably by making trinkets, though perhaps the jewellers cannot boast much of their honorableness; that glovers thrive by making pretty gloves, and that the more gloves a dandy wears the more they thrive; that cigars —most sweet effacement of troubled hours—bring as much money to the tills of a thousand tobacconists as they bring smoke and easy chat to a thousand coteries, and are a positive "necessity" to the happy slaves who have learned their charms; that good wine and bad wine—but especially bad wine—are a source of revenue to both wine merchants and the exchequer; the "duty" which is paid on them helping the State to remit taxes, and the "duty" which *we* pay on them poisoning our system; but still both "duties" being compensated by the obvious gain of the wine mer-

chants, as well as by a certain winging of our own temperaments; that lordly mansions, big enough for half a parish, bring grist to architects, builders, painters, and upholsterers; in short, that all luxuries deserve the patronage of the philanthropist, on the ground that they are sources of profit to the working classes? Most exquisitely subtle dilemma of a rich man's conscience: "ought a rich man to be luxurious—to support trade?" The pagan Romans were not such hypocrites as to affirm this; they simply said "carpe diem," and lived sumptuously. Our modernists are Christian apologists for their own paganism. "Be luxurious on the ground of active charity, and self-indulgent that you may support the working classes," is the profound Christian philosophy of many an egotist. Yet that there are legitimate uses of luxuries, and that some luxuries ought to be patronized, is a principle which no moralist can dispute. Nor is any mind sufficiently acute, or analytical, or comprehensive, to say precisely what those luxuries *are;* or in what proportion they should be relatively cultivated. It is safe to say of *some* luxuries that they should be shunned; but it is difficult to say of *most* luxuries that they are evil. Such luxuries as are implied by gluttony and extravagance are mostly luxuries in degree, not in kind. To give a dinner party implies luxuries, at least abundance; yet hospitality has been always regarded as a virtue. To dress well is a natural instinct of a gentleman, but to have a new suit once a week would be disgraceful. It is the degree which makes the luxury or the—moderation. Juvenal's description of the entertainments of pagan Rome shows that luxury, not only in degree but in kind, had attained to the proportions of crime. Science and art, thought and labor, were lavished on the invention of whatever could be titillating to the senses, or effeminately deteriorating to the manhood. This was crime, both in kind and degree. Shall we compare our modern dinners—full dress, at a quarter to nine—with the pagan suppers mocked by Juvenal or by Terence? In some details we surpass our pagan ancestors. A few weeks ago a poor Londoner—in fact a man of such nobodiness that he was said occasionally to "dine off fried fish and potatoes"—slipped on a crimson carpet that had been laid down across a pavement, for the tender care of dress boots and ladies' shoes. He was hideously injured by the fall. A grand gentleman in Grosvenor Square was giving a banquet, and he expected "the public" to "clear off" from the public pavement. The poor gentleman, who was injured for life by his fall, brought an action to recover damages from the banquet-giver. The *Times* newspaper sneered at the poor position of the plaintiff, though happily the Lord Chief Justice approved the "damages." Here we have civilization carried to a degree of selfish tenderness

which has not a little in it of the spirit of Roman effeminacy. With some slight modification we might apply Juvenal's ridicule:

> "Who, proud of impious gains,
> Choke up the streets, too narrow for their trains."

Nor is there much difference between Juvenal's description of the Roman "supper" and the supper which we prefer to call "dinner." Even the dishes which he speaks of are our own. The chief difference between the two fashions is that our guests sit at table, whereas the chief guests used to recline at Roman banquets. Then, too, gambling was the fashion after the Roman supper. We also have adopted card-playing as an institution. Is it not in Juvenal we read:

> "Is it simple madness, I would know,
> To venture costly thousands on a throw;
> Yet want the soul a single piece to spare,
> To clothe the slave, that shivering stands and bare?"

There is not much to choose between the epochs.

It has been gravely urged by a modern apologist, that "no luxury which is productive, that is, that helps to support a class of workmen, can be mischievous to the community that encourages it." Such a theory is, to say the least of it, superficial. We could name luxuries which support workmen, but which are hateful. We must be safe in affirming the principle that the excessive indulgence in any luxury must have a deteriorating effect on the individual; and what deteriorates the individual must deteriorate the community, in the proportion of the number which indulges in it. The luxuriousness of our rich classes deteriorates those (whole) classes, in making them selfish, cold-hearted, and worldly. Riches are deteriorating, unless a man have a strong character, a fine heart, or some active religious principle. Selfishness and vulgarity being one and the same thing, and most rich persons being intensely selfish in their use of wealth, it follows that most rich persons are intensely vulgar; whereas poor persons, as a rule, are refined.

Assuming that wealth, like capacity, or muscular power, or like any rare gift of head or heart, is a "talent" not to be "laid up in a napkin," we may well pity its possessors in their terrible responsibility, which, however, it must be said that they feel lightly. The number of wealthy men who lie awake half the night in fear of having misused "that thousand pounds," or whose consciences are disturbed, even in the day-time, lest they should have given pain where they might have given infinite solace, is not a large proportion of the plutocracy. And this leads us to consider the

question: How far does religious principle,—nay, good principle which does not affect to be religious,—influence the majority of golden men? It is a difficult question, because one that cannot be answered; yet we may "diagnose" the symptoms of this sensibility, and ask what would appearances indicate?

When a man boasts of "doing everything by principle," we may put him down as "a man who has no soul." It goes without saying that a man should be principled; but intuition is far above principle. As a matter of principle, if you owe a man five shillings, and have no hope of paying him more than four, you are not justified in giving away one shilling. As a matter of intuition, if you see a man in great need, and give him one shilling out of the four you should give to the other man (we must assume that the man you owe the money to is quite above the bitter need of the one shilling), you act as an angel, and bless your own soul and the poor man's soul, and leave it to God to make it up to the comfortable man. We call this intuition, not principle; it is the divine touch we have, most of us, on our natures. Let the materialists say what they may, there is an instinct of the pure intellect which is divine. It would be out of place in this kind of essay to even touch on moral theology, or to speak about the "spiritual" man. Let laymen keep to their measure, which is to write as men of the world who know the Christian catechisms and read everything.

Now our rich friends, who "do everything by principle,"—taking care to construct their principles to their own taste,—are usually men who are full of platitudes or trite sayings, which are as false as they are pretentiously sagacious. For example, it is very common to hear a rich man make the remark: "There is much harm done by giving to the undeserving." Very possibly. We could imagine that a man who pretends to be maimed or sickly, or who has a preference for a leisurely life to an industrious one, would not be benefited, morally or financially, by having a sovereign given to him every time he wanted it. In the same way we could imagine—if we may take the side of the "undeserving," and act as counsel for the prisoner at the bar—that many a rich man *would be* benefited, morally and in every other sense, by being compelled once a week to go dinnerless. As counsel for the defendant—that prejudged wretch, the undeserving—we retort that his accusers are, as a rule, *less* deserving that even the habitually lazy pauper or the sometimes lazy. The poor man has not magnificent opportunities. He has no independence—scarcely a dependence. He does not know the taste of the rich man's luxuries; probably he knows the names of but a few of them; and as to a banker—he may have several, but they are pawnbrokers. Now, as counsel for the undeserving, we urge that it is not usual to refuse the invita-

tions of a rich man to his banquets on the ground that "the rich man is undeserving." "Mr. de Consols does not deserve his vast income, and therefore I really cannot dine with him," is not a protest we often hear in Vanity Fair. Yet it is obvious that if the rich man is to argue with any consistency, that it is wrong to help a poor man who is undeserving, it must be equally wrong to give dinners, or to eat dinners, which are paid for by money that is not deserved. If all our interchanges, for our own good or for others', were to be done solely on the ground of personal merit, we should be obliged to refuse many a "my lording," many a hat-lifting, which accident, not desert, renders customary. How many rich men "deserve" their riches? How many dukes "deserve" their dukedoms? You say: "We ought not to give that mendicant a shilling, because he will spend the whole of it on whiskey, or because, by whiskey, he has come to feel the need of it." As counsel for defendant we admit the whiskey; but we ask: Does not the plaintiff drink Lafitte? And since you, my Lord Broadacres, live comfortably every day, without the excuse of seeking oblivion of your biting cares, would it not be in better taste,—and would it not show a bigger mind,—were you to take account of the incitements to a poor man's folly? You have plenty,—perhaps by the accident of your birth, perhaps by speculation, perhaps by "cuteness,"—yet you do not make the best use of your plenty, nor do you deny yourself "the pomps and vanities of this wicked world." Ought you not then to speak modestly of the "undeservingness" of a class of men who may have their faults,—just as you have,—but who have not your means; or who, if they had your means, might use them better? You are very discriminating as to the vices of the poorer classes; but is it not in Phædrus that we read such lines as these:

> "Great Jove, in his paternal care,
> Has given a man two bags to bear;
> That which his own pet vice contains
> Behind his back, unseen, remains;
> But that which others' vice attests
> Swags full in view before our breasts."

"Oh, but it is principle," you say, "high principle, which makes me profoundly discriminating in my charities." This is a very satisfactory state of things. We are so glad you are discriminating; and we feel that your own virtues and your own graces entitle you to be judicial towards others. The discrimination shown by nature in making *you* a rich man, while leaving the industrious, the ingenious, and the imaginative poor, is a warranty, to begin with, that you are the right man in the right place, and that no one else could top your pinnacle with such fitness. Yet—banter aside—how much trouble do rich men give themselves to find out the

whole truth of a suggested need; how many personal calls or visits do they make; with what solicitude do they set themselves the angelic task of anticipating all unnecessary pain or humiliation; or with what modesty, with what justice, do they believe only what is good of those they know little about—and care less? If it be difficult for a rich man to enter the kingdom of Heaven,—a difficulty which does not seem to oppress most rich men,—it must be so, not because he keeps a brougham, not because he gives diamonds to rich people, not because he lets the poor sit behind him in church, while he occupies a paid-for, cushioned pew; but because of the indolence or selfishness, and therefore the cruelty, which lead him to misapprehend others' sorrows.

In England it is customary, when some one dies whom we respect, to send our empty carriage to follow the hearse. Perfect symbol of the hypocrisy of sympathy! We do our sympathy by proxy; just as secretaries write our letters, or our clergy distribute our cheques, to save ourselves the trouble of active charity. We shut our eyes to grooves of sympathy which might bore us. Let us take a recent example of this truism—of English *natural* neglect and *fashionable* charity. During the past few months there has been an awakening of public sympathy in regard to the unkempt tenements of the poor; royal princes and fine gentlemen having suddenly come to be conscious that they have been living within stone's throw of styed humanity. The sympathy is a sound one, but it would not have been awakened had not a dissenting minister published "The Bitter Cry." That "Bitter Cry" set a thousand tongues wagging, and set some scores of persons writing to the newspapers; hence "the fashion" of becoming interested in a national infamy which had been in full bloom for scores of years.

If, instead of mere suffering, mere mortal destitution, there had been a thousand cases of plague or of cholera, the fashionable community would have realized "the danger" much sooner than it has realized the suffering. If a cock crows in the early morning, and wakes the neighbors, the public-nuisance act is speedily invoked to stop the nuisance; but if it is only a case of starving or of overcrowding,—or only a thousand or two of such cases within one district,—the peaceful slumbers of the comfortable classes are not in the smallest degree disturbed—unless royal princes make the new sympathy to be fashionable. This does not say much for "modern uses of wealth." It does not speak volumes for our "men of principle." It does not imply that those tender consciences which are so afraid of "helping the undeserving" have used their vaunted discrimination as to the "deserving." Perhaps they have fancied, during the last hundred years, that one-eighth of Lon-

don, living as pigs—without the sweet assurance of two meals a day, which pigs have—was every body's business except their own. Shall we put it in this way—that the neglect of public duties comes from the want of combination among the powerful classes, while the neglect of private duties comes from the want of personal interest in anything that is troublesome or humiliating? We all know the hopeless difficulty of trying to work out "political economy," or fine theories about the "improvement of the masses." The "natural rights of man," like the "greatest happiness of the greatest number," are logically mere theories, full of fallacy. The solution of all such puzzles is probably this: You will never get any one class to act improvingly on another class, unless the one class first improves *its own* character. And since character is not form, or feature, or manner, but the influence of our own qualities upon others—every character necessarily influencing other characters—the self-respect of the powerful classes begets the self respect of the lower orders, just as immorality in high places poisons the commonalty.

Platitude as all this is, the whole gist lies in character—that is, in the moral sense of relative duties. Theoretically every man admires virtue, praises industry, imagines that he detects one man's superiority, another man's culpable emergency. Man is a judicial animal. He judges everybody except himself. The result is, that he generally judges wrongly. This is as true of whole classes as of individuals. The discontented classes as utterly mistake the rich classes as the rich classes mistake themselves and the discontented classes. And the reason is that they never come into personal contact. Just as the word "Catholic," which might be supposed to imply brotherhood, really means nothing but a common creed, so the word "sympathy," which might be supposed to imply interchange, really means nothing but "sorry for you." Now, the primary use of wealth,—to a man who apprehended it with intellect, heart, soul, and all earnestness,—would be to link all classes together in one common aspiration—by an example of the highest aims in the higher classes. But this is the last use of wealth which is dreamed of. It is a good thing that Lord Carnarvon, with the dukes of Argyle and Westminster, should have just discovered that "a peasant proprietary of small lands would be beneficial to both the poorer classes and to agriculture"; it is a good thing that the universities should establish "settlements" in East London,—nay, it is the best thing of the kind that has yet been done,—for lifting the standard of local thought or education; it is a good thing that Lord Folkstone and other gentlemen have interested themselves in organizing cheap concerts for the enjoyment of the working classes in poor neighborhoods, just

as Lord Bute and other gentlemen have shown a liberal disposition in lending their best works of art to provincial galleries; yet *the* barrier between the rich and the poor classes is, that the rich classes mistake their acts for themselves, or imagine that deeds of kindness, in the cold abstraction of "philanthropy," can take the place of a class sympathy which would be enduring. That hateful word "philanthropy," newspapered, platformed, cheque-booked imposture,—like the empty carriage sent by a rich man to a funeral,—has usurped the place, in social canons as in religion, of the sympathy which is personal, and therefore real. A "great philanthropist" means little more than a poor-law guardian in high position; a sort of man who, in evolving schemes for the improvement of everybody, talks himself and his listeners out of improving anybody. A rich man who, in his own "circle," sets the highest example of modesty, of delicacy, of forethought, of graceful kindness, while at the same time distributing his wealth with a generosity which is equalled by his own simplicity and self-denial, is a philanthropist who improves every one's tone and character, at the same time that he helps their material estate.

It is a funny delusion of the mind that whatever it possesses is, in some mysterious way, part of its own self. The rich mind which possesses wealth—for it is the mind which possesses wealth, in the sense that it is conscious of the possession—somehow imagines that the wealth, which is but "possessed," is part and parcel of the identity of the mind. Why is any man vain of wealth, but because he imagines it is himself—that £. *s. d.* is, somehow, brain, character, personality? Just as a man who is well coated fancies that *he* is a superior man to even himself when he is ill-coated (or ill-hatted), so a man who is well "balanced" fancies that he and his banker's account—he and his landed estate, he and his big title, or he and his position in the neighborhood—are somehow a unity of identity. Probably no man ever lived who could wholly separate his *egomet* from the accidents of his surroundings or worldly toilet. A man walks the street with a tacit conviction that he is respected because he *is* twenty thousand a year. It is not only that he thinks that others think more of him, but he really thinks more of himself. Money being power, and money being his, he and the power are one. It is so true, and yet so false. You might as well try to separate a river from its bed as to separate a man from his fortune; and yet, to say that the river is its bed would be as grotesque as to say a man is his money. Now, it would not much matter that, when we meet Sir Million de Consols, we raise our hat to his securities or to his sweet dividends, if only Sir Million did not raise his hat in return, fully impressed that he *is* his own million. Let us take the most familiar

of illustrations: Why is the king the greatest man? Is it because he is the chief magistrate of the nation? No; it is because he is surrounded by the most pomp. Pass a law that the king shall have fifty pounds a year, and shall live in a garret without servants, and the king might walk the streets without any one looking round, or so much as remarking, "There is the king." The same truth holds good of the nobility. If a duke were only allowed to have one pound a week, and were obliged to live within the measure of that allowance, the opulent tradesman or mechanic or the parish curate would run him close in point of "social consideration." Now, playful as all this seems, the "philosophy" of it lies in this: That the highest effort of a rich man is to learn reality; to know that riches can only be used but not assimilated; that a man's use of all he has is in purely probationary stewardship, but cannot affect *himself*, save in character. Pure philosophy, but utterly hopeless impossibility! Vanity is so interwoven with every fibre of the constitution of every man who lives upon the earth, that, of the three levers of human life—vanity, love, interest—vanity is the only one which *always* rules. Love is an incidental operation; interest is cold, calculating office-work; but vanity begins in the morning when we are brushing the hair, and ends at night after the bed-candle is put out. To tell a rich man not to be vain of his riches, but to fear himself for a misuse of God's loan, is like telling a man not to be human, not to be sensitive about appearance, not to be conscious that his "six feet high" are more than four feet. A man is what he is; and he can only modify his misfortunes—of vanity, selfishness, feebleness.

So that, when we hear a man boasting of his "high principles," in regard to the distribution of his wealth, we suspect that he has not realized these three facts: the first, that *all* men, being full of faults, are to be charitably judged, charitably treated; the second, that such sympathies as are to avail for personal happiness must be personally rendered, and with modesty; the third, that it is the privilege, just as much as it is the duty, of every rich man to try to bless others.

Privilege is a relative possession. A privilege is a central point which must have a circumference of the same size as a man's opportunities. Now, the ordinary idea of the privilege of being wealthy is, first, that it makes a man independent—that is, *not* dependent on other men; next, that it gives immunity from vulgar contact, enabling a man to avoid his inferiors; thirdly, that, in conferring status, it is itself to be respected, without reference to uses, to duties; and, lastly, that it gives the power of enjoyment, and, with this power, the right. Even the "man of principle" does not forget any of these privileges, though there are some few men

who rise above weakness. Happily, in England, the obligations of position are now much more recognized than they used to be. No man can now presume on his position. But the duties of wealth are not recognized, proportionately, as are the duties of rank or of office. Why is this? Because wealth is regarded as a man's own—not as "God's loan for life's span"—rights of property including rights of use. Is this true? Legally, and also morally, it is true; but is there no ideal beyond morals? Conceive of a world in which the Catholic Ideal should be carried out in perfect practice and fruition! Imagine a nation in which all members of all classes positively acted on St. Paul's beautiful belief, that "we are every one members one of another," and that, "if one member suffer, all the members suffer with him." St. Paul's assurance, that Christian society is equally integral with the human body—every one person being to every other person as a nerve or a bloodvessel of the same body, and, therefore, by sympathy, of the same mind—sounds fantastically ironical, in the face of the *fact* that most persons feel complete in their own selves. Thus, the privilege of wealth is esteemed to be the privilege of monumenting one's self above one's fellows; not—to use St. Paul's similitude—the privilege of tenderly caring for every poor or sorrowing member of the social body, but the privilege of being so tall that the extremities of the social figure—or even the anatomy which is just below one's *tête montée*—are in quite another world of being to our own apex. "Temperament" and "principle" play their parts in this estimate; but selfishness and vanity are at the bottom of it.

VAGARIES OF PROTESTANT RELIGIOUS BELIEF.

UNCHECKED by civil or ecclesiastical authority, and imbued with no awe for public opinion, the mind of man in this country has found its action unfettered for the announcement and promulgation of the most extraordinary theories in regard to the nature of God, and man's relation to Him; the channel by which God makes known His will, the special and peculiar public honor which God requires from His creatures. The right of private judgment claimed by the "Reformers" has been put in practical form, and Protestants cannot logically condemn those who act under it, and seek to induce others to accept their judgment. The result has been the rise of an incalculable number of religions and schools of thought in the denominations which still adhere together from force of association rather than from any fidelity to the symbols or creeds adopted originally as their standard of divine truth. For, as no denomination or body cutting itself away or assuming a new name, can arrogate to itself infallibility in the conception of God, of His law and of His worship, which it holds for the time being, so none can exact obedience or condemn those who refuse to accept its dictation.

On the other hand stands the Catholic Church, recognizing a personal God, revealing His will to man, making the Church the guardian of His truth, the channel of His graces, the teacher entitled to obedience, and holding, as its great act of worship, the sacrifice of Christ completed by the consuming of the divine victim in the Holy Eucharist.

While the Catholic theory is thus clear, distinct and comprehensible, resting entirely on God, objective; the moment her teaching authority is denied, every religious idea becomes subjective, a conception of the human mind, which may approach the truth or diverge from it most grossly.

Absolutely, none of these conceptions corresponds to God; so that, in a certain sense all who adopt them worship a false god, and in some forms, as the Shakers, the Mormons, the Leatherwood, the idea of the deity has become as gross and sensual as ever existed in the mind of a pagan, before he embodied it in stone or metal.

It is not easy to draw the line, and say where the idea of the true God, resulting from the teaching of the Catholic Church and traditionally held, often unconsciously, has been so effaced by the erroneous conceptions of the mind as to be virtually lost. For,

though the rejection of the true theoretically implied necessarily the acceptance of the false, the Catholic tradition of God and the correct habit of thought proved, for a long time, stronger than the abstract teachings of error. In this country, unfortunately, in all the Protestant denominations the residuum of Catholic truth is fading away, and men, falling back on mere reason, wish to acknowledge only what they think they can understand, and refuse to understand everything that militates against prejudice, temperament or pride.

The church of England set out by endeavoring to retain many truths, and has, since its origin, exhibited a strange spectacle, one portion grasping at rejected truths and graces, the other endeavoring to cast aside what it had retained. The Lutheran church still retains in its books of devotion the Augsburg confession, in which Lutherans indignantly deny that they wish to cast aside the Mass and the confessional; yet they would not tolerate either for a moment. Hence, an English bishop can deny the authenticity of the books of Moses, the inspiration of scriptures, the apostolicity of the Church, and retain his position against cavillers. A Lutheran professor in a German university can, without compromising his salary, treat the existence of God or of revelation as something to be as little respected as the Mass or the confessional. The teachings of Calvin are nowhere distinct and clear in regard to the doctrines of the Holy Trinity; that dogma was never prominently put forward in the Presbyterian or Congregational systems, and as soon as men dared express their opinions in New England, people began to reject the doctrine, till Unitarianism became the leading belief in those States. A sect, losing a divine truth, never regains it, and the effort produced in the minds of a few by the loss seems in most cases to carry them not back to what had been lost, but into some new form of error.

Yet, as dogmas and doctrinal truths faded and religion became an aching void, men sought to delude themselves by forms and ceremonies. These, as the outgrowths of a doctrine, or clung to as hallowed outworks, have a value and a significance; but when introduced afresh to revive a dying creed and re-animate it, are like decorations of a corpse; they only serve to make death itself more ghastly.

But, while every truth seems to become evanescent and perishable in the keeping of the sects that have fallen away, seems to lose all vivifying sap, a hatred, prejudice and bitter antagonism against the Church as the guardian of the principle of divine truth and its appointed definer seems never to weaken, but to increase in intensity even when the peculiar ideas that led to schism and heresy have lost their hold and been practically superseded by new forms

of error. No philosophical analysis of this strange phase in human thought, this enduring and potent hatred of the Catholic Church, has ever been attempted. It darkens the understanding, making it, in otherwise clear-headed men, unable to use the ordinary rules of reason; in an age when men demand reasons and proofs for every allegation, it makes men accept unhesitatingly the most absurd statements without a shadow of proof and in defiance of common sense. It seems really to manifest a character of diabolical possession. Take up a newspaper of the day. A falsehood against the Church will be started—as that Pope Pius IX. was a free-mason in Philadelphia, that he sent Riel, as a relic, one of the nails of the true cross to reward his rebellion, that some Catholic bishop is leading a revolt in Spanish America; and not an editor will stop to examine whether it is not preposterously false on its face, when he would regard it as trash if told of some one not connected with the Church. It is at once accepted, and the penny-a-liners are set to pad it out, and extend it by "it is said" and "it is well known," till a paragraph grows into a column, to be cited gravely in some legislative hall, not by an idiot escaped from an asylum for mental imbeciles, but by a man of ordinary good sense, while controlled by this demon which suspends the exercise of his habitual good faith, judgment and honesty. It is this spirit which compels men who profess to be religious, and earnestly so, to make public education godless or irreligious, to aim deliberately at a system that will prevent their own children from being imbued from the cradle with religious thought, rather than allow Catholic children to enjoy that advantage, to make the young unreligious, though they themselves, impelled by exaggerated religious feelings, ought naturally to seek to make them religious. It is this strange phase of the human mind that makes so many ready to assist in sapping and weakening the faith of Catholics, to pervert them, and to applaud and encourage all efforts of atheism in Catholic countries, without the slightest care as to results or to the horrors which they are preparing for the social and civil order by this extirpating of all Christian check on millions, who become the blind tools of atheistic demagogues. A sample of this was seen recently in the general approval by our press of the French government in expelling the ministers of religion from the Church of St. Genevieve to make it a National Pantheon, not that the State needed means to erect a suitable edifice for that purpose, but simply to show its power. Had the State of New York seized the new Cathedral at Garden City for a Walhalla, what paper in the land would have denied the right of Bishop Littlejohn, as a citizen and a bishop representing thousands of fellow-citizens, to protest against the act and invoke the aid of the courts to protect the rights of religion?

Thus we see the human mind, after discarding the gift of faith, become enslaved by a hatred of the Church as the guardian of truth, and produce the most strange and wild conceptions in the place of lost truths, and induce others to accept them.

Thus in early times in this country Roger Williams was so imbued with hatred of the Church that he raised a turmoil in Massachusetts by inducing people to believe it idolatrous to have a cross in the English flag, so that they actually cut it out; yet he was soon driven out of that colony for his ideas in regard to religion, and in Rhode Island set up a new community, stoutly holding that "there is no visible Church in the Bay, nor in the world, nor any true Ministerie;" or, as Hanbury puts it more explicitly, "no church, no sacraments, no pastors, no church officers or ordinance in the world, nor has been since a few years after the Apostles."[1] He swayed from excessive views of the authority of the Protestant church to a denial of all church authority, doctrines, sacraments.

The religious vagaries in this country show no case more astounding than that of Joseph C. Dilks, who, appearing suddenly at a camp-meeting near Galesville, Ohio, in August, 1828, startled the assembly by shouting "salvation," and giving a prodigious snort. In a few days he impressed several people with the belief that he was the Messiah. One of his proselytes soon told of the heavenly light that surrounded him, and described a contest with Satan in which Dilks defeated the enemy of mankind with his breath. The next Sunday this man took possession of the log meeting-house of the place and proclaimed himself God. "I am God, and there is none else." One of his adherents cried out: "Behold our God!" and the people fell on their knees and worshipped him. A Moravian minister became a convert, and though other ministers endeavored to withstand the delusion, the people shouted, "He is my God." A party was at last formed against Dilks, he was seized, ill-treated, and dragged before magistrates, who released him. After remaining concealed for a time, he again appeared in public, asserting his claims, and finally left the place to go and establish the New Jerusalem in Philadelphia. Though he never returned, men lived and died recognizing him as the living God.

This monstrous case would seem to be incredible, and we should not venture to state that men in this country could be found so ignorant of the first principles of natural, not to say revealed, religion, as to fall down and worship an ordinary man on his mere assertion that he was the Deity; but the history of the whole affair has been carefully traced and gathered, and remains undisputed.[2]

If Dilks stands pre-eminent in his fearful blasphemy as claim-

[1] Lechford's "Plain Dealing," p. 96.

[2] The Leatherwood God. By R. H. Taneyhill. Cincinnati. 1870.

ing to be God, there have been many "false Christs and false prophets." At the head of these stands the celebrated author of the "Book of Mormon." The length of time that his imposture has gained credence, and the numbers who have been led to recognize him as the prophet of a new dispensation, make the history of Mormonism one of the most curious and extraordinary studies in the religious history of the nineteenth century. Joseph Smith, born at Sharon, Vermont, in 1805, and removing with his parents as a child to Palmyra, New York, grew up idle and unguided. That he had some religious yearnings may be possible, and that he found in the systems around him nothing to satisfy any one, is no less probable. That he saw the field open for a bold religious adventurer, who, by a show of earnestness and enthusiasm, might promise himself success, is pretty evident. As he approached manhood he began to claim that he was visited by angels, and in September, 1823, he boldly averred that a heavenly messenger had appeared to him announcing that he was to be the instrument of a new dispensation. Four years after that he produced a set of engraved brazen plates which he asserted had been placed in his hands by an angel with a Urim and Thummim to enable him to translate them. The result was the Book of Mormon, alleged by some to have been a work of fiction composed in Biblical style by a Mr. Spalding, and pretending to give the history of the earliest inhabitants of America. This Book of Mormon became, together with the Bible, the basis of a new religion founded by Smith at Manchester, New York, to which he gave the name of "the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter Day Saints." He found followers, and soon gathered many proselytes; but as the State of New York seemed a place where his imposture could grow but slowly, he moved to the West, and made many converts in Illinois and Missouri. In the latter State, however, the people generally did not view the religious extravagance and pretensions of Smith with any favor. The Mormons were persecuted in every way and driven from their farms. After enduring all this for several years, they finally made Nauvoo in Illinois their chief settlement, founding that city in 1837, and beginning a grand temple. Here their troubles were renewed, the people rose against them, and Smith was at last murdered by a mob, but not before he had established or paved the way for polygamy and other horrors among his deluded followers. Led by Brigham Young, who had joined the body in 1832, the Mormons made their way to the neighborhood of the Great Salt Lake, where, under the supineness and at times actual encouragement of the Federal Government, they have increased to a community of more than one hundred thousand, completely controlling the territory of Utah, practising polygamy, and murdering with impunity any whom they

condemn in their secret councils. They form at this day one of the most perplexing difficulties in the country. They are heathens as much and as completely as the Chinese, although they assume the name of our Lord in the title of their church, for the god whom they profess to worship in their obscene rites is not the true God, but a being with material body, with flesh, and limbs, and members, and human passions, and the holy spirit is, they assert, simply a fluid![1] This horrible enormity has grown up, drawing its votaries from Protestant sects, none of which have attempted to withstand it. In that new Sodom by that American Dead Sea, Catholicity alone has dared to raise an altar to the Living God, and preach Christ and him crucified.

Second only to Joseph Smith, in the extent and permanence of his religious imposture, was Mrs. Ann Standley, usually known as Mother Ann Lee, the foundress of the Shaker community, which grew up in the woods of New York during the stormy period of the American revolution. She was born in England about 1735, the daughter of a blacksmith, and, when still young, married Abraham Standley, who followed her father's trade. She soon after joined a community of what were called the French Prophets, a wild and visionary sect founded by John Cavelier who, beginning as a religious enthusiast in France, died an English colonel. She became in time the spiritual mother of the little sect, which denounced marriage and looked upon her as the incarnate word. In obedience to a pretended revelation she came to America in 1772, and with a few companions settled at Niskayuna near Watervliet. The enthusiasm and industry of the new-comers attracted attention, and during the period of religious exaltation caused by some Baptist revivals in that part of the country, hundreds flocked to the Shakers, where Mother Ann Lee received them warmly, declaring that their coming was announced to her, that she was the woman clothed with the sun, and daily judged the dead. Many became her proselytes, and her community grew, her wild dreams being received as revelations. The body subsists to this day, and has spread to Massachusetts and the West. Celibacy is enjoined on all, the Brothers and Sisters living in separate houses, and meeting to conduct religious services, in which dancing forms a striking feature. She asserted that she was not subject to death, and that she would ascend to heaven in the twinkling of an eye. Even her death in September, 1784, did not dispel the delusion of her followers, and the sect, with its idolatrous honor of Mother Ann Lee, its strange doctrines and services, lingers on amid the busy population that has grown up around its original settlement. The

[1] This is the teaching of the catechism used to instil their religion into the minds of the young.

Shakers, gaining only by accessions of adults from without or poor waifs whom they adopt in childhood, have never increased greatly in numbers; and as the census of 1885 returns only 25,000 for the whole country, the body seems destined to early extinction. Of course, their ideas of God have become so perverted that it would be rash to assert that the object of their devotion is the true God.

What are called the Pagan Onondagas and Senecas, on the other hand, who still linger by their old camp-fires in New York, are really more advanced than Mormon or Shaker or Dilksite. They rejected two centuries ago the Agreskoué or Thoronhiawagon of their ancestors, to worship Dieu or Niio, the God whose nature was explained to them by the Catholic missionaries.

Prophets claiming to be the recipients of special revelations from the Almighty have constantly appeared in this country, and never fail to obtain credulous followers. To the ordinary Protestant they say: You admit that the Catholic Church has fallen into error; but your ministers all disagree. There is no one to teach the people truth. Open your bibles. How did God act in such cases? Did he not raise up his prophets to announce his will to the people and lead them back to him? Even such am I.

As early as 1724, there arose a prophet among the French emigrants to South Carolina, one Peter Rombert, who obtained complete authority over the family into which he had married, and many others in the neighborhood. As in most similar cases, the prophet took to himself a new wife. Refusing all submission to the laws of the colony, his followers would not work on the roads, and defied the officers of the law. When the prophet's immorality called for the action of the authorities, it became necessary to send a body of armed men. The prophet and his followers stubbornly defended the houses, killing one of the officers, but were all at last secured, save one woman, who was killed during the affray. Rombert and two of the men were tried, when they pleaded their authority from God, and insisted that they had done nothing but by His express command, and they maintained that they would rise again on the third day. Their failure to do so seemed to disabuse the rest of their community; yet, not long after, one of these who had been spared killed an innocent person without provocation, maintaining that he acted by the command of God. He paid the penalty of his crime.

Pennsylvania in the last century teemed with prophets and men who claimed commissions from on high to frame new ways of salvation for mankind. A writer in the *Lutheran*, who undertook to treat of the extinct sects in Pennsylvania, carried his series of articles through several years, so extensive did he find the field which he had undertaken to treat.

In later days several prophets rose in various parts, winning local adherents and flourishing for a time, to vanish at last from the page of history. It is not easy to trace all these, and the current histories, either of the country or of local divisions, and even the works which pretend to treat of all the religious denominations in the country, seem ashamed of these vagaries, and seek to consign their record to oblivion. A broken-down country storekeeper in Washington County, New York, excited by the preaching of some rhapsodical revivalists, began to have revelations and held forth in the streets of Albany, but, being rejected there, went to New York city. There he assumed a strange garb, and soon obtained influence enough to gather a band of disciples. Over these his influence was supreme; their houses, their property, their wives were at the disposal of the prophet. But Mathias seemed to be in haste to secure all, and the death of one of his older followers was ascribed to poison administered by the false prophet. He escaped the gallows, but soon disappeared from public view.

More recently a woman in Philadelphia, Myra Mitta, assumed the role of prophetess or Messiah, and was almost worshipped by a few deluded followers, from whom she took care to obtain the deed of a house, which was used as her residence and church. But though, like Ann Lee, she had proclaimed herself immortal, death took her from her votaries, leaving the courts to settle the title to the sacred edifice.

In these cases all will admit that the true idea of God, as handed down in the Church, has been lost to such an extent that these blind leaders of the blind can no longer be regarded as worshipping Him in common with Jews and Christians, but as distinctly heathen.

Most of these cases of false prophets are directly traceable to the mad and extravagant preaching of itinerant ministers, from the days of Whitefield and the first Moravian and Methodist preachers. The wild appeals, the excitement which they caused, always dangerous, inflamed the worst passions, unsettled reason, caused the most aggravated forms of mania, often resulting in permanent insanity. The camp-meetings were prolific sources of all these evils. The first of these was an outgrowth of the Kentucky Revival of 1800, and was held at Cane Ridge. There not only ministers, but men and women, and even children, took part.

"At no time," says a recent writer, "was the 'falling exercise' so prevalent as at night. Nothing was then wanting that could strike terror into minds, weak, timid and harassed. The red glare of the camp-fires reflected from hundreds of tents and wagons; the dense blackness of the flickering shadows, the darkness of the surrounding forest, made still more terrible by the groans and screams of the 'spiritually wounded' who had fled to it for comfort; the entreaty of the preachers; the sobs and shrieks of the

downcast still walking through the dark valley of the Shadow of Death; the shouts and songs of praise from the happy ones who had crossed the Delectable Mountains, had gone on through the fogs of the Enchanted Ground and entered the land of Beulah, were too much for those over whose minds and bodies lively imaginations held full sway. The heart swelled, the nerves gave way, the hands and feet grew cold, and they fell headlong to the ground speechless and motionless. In a moment crowds gathered about them to pray and shout. Some lay still as death. Some passed through frightful twitchings of face and limb."

"As the meetings grew more and more frequent, this nervous excitement assumed new and more terrible forms. One was known as jerking; another as the barking exercise; a third as the Holy Laugh." The community seemed demented. From the nerves and muscles the disorder passed to the mind. Men dreamed dreams and saw visions, nay, fancied themselves dogs, went down on all fours, and barked till they grew hoarse. It was no uncommon sight to behold numbers of them gathered about a tree, barking, yelping, "treeing the Devil." "The Holy Laugh became a recognized part of worship."

And all this was the outgrowth of what was and is paraded as pure Evangelical Christianity! Men claimed that Catholic doctrines and Catholic rites were incompatible with a due exercise of human reason, and their attempt to display human reason duly exercised resulted in wild unreason.

It is sad to follow these wanderings of the human mind and see what extravagances the revolt from the authority established of God entailed on the unfortunate nations which took the fatal step.

The development of what is called Spiritualism seems to indicate that men are worshipping not a mere subjective god, the conception of their own brain, but Satan himself.

The oscillations of error are curious. The whole tendency of New England Puritanism was to relegate from thought the humanity of our Lord, prompted apparently by the desire to avoid honoring the real mother of one really man. This led to confusion of thought as to the Father and the Son, and paved the way for Unitarianism, which so largely supplanted the earlier Christian doctrine of the Trinity even in the feeble form in which New England held it. Unitarianism exalted the humanity of our Lord, and, Sadducee-like, spread disbelief in all things spiritual. Science came with its gross materialism.

Then came the reaction in favor of spiritual existences. Instead of yielding to the clear, intelligent teachings of the Church, the minds of men sought to hold intercourse with the unseen world. They did not bow before God in humility, with sorrow for sin, with a desire for His love, a dependence on His graces and mercies.

They became the sport of evil spirits and more frequently of charlatans. The influence of the Spirit of God or spirits sent by God would be seen in peace, in greater love for God and man, in desire to advance in virtue. But in the vagaries of Spiritualism we can see nothing of this. Pride, insanity, hardness of heart, are much more likely to meet our inquiries.

So far as any effects are seen that are above natural powers, we find nothing to induce us to ascribe them to God. If not from God but yet supernatural, they are diabolic, and the whole affair is a service of demons. Men fall lower than Mormon or Shaker, they become worshippers of Satan. In fact, in all this system of Spiritualism there is no real active recognition of the true God; He is utterly ignored. The whole honor of the votaries is paid to the spirit working to delude them, who can be Satan only.

While Mormonism and Shakerism are mainly local, Spiritualism pervades the country, and without church or minister is sapping the last remnant of Christian faith and leading thousands who are scarcely aware of their lapse from Christianity to a real and distinct worship of the Evil Spirit. New England in its early days, while formally denying that the saints and angels, in the order of God's providence, could be aware of the prayers emanating from the hearts of the faithful or could aid them in soul and body,—though our Lord portrayed Dives as praying from hell itself to Abraham in behalf of his brethren,—admitted and maintained that evil spirits could hear men, make compacts with them, and render service for their temporal benefit or the injury of their neighbors. With little scientific knowledge even for their own day, with no criteria for judging the supernatural, the people of New England undoubtedly condemned many innocent persons to death; but in modern Spiritualism they might have found clearer cases than any that came before their tribunals.

The Protestant sects themselves, where they have retained the traditional teaching of the true God, have not been able to check extravagance. Protestantism is not a religion, although many of our early statute-books required people to swear to a belief in the truths of the Protestant religion. It is merely a phase of thought, and has no real characteristics of a religion, since it rejects authority, has no infallible creed, no priesthood, no essential act of divine worship. Its one vital principle, hatred of Catholicity, cannot satisfy the wants of the human soul. Man feels that there must be an authority from God to guide him, that there must be an authority to speak infallibly in God's name, that there must be some distinct act of divine worship, and a priesthood to offer it. All this his Bible tells him distinctly, constantly; but in practice he finds none of it, and the prejudice against the Church in which he has been trained from the cradle, in his meeting-house, in public

school and general literature, keeps him from turning to it to seek relief. The death of our Lord on the cross is represented to him as the only sacrifice, but it is not brought home to him, and is made a mere fact of history. Yet the death of our Lord on the cross, though decreed by the high-priest, and carried out under his will by the Romans, was not in itself a sacrifice. Nowhere in or out of the Bible is there a case where a victim was slain on the wood of the altar, and then taken away and buried. The victim must be consumed by fire or by eating. This is essential. The Holy Eucharist "fills up those things that are wanting of the sufferings of Christ," and makes His death a real sacrifice, complete and perfect, enabling each one to partake of the victim and join in the great act of adoration as well as enjoy the blessings it procures. What to the Protestant is only a fact of history, is to the Catholic an ever-existing sacrifice, "showing the death of the Lord from generation to generation, till He come."

Cut off from this, with no guide and no chart that he can feel absolutely certain in following, the Protestant seeks constantly something to rouse and excite him. From time to time we see movements tending in this direction. Like Wesley, some attempt to copy Catholic methods, and apply them; but as the error of justification by faith only makes each one judge in his own case, he considers himself justified whenever the thought comes to him that he is; and as he is taught that he is thus one of the elect, there is no precaution against relapse, no purpose of amendment based on contrition for the past, no looking to our Lord for help through the channels He has appointed. The momentary fervor passes, and the last state becomes worse than the first, often to be a mere jest and scoff. The Moravian and Methodist systems, with the camp-meetings which grew up in this country in days when settlements were sparse, and rough, untutored, but earnest ministers were the only ones to reach many of the people, gradually declined as population increased, and have taken a new phase, combining commercial thrift with summer relaxation at the seaside or the mountain. The camp-meeting, in becoming more decorous, has become less earnest; there is less of scripture and more of human oratory. The great revivals among the Congregationalists have, in a similar way, lost all their supposed efficiency. The Lorenzo Dow of former days re-appears in a singing Phillips, or Moody and Sankey, or in some rough outspoken man like a Sam Jones. But the regular ministrations of Protestantism fail to gather people within the walls of their meeting-houses, except where some preacher suits himself to the popular taste, and discusses questions of the day rather than the tenets of religion or the teaching of morality. In the Church of England, and the Episcopal Church in this country, the largest congregations are those drawn by the

saddening imitation of Catholic rites and Catholic thoughts, sad because they are but a figure without the substance.

Outside of that body, the only exhibition of a real spirit of reaching the people, and rousing them to a sense of the importance of religion, is the strange creation of our times, the Salvation Army. This is entirely outside of the Protestant ministry. The actors are not ministers, claim no rights or privileges as such; in fact, attest the uselessness and inefficiency of any ministry in the Protestant system; they take their titles, not from any ecclesiastical offices, but from the military nomenclature. Their leader is General Booth; the superintendents of their bands of home missionaries, as they would, in other terms, be called, are captains. They go about with noisy music, singing and declaiming their exhortations. They are earnest, and gather crowds. While the earnestness lasts, their sincere endeavor to reform the sinful may excite some sympathy for their misdirected zeal; but the earnestness flags, and unworthy motives appear, and the whole affair becomes a public nuisance, often leaving no result but an unhealthy religious excitement, which leads to the overthrow of all rational equilibrium in weak minds, producing insanity, sometimes attended with most terrible results, as it points to lust or murder, developing into acts like those of the Newark Adamites, gathering naked in their prayer-meetings, or like the case in Massachusetts, where a father, impelled by religious fanaticism, murdered his own children, reviving the sanguinary worship of Moloch to honor the Almighty.

As the knowledge of the true God is so rapidly disappearing, and false gods are gradually obtaining the honor due to Him alone, ought we not to make some exertion to rescue the country from a return to heathenism? The Council of the Vatican is the first ever held by the Church in which it became necessary to define the existence, personality, and nature of God. This seems to indicate clearly the importance of inculcating these truths as against the errors condemned. Our great theological school at Woodstock has, in the same spirit, given a grand treatise, *De Deo Uno et Trino*, suited to the wants of our day. If learned priests in our great cities were, on Sundays in some hired hall, and with nothing to suggest church ceremonies, to give conferences on God, Revelation, Redemption, the End of Man, on topics such as were propounded by the Apostles to the Gentiles of the Roman Empire, many would be saved who are now losing all trace of Christianity. The very fundamentals of religion are so obscured in many minds that it is necessary to begin at them, and so clearly exhibit the whole scheme of Redemption that thousands with clear minds and willing hearts will, when they hear the word of truth, correspond to the grace of God, and believe.

MORALITY AND LIFE.

WHEN we consider the dishonesty and fraud of our times, the vices and crimes destructive of all confidence of man in man and almost of society itself, we must acknowledge that life is out of joint with morality in this nineteenth century. The pomp and parade of wealth, the deference it commands, the honors paid to it, the influence it exerts, if they mean anything at all, mean certainly the worship of mammon, which renders the poor discontented with their lot and creates a universal desire and a universal scramble to get rich, honestly if possible, but to get rich at any rate. Public opinion is but slightly scrupulous as to the means employed to gain wealth or to obtain control of it. Offences against the person which spring from heated blood or untamed passion are bad enough, but they are not nearly as bad as the cool, deliberate offences against the rights of property which constitute the chief characteristics of modern society, and so numerous and gigantic have these become that the strongest governments are impotent to redress or to restrain them. The moral sense of society appears stunted and suffering from a radical defect.

That life should be moral, and that the degree to which genuine moral principles penetrate thought, will and action, determines the greater or lesser value of life, both as regards the individual and as regards society, are propositions just as clearly recognized now as of old. The absolute necessity of a moral code for the regulation of conduct is not in the least contested. But the notions as to what constitutes morality, on what basis ethics must rest, and what office they have to perform, have undergone material changes. The issues of life are now being viewed from entirely different standpoints, so much so that the reasoning which thoroughly satisfied the tenor of mind of the mediæval period, and of our more immediate ancestors, though it has lost neither its force nor its correctness, is no longer applicable in our times. Large numbers nowadays believe that our age is a great movement in behalf of intelligence against ignorance, of reason against blind authority, of mental freedom against mental bondage, of rational scientific belief against bigotry and superstition. The world, which once held that morality is inseparably bound up with religion because of the direct influence which religious belief exercises upon human actions, no longer thinks so. Religion is now superseded, so people try to persuade themselves, by "enlightenment," "the culture of the

nineteenth century," "the creed of science." This view resulted quite logically in the secularization of the schools, that is to say, in a system of education which carefully avoids engrafting any religious principles upon the juvenile mind. The fruits of this system confront us in the present moral condition of society, for it has now been long enough in existence to show what fruits it can bear. Its success, as a Protestant divine tersely states, ought to be apparent in politics and upon the bench, upon boys and girls, men and women, and upon the statistics of crime. In all these respects, however, a decided deterioration has taken place wherever "advanced ideas" and "modern cultured thought" appear in the foreground. In the most civilized countries we behold corruption in the legislative bodies, bribery at elections, juries equally deficient in learning and integrity, politics a regular and rather disreputable business, repudiation of debts, betrayal of financial trusts, crookedness in mercantile life, adroit embezzlements of public funds. Nor is this all. We behold, moreover, the magnificent offenders flaunt their crimes with impunity in the face of a helpless community, divorce legalize concubinage, and free-love administer the deathblow to the family. This sad picture of the moral condition of our times resembles only too closely the period of the decadence of the Roman Empire, and yet it is by no means overdrawn. As has already been stated, the rueful deficiency of the ethical code, construed by the leaders of thought of this age, offers the only explanation. The code of morality, based solely upon scientific truths, no matter how admirable a structure it may be in its way, no matter what a wonderful evidence of the keenness of human intellect, has proven an ignominious failure in its effects upon the life of mankind.

Strong suspicions begin to arise now in the minds of many that these systems, after all, present to us nothing but the achievements of fanciful mental gymnastics; the impotency and the hopeless incapability of appealing by science to more than the intellect is being more and more understood; society gradually awakens to a proper realization of the fact that these modern systems of morality are far from furnishing a basis upon which society could rest without most serious misgivings for the "morrow"; and in proportion as this recognition grows, in the same proportion grows the desire in earnestness and intensity to find the one vital force by virtue of which society may be reconstructed on the basis of true morality. The great question, then, is this: how can the re-acceptance of the true code of morality be brought about, and how can the world be taught where the same is to be found?

There is, it is true, the Church of Rome, which says to mankind, with the same unalterable firmness as in the days of the apostles,

"Turn to my form of Christianity for genuine morality." She presses her claim of being sole possessor of an ethical code by which life is rendered worth living, and all incongruities of time and place and circumstances harmonized. But let us not deceive ourselves. To outsiders this apodictic statement appears as an arrogant assertion, entitled to no more weight than that of any other religious belief. Add to it the fact that there are but too many who, though nominally at least belonging to the Catholic Church, belie by their lives the purity of the moral code they profess as their own, and it is easily understood that the situation is not much improved by the attitude of Catholicity. It is idle to hope that dogmatic assertions, no matter how strongly emphasized, will change the tenor of mind of our age, and whoever indulges in such belief betokens only a gross misunderstanding of the intellectual attitude of society. The only road which, to our mind at least, promises a fair share of success, consists in a careful re-examination of the true meaning of morality, and in evolving by such a study what basis ethical principles demand in order to hold humanity with the grip of omnipotence. Such inquiry will soon convince us that true morality does not float in the air, but can be generated and sustained only by the true teachings of Christianity. By following this road we are at once free from all objections that might be raised against any other method of inquiry, for we adopt then the very line of thought of our times and keep thus abreast of the tendency of the age.

Now, "life," that dire fact, staring us in the face with a tale of crime, of misery, of suffering, of wretchedness; life, exhibiting to us the unceasing struggle of human passions, the victories and, alas! the defeats also of virtue; life, this conglomeration of volition, reasoning, and sentiment, issuing forth in energy and activity; this great enigma, life,—shall we, can we, believe it to be unable to tell us wherein true morality consists, and what its origin, its sustenance, if we attentively read the lessons of that stupendous drama? Ah, it would be the extreme height of sadness if life could make no answer. To feel that reason imposes an obligation which it cannot instruct us how to fulfil; to find ourselves with broad conceptions which we know not how to realize, with a sense of duty hanging over us which we cannot practically discharge—to hesitate between probabilities, to balance between uncertainties, to find the darkness increasing as we advance, and finally to lose ourselves in doubt and bewilderment, this would be our cruel fate if life had to remain silent. But though, engrossed with the world, with its cares, its follies, its gayeties, its dissipations, we may for a time silence the voice within and disregard the admonitions of conscience, the day must come in each individual life, for it comes to all men, when

all of a sudden we realize the true inwardness of morality, and at that time conscience imparts a knowledge to us which we feel and know by intuition to be true, irresistibly true knowledge. But for conscience morals would be an idle phantom, ethical codes superfluous brain-speculations. This conclusion, to which the introspection of life in individuals drives us, is also corroborated by the study of the lives of nations; that is to say, by inquiry into the true meaning of public morality.

Before proceeding further, it may not be superfluous to make some few remarks, or rather statements of facts on morality itself, because most of the errors into which men fall generally arise from the attempt to solve questions without the necessary preparatory knowledge and discipline. Now, morality means a set of first principles which, by taking hold of thought, will, and action, regulate our conduct in life. First principles in ethics, as well as in anything else, must, of course, possess the character of universal applicability, that is, the character of truth. And if absolutely true, they are necessarily so irrespective of time and place. If we do not insist upon what is strictly true, independently of our notions of truth and justice, but insist merely upon what appears to the actor to be so, we make right and wrong vary with the varying notions of each individual, and deny all invariable standard of right and wrong. Morality would then depend solely upon the private notions, caprice, or idiosyncrasies of each separate individual. The same thing might be right for one and wrong for the other, which is obviously preposterous and absurd. We know very well by natural reason that the distinction between right and wrong is not arbitrary, accidental, and variable, but immutable, independent, and eternal. The moral law is consequently the same at all times, in all places, and under all circumstances, and, instead of being the creature of our notions and convictions, is independent of and unaffected by them. For, the moment we substitute our views of truth for the truth itself, we deny virtually all truth and all falsehood, all right and all wrong, make them relative matters, one or the other, according to one's mode of seeing, feeling, or thinking. The laws of logic and of reason forbid us, if we think at all, to think otherwise. Consequently there can be but one absolute and invariable standard of morals which is not subject to change, but remains, all the wide world over, the same.

Again, all morality necessarily pre-supposes an objective law—a law out of man, above man, to which he is accountable, which he is under obligation to obey, obedience to which constitutes virtue, and disobedience to which constitutes vice. This conception, let it be emphasized, is essential to the very idea of morality. If there be no such law, or if it is not and cannot be known to us, then

man would simply cease to be a moral being. Nor is this all. From the necessity of a moral law out of and above man springs also the necessity of a moral lawgiver, who has the sovereign right to impose the law. "Duty," that which a man is *bound* to perform, is conceivable only if there is an absolute sovereign law which binds us. There is no use trying to smooth over these very plain facts or to invent fine phrases for covering up an intolerable and unjustifiable ignorance on this subject. If we do not recognize the existence of the supernatural, we cannot, consistently, recognize any moral law whatsoever. The attempt to separate religion and morals, and to obtain a solid foundation for our moral superstructure independent of religion, has for this reason proved and always will prove disastrous. The men who propound in our times theories and systems of ethics, which in reality are far from being in accord with true morality, do not profess to break with Christian civilization, or to reject religion and morals; but they strive to assert a morality without God and a Christianity without Christ. It is but a little while and all their works need recasting, because their systems are giving way. Sincerity or firmness of conviction on the part of those who dish up the modern vague theories of morality, does not render what they announce true and of moral obligation. Uncertain opinions, unproved theories, unverified hypotheses, have no claim to be listened to in the moral sphere. From a moral point of view, from a rigidly ethical standard, the codes of Darwin, Sir John Lubbock, Taine, Buchner, Schopenhauer, Huxley, Tyndall, and Herbert Spencer are simply opinions, theories, hypotheses, which are, at best, plausible conjectures under the imposing name of science, and which, being nothing more, should not unsettle men's minds, bewilder the half-learned, mislead the ignorant, undermine the very bases of society, and assail the whole moral order of the universe. It will not do to arraign the faith and the convictions of enlightened and living mankind and try to overrule them by science which is not proved with apodictic certainty to be science, and by truth which is not demonstrated to be truth. Yet this principle of ethics and of logic is disregarded by the whole tribe of contemporary moralists. Let us not deceive ourselves. The merit or the demerit of earthly career is measured only by the absolute and invariable standard of morality; that alone determines the individual, the intrinsic, as well as the sociological, the extrinsic, value of our morality. People are not moral because they frame their lives in accordance with an essentially deficient standard of morality; else all we would have to do to be truly moral would be to adopt a code in harmony with our propensities, whatever these may be. Relative morality does not count in life; un-

less we are moral in the true sense of the word, we possess no right to call ourselves so, nor does the world call us so.

We are now prepared to go one step farther. We will inquire first what does morality embrace in the surging ebb and flow tide of life, and what is the principle upon which it can rationally rest. Individual morality is twofold; it is negative and it is positive. It is negative in so far as it enjoins us not to perform any inherently immoral acts; and it is positive in so far as it bids us to exercise and practice virtue. For the shunning of vice is by no means the practice of virtue. The groundwork on which the regard and esteem of our fellow-men does rest, comprises hardly more than negative morality. Our social intercourse is conditioned upon certain civic virtues; our actions are constantly watched by those around us; the laws of every land impose certain restraints upon us. To steer clear of the criminal code does not consequently imply a really moral character. It is not enough to be honest, straightforward and truthful, because the thief is imprisoned, the liar dishonored, and the murderer hanged. Fear is, then, our motive power rather than love, and such morality is hardly worthy of the name. To be truly moral requires a subduing of our passions, a curbing of every inordinate appetite, a checking of undue ambition; but it requires much more still. It is not action alone, but will and thought likewise that must be governed by our moral principles. Licentiousness of thought, though less reprehensible than licentiousness of word and deed, remains nevertheless a criminal offence against the moral code, and differs from immoral actions not in kind, but only in degree. Consequently, the inward disposition, the habit of the mind, the principles we cherish and live up to, these are essential elements of any truly moral character. Morality, therefore, is not put on like a garment from without, but issues forth from within. And these principles adopted for the guidance of conduct must prevail to such an extent that we would part with life itself rather than forfeit one iota of these principles. And not only that, but all moral virtues, as for instance, chastity, temperance, charity, must not remain passive, but become active in us: they must inspire our thoughts, fill our hearts and bring tangible fruits during our lives. Now, if this has to be conceded, as it must needs be conceded, we perceive at once that a stronger motive than the world must impart life-giving power to those principles which are to produce all that. Let us consider a few striking examples. The virgin, who prefers cruel death to the loss of virtue, displays a conduct which remains utterly inexplicable by any moral code which makes the "here-below" the all of life. We must reach higher than science, higher even than this world, to realize what can and does prompt this preference of cold,

pitiless death to a life of luxurious ease, if conditioned upon the loss of virginity. And as with chastity so with all other virtues. Social upheavals may from time to time induce the amasser of wealth to disgorge some of his ill-gotten gain; but this is not charity, no matter how often it may be misnamed such. In order to behold true charity, we must seek the principle which teaches self-sacrifice, bids us forego pleasures in order to sit at the bedside of the sick and watch their feverish brow, and not until we reach the immolation of self in the service of fellow-man do the noblest and highest examples of charity stand before us. We may single out all typical figures of unquestioned morality, those that have received the unanimous plaudits of all succeeding ages, and we will find that the fundamental principles which actuated them to do what re-echoes to their praise from century to century, proceeded not from the senses, but from the soul, not from this world, but from belief in another world presided over by a sovereign lawgiver. True morality presupposes, thus, for a rational basis a common relation to a supreme lawgiver by which all distinctions of sex, of rank, of wealth, of age, of time and place are abolished. Only by perceiving in fellow-man the image of Him towards whom we have to discharge a duty, can we rise to an actual discharge towards that fellow-man of the debt we owe to the Creator. Thus belief in a supernatural life which centres in and revolves around God offers the only possible and real basis of morality. The law of love, the law of freedom, the law of equality by means of which mankind not only rose from the low plane of brute animalism, but recovered its own dignity and breathed again the pure atmosphere of genuine morality, these laws do not result from a contemplation of physical facts, nor can they be evolved from science. They are due, it must be acknowledged, to the all-embracing love of that transfigured Humanity, the God-Man crucified, who shed from the foot of the cross the life blood of all true morality, and bade us believe and hope and practice the moral law. As the love given of free accord by man to that central figure of the whole human race, proceeds not from the senses, but from the soul, so also do the affectionate devotion and observance of the moral code taught by Him proceed not from any mundane, but from supernatural motives. Let human nature act according to its present laws, give to each faculty its natural exercise, to each tendency its natural gratification, to the whole the natural objects craved for, and it is never further from having attained its goal. With all that nature can give, man remains infinitely below his destiny—a mere inchoate creature, wanting an object that can fill the deep void within; for though man, he is not as yet a moral being. It is both a remarkable and an undeniable fact that all who take reason alone for their

guide and disown conscience, fail to grasp the one essential principle of all ethics. It is an undeniable fact, for it is the standing reproach of all speculative systems, from Plato down to our own times, and it is remarkable because it is invariably reproduced in every department of life, if we trust ourselves in practical matters to the guidance of reason rather than of conscience, because it runs through all human life, when abandoned to simple nature. True morality, then, as far as the inquiry into individual life reveals, consists in the practical worship of those highest and purest virtues that are embodied in a real person, living and acting, the God-man, Christ, out of an affectionate devotion. The recognition of the relationship of man to God, and of God to man, and of man to man through and on account of the common relation to God, is, then, the very essence and substance of all morality. Only by referring all our actions back to God do we obtain rational, acceptable motives. Life, as we have seen, asks us to do a great many things which neither civic nor social relations can ever impose upon us, and these very acts, whose performance sometimes seems almost to defy reason and every law of nature, are those which secure to the performers the character of exalted and unquestionable morality. Sociologists and agnostics, together with all Christendom, point out, as prototypes of the highest ethics, acts which, without a supernatural motive, refuse altogether to be comprehensible, and thus, in point of fact, acknowledge that without a belief in God, an accounting for our deeds and a retribution in accord with their merit or demerit, the individual is bereft of, is *minus* that one motive power which alone can stir up his sluggish energies to overcome the low promptings of human nature.

Apart, however, from the consideration of morality in the individual, an inquiry into the moral aspect of nations and ages forces us to precisely the same conclusion, for history is by no means a silent book on this very point. Let us confine ourselves, first of all, to those three principal virtues or perfections which are most wanting in heathen society and most characteristic of true civilization, namely, humility, regard for maternity, and lastly, chastity.

The whole philosophical and moral system of the Stoic school, which must be acknowledged as the least discreditable of all ancient systems, is founded on pride. The Stoic, to be sure, taught self-denial, detachment from the world, contempt of riches and honors, and superiority to all accidents of fortune. But he taught so because a man should have too high an opinion of himself to be affected by such trifles. Very different is the view taken by Christian moralists. The truly moral man rises with them above the world, not by his pride but by his humility. He proves his superiority to the world and to fortune by proving that his capacity

to suffer pain, disgrace, and even death, is much stronger than the power of the world to inflict them. The Christian observes the moral law, not like the Stoic, from a contempt of the weakness that could violate it, but from love of the law itself, from a profound sense of its sacredness and justice, engendered by the love of its Author. The Stoic found himself not unfrequently compelled to lay hands on his own life, while the Christian triumphs in his weakness by relying on a greater strength than his own. The Greek, as well as the Roman, civilization, was founded on pride and respect for success, and exhibits, consequently, no trace of compassion and sympathy for the poor, the friendless, the helpless, and the aged. "*Væ victis!*" was a maxim most scrupulously observed. Not until we go back to the nations of old, and make ourselves acquainted with their manners and customs, usages and laws, prior to their conversion to Christianity, do we see their real deformity, or can we in any degree appreciate the immense change, as regards humility, wrought by the ethics of Christianity.

Coming next to the holy function of maternity, nowhere do we find in heathendom any conception of its true significance, its sacred character. It is well known that in Sparta all malformed children were put to death as soon as born, and, in Rome, also, the mother had no right over the child. The father had to say, when the nurse brought the child to him, whether it was to be reared or strangled. The prevalence of child murder, and the exposure of children in China and India, result likewise from the low estimate in which maternity is held. By placing maternity on the level of a mere animal function, society leads not only to the toleration and authorization of infanticide, but it degrades also womanhood, by making her a mere accomplice with man in sensual gratification. On the other hand, we observe that in proportion as the Christian view of woman and motherhood gains way, in like proportion child murder ceases.

As to chastity, suffice it to say that voluptuousness was worshipped as a goddess through nearly all polished heathendom, and, if what grave historians have recorded is to be believed, nothing can exceed the corruption of the moral atmosphere of Rome with a Julia and a Messalina. We cannot speak of really moral notions on any of these three virtues prior to the advent of Christ.

If we consider next the social position of woman, we arrive at the same result. The sale of women to the highest bidder for the gratification of lust was customary among the Babylonians, and if we mistrust Herodotus and turn to Strabo, we learn of still more revolting practices among other nations. Woman's position in Greece was hardly less degrading. She was the instrument of

lust, and the bearer of children, but not man's equal; on the contrary, his inferior, whom it was no crime to treat with contempt. Beauty of form constituted her main worth even at the time when the civilization of Greece had reached its summit. If we turn to savage tribes, we learn that men went wife-hunting as they went bear-hunting, and the captives were slaves. Judging by the foregoing crucial tests the morality of any age or nation, we are constrained to admit that except in Christendom none can be found. The normal current of human morals has flowed, and never ceased to flow, from the foot of the cross. Whatever real progress has been made during the last nineteen hundred years, came from the influence of Christianity upon society. No one can hold otherwise without confounding change with progress. Changes, very great changes, have been wrought outside of that current, but no real progress. Fortunately, the world is pretty well agreed that the Christian code of ethics is so far superior to anything preceding it as to offer no longer debatable ground. Unfortunately, the world is not yet agreed that there is but one code of Christian morality extant, and that all others, whether sailing under the disguise of Christianity or not, are spurious fabrications. And here again, we take it, the questioning of life enables us to discern the genuine from the shâm code.

Society, as is well known, depends upon the family, and the family, in turn, depends upon a sacred and sanctified relationship, marriage. Now, if we withdraw from marriage the moral principle by and through which it acquires a sacred character, the only supports left to virtue are the natural sentiments, instincts, and inclinations which lead invariably to crime, vice, and immorality. The moment we look upon marriage merely as a civil institution, the moment we remove from it the moral element, we leave, practically, the relation of the sexes to the concupiscence of human nature. Divorce is, in reality, nothing but successive polygamy or successive polyandry, as the case may be, and wherever divorce is not tabooed, there we need not look for the true code of ethics. Nor is this all. If marriage consists only in the operation of the unrestrained sensual appetites of men and women, it can have no regard to the birth and education of children, but must look solely to the self-indulgence and pleasure of the couple to which children would be a great encumbrance. Thus divorce and free-love are not only incompatible with true morality, but wherever they are, the atmosphere is far from pure.

But this is not all. A more careful investigation tells us more still. As morality in the individual must needs begin with a habit of thought, a belief in the authority of the moral law, and must next influence will, and finally issue forth in action; so morality begins

in society with the social unit, the family. And since the family is constituted by marriage, the morality of society depends entirely and solely upon the correct moral view in regard to marriage. Now marriage, in order to be in full accord with the true moral code, demands, or rather presupposes, three things: sanctity, unity, and indissolubility, three things which it lacked in the pagan world, and which it lacks even in the modern world in proportion as it ceases to be truly Christian. Social corruption, whether ancient or modern, begins always with the family; and to destroy the family means, then, to destroy society and all that deserves the name of civilization. Whatever moral greatness modern nations possess, as compared with pagans, proceeds from the moral view of marriage, from the Christian view of the family. Let this be clearly understood, for it is the most important lesson history teaches us in order to find where true morality is now to be found in the world. Now, the "reformers" of the sixteenth century began by first denying the indissolubility of marriage; and by next denying its religious character, viz., its sanctity, they entirely cut loose from true morality. To permit polygamy, not simultaneous polygamy, but successive, actual polygamy, by permitting the divorced man or woman to marry while wife or husband is still alive, is to proclaim a moral code, not on a higher, but on precisely the same plane with that of antiquity. It is strange, indeed, with what blind tenacity would-be Christianity clings to a shadow after having discarded the substance. It is sheer mockery to talk about morality alongside of divorce; it is a mere play of words to acknowledge divorce, but to disown polygamy. Yet Protestantism could not help itself. The two cardinal principles underlying all its countless forms of belief, that of negation and that of private judgment, once admitted into ethics, destroy with deadly certainty. It needs but a denial of an absolute, invariable standard of morality; it needs but an application of private judgment as to what is and what is not moral, in order to have, not only divorce, but free-love. Private judgment, guided on one hand by our rebellious inclinations, and on the other hand by our disinclination to morally reproach ourselves, easily coins a code by which the semblance of moral conduct, at least, may be preserved, by which that which is repulsive to truly moral notions may be seemingly moral by being in accord with a loose ethical code. Again, denying, as Protestantism does, that an infallible interpretation of God's law exists here below outside of human reason, the ultimate tribunal pronouncing upon right and wrong is transferred to that selfsame *Ego* which hates so much self-accusation. The repugnance within us to offend our own sinful propensities predisposes us to cling to every straw, if, by holding on to it, we appear a trifle less sinful in our eyes. If we

are immoral, we hate to so consider ourselves, even in the secrecy of our chambers, so strong is our innate desire to escape the censorship of conscience, and for this reason are people so ready to subscribe to ethical codes which apparently remove, or at least lessen, that odium. The old lines,

> Video meliora proboque,
> Deteriora sequor,

have lost none of their force. They apply even to our unwillingness to see after we are no longer blindfolded; for to own up that the truth is perceived, and yet not to embrace the same at once, requires a moral courage much greater than to pretend to not having seen the truth, an avowal of moral cowardice with which, alas, our times are surfeited. Let it not be forgotten that we are responsible, morally responsible for our convictions, our belief, our actions, for all in which the *will is brought directly into play*. Great heroism is not required to plead ignorance, when ignorance suits our purposes; but to see and embrace truth, requires a complete attachment to truth, and very few in a period of laxity such as ours have the courage to do it. "Morality without foundation in the belief in God and the soul's immortality," so M. Emile de Laveleye, a Protestant, writes, "the vague sentiment which wavers between good and evil, without any exertion on our own part to awaken in us the consciousness of our imperfection and the aspirations after an ideal of the true and the just; in a word, human nature totally delivered up to its earthly instincts, how is it to follow the right path and accomplish its high destiny? Without doubt the animal species, directed by its instincts, subsists and perpetuates itself by gratifying the appetites. Savages live pretty much in the same way, without the ideas of duty and of another life exercising great influence over their actions; but their existence also is that of brutes; without ceasing, they fight over the prey, and the strongest comes off the best. What would become of our societies, which rest upon respect paid to law, were the duty and the very idea of justice to disappear? Atheism, conscious, universal, publicly avowed and everywhere taught, would it not inevitably lead us back to the barbarity of prehistoric times?" Evidently, M. de Laveleye recognizes the necessity of a supernatural belief as the only basis of morality, and hence of society. Whether the inability to believe in God proceeds from the cherished and unchallenged bias of atheistic education, or from a violent recoil from religious training, or from a habitual disregard of the voice of conscience, or from a too exclusive addiction to the methods and teachings of physical science, or to the combined action of these influences, it is quite certain that man is none the less morally responsible for his convictions. It is, therefore, not the relative, but the absolute

standard of ethics which alone applies universally. Of course, in the limited space of a review article, it is impossible exhaustively to treat as vast a subject as morality and life even in any one respect. The mere attempt would at once show a fatal delusion on the part of him who would venture upon so bold a task. Yet from the few outlines which we have jotted down, from the line of thought which we have tried to point out, certain conclusions are already inevitable, and it seems to us that more thorough inquiries into the aspects of the question on which we threw out merely a few suggestions, can not fail further to confirm these conclusions.

To sum up: We hold that the introspection of morality, as far as individuals are concerned, reveals to us the imperative necessity of belief in an omnipotent law-giver as a first and indispensable condition of morality. To render suffering meritorious; to impart contentment with our lot, no matter how humble and miserable it may be; to awaken in us a life-giving consciousness of our duties to our fellow man and to society; to make us consider ourselves not owners, but trustees simply, of what is given to us, stewards who have to render account; to render charity, compassion, love, chastity and all ennobling and elevating sentiments as active forces in life the priceless treasures which these virtues are acknowledged to be; in short, to put mankind above the level of the brute and prevent humanity from crawling along with gaze bent downward upon the crust of the earth, we need God, we need His moral law. But we need one thing more; and that is, we need an infallible interpretation of that law by the observance of which we rise to the heights of true moral beings. We must consider ourselves moral beings, for without a higher central force impelling us to forsake and overcome our corruption, the victory of our animalism is certain; we must believe ourselves moral, for without belief our intuitive consciousness of responsibility for all we do and leave undone would be fatal mockery; but we must believe, finally, also in an infallible interpretation, else the knowledge of the moral law would be wanting, and it would not be our inheritance, our birthright, our privilege to stand upon the elevation of the moral ground. And all this, let it be well understood, we must believe, not because the Catholic Church and the Pope in Rome say so, but because life bids us see that only upon the co-existence of these conditions can morality be predicated. Every truth taught by life is a truly Catholic truth, a dogmatic truth, not because the See of St. Peter proclaims it so, but because of its being a truth; and as Catholicity can hold only truths, it is then, *ipsissima natura*, a Catholic truth. This road we take, is the one best adapted in our times to lead society back to the re-acceptance of that incorruptible moral code of Christ which we must live up to, if we hope for true life as the reward of a truly moral earthly career.

THE LATEST PHASE OF THE GREAT PYRAMID DISCUSSION.

Life and Work at the Great Pyramid during the months of January, February, March, and April, A.D. 1865. In three volumes. By C. Piazzi Smyth, Professor of Practical Astronomy in the University of Edinburgh, and Astronomer Royal for Scotland, etc. Edmonston & Douglas. Edinburgh. 1867.

Our Inheritance in the Great Pyramid. New and enlarged edition, including all the most important discoveries up to the present time. By Piazzi Smyth, Astronomer Royal for Scotland, etc. W. Isbister & Co. London. 1874.

A Miracle in Stone; or, the Great Pyramid of Egypt. By Joseph A. Seiss, D.D. Thirteenth edition, enlarged. Porter & Coates. Philadelphia. No date, but the preface to the fourth edition is dated September, 1878.

The Pyramids and Temples of Gizeh. By W. M. Flinders Petrie. Field & Tuer; Simpkin, Marshall & Co.; Hamilton, Adams & Co. London. Scribner & Welford. New York. 1883.

The International Standard. A Magazine Devoted to the Preservation and Perfection of the Anglo-Saxon Weights and Measures, and the Discussion and Dissemination of the Wisdom contained in the Great Pyramid of Jeezeh, in Egypt. Article by the Rev. H. G. Wood, in the January number of 1884.

The Imaginary Metrological System of the Great Pyramid of Gizeh. By F. A. P. Barnard, President of Columbia College. From the Proceedings of the American Metrological Society. Presented to the Society December 29th, 1883. Reprinted from School of Mines' Quarterly of January, March, and May, 1884. John Wiley & Sons. New York. 1884.

WHAT may fairly be termed the vagaries of the Pyramidists might be passed by in silence, were it not that one form of them presents itself as obstructive, both in this country and Great Britain, to the general introduction and use of the metric system. When we say "metric system," we have in mind much more the idea of a decimal system, based on some convenient unit, than the idea of the particular metric system, based on the French metre. The value of the "metric system" depends less upon its initial unit than upon its decimal and correlated character. But, in opposing the metric system, as based upon the metre, pyramidists, some of whom favor a decimal system, do more than this.

They advocate without alternative the inch as the base of their system. They establish no relations, such as exist in the metric system, between standards of capacity and weight, and make no adequate suggestion as to whence to derive the unit of weight. Therefore, as the case stands now, the metric system having been largely adopted by civilized countries, it were best to give it our cordial support, and to regard as of little force an objection to it which would obstruct its final general adoption, because of a far from insuperable difficulty, inherent in its derivation from a truly standarded metre. Nevertheless, this system is called, at least by some pyramidists, atheistical, upon the rather vague ground that it originated about the time of the French Revolution, and that it is antagonistic to the measures which pyramidists regard as prescribed by divine authority, deduced by them from indications in the Great Pyramid of Gizeh.

One of the latest prominent incidents of the Great Pyramid controversy is the publication in book form of President F. A. P. Barnard's essay on the Pyramid, which had appeared serially in the Columbia College *School of Mines' Quarterly*, and which has been adversely reviewed by believers in the authenticity of the Pyramid's metrological and religious record. The wide difference of opinion regarding the significance of the Great Pyramid could not be better exemplified than by the title of President Barnard's book, as contrasted with that of the Rev. Dr. Seiss, published a few years ago, President Barnard calling his work "The Imaginary Metrological System of the Great Pyramid of Gizeh," and the Rev. Dr. Seiss, his "A Miracle in Stone, or The Great Pyramid of Egypt."

The literature of the subject is voluminous, originating before Professor C. Piazzi Smyth's large contribution to it, but only from that date acquiring momentum, until now, when belief in the religious significance of the Great Pyramid includes in the list of its promoters several men of ability combined with certain scientific attainment, is represented by a society called the International Institute, and by a magazine devoted wholly to the discussion and elucidation of discoveries in regard to the Great Pyramid, and to the promulgation of faith in its divine origin. From our point of view, it is strange that such men as we find among the membership of the International Institute can credit certain things which they affirm upon what has, to them, seemed sufficient evidence derived from the Great Pyramid. But while, on the one hand, it must be remembered that acceptance of truth has not always or generally followed immediately upon its promulgation, it must, on the other, be conceded that the finding of certain names of mark ranged on one side of a given question is no infallible criterion to which men may pin their faith in assent. So, the misery of it in

this world is that every one must, in the long run, judge for himself, while, at the same time, few are capable of judging wisely.

We do not understand President Barnard as altogether denying the metrological (measuring) significance of the Great Pyramid, but as denying the peculiar metrological significance ascribed to it by some persons. We understand him as denying what we, according to the best lights obtainable by us, ourselves deny, that from the Great Pyramid is deducible a sacred cubit, from which, in turn, was originally deduced the British inch, now degenerated by the loss of one one-thousandth part; that this sacred cubit, in contradistinction to the profane cubits (profane, in this connection, meaning merely secular), was used by the inspiration of God in the construction of the Great Pyramid, and that certain pyramid dimensions are inspired teachings, or indeed any teachings at all, with reference to earth-dimensions, and to the earth's astronomical relations, in time to certain constellations, and in distance to the sun. We do not deny that metrological knowledge is embodied in the Great Pyramid. We hold merely that its degree is undemonstrated; and that, as to the question of whatever there exists being there placed by divine wisdom for the instruction of future generations, it must remain forever undemonstrable and unknown. There have been deduced from certain interior portions of the Great Pyramid even prophetic details of the "Reformation." Undoubtedly, President Barnard goes too far in the opposite direction from pyramidists, in designating the Great Pyramid "that huge and senseless pile;" for it has been clearly shown that, both exteriorly and interiorly, the relation of the radius to the circumference of the circle is expressed in its proportions, and that, in many other particulars, it is wonderful in design and execution. That President Barnard has used the expression quoted, only goes to show, nothing more, that the controversy has led as usual to extreme statement, to meet exaggeration on the other side.

It seems to us that the exaggeration of the other side is immeasurably greater. Considering that exaggeration, it is strange to us, for one thing, that President Barnard's critics deny that the believers in the Pyramid metrological-religious theory have rendered themselves liable to the ascription to them of having instituted a new religion. New religion, strictly speaking, it certainly is not; but when these persons acclaim as inspired of God a work in which they find so much significance as they do at every step in the Pyramid, in physical teaching and in prophecy, their belief is surely sufficiently defined in popular parlance by the statement originally made by Professor Proctor, that they had instituted a new religion. In strict accuracy, the Great Pyramid is to them another Bible, antedating even the Old Testament. It is, accord-

ing to their view, one of the only two inspired records on earth. It may be said, on the other hand, that many pyramidists probably repudiate the extreme views which others entertain. Probably they do; outside pressure has hitherto been too strong for the potentially existing sects to break out into open schism. The Rev. Dr. Seiss took occasion, in a foot-note to page 248 of the thirteenth edition, enlarged, of his work on the Great Pyramid, to reprove some zealous writers, who, going far beyond his own belief that it was possibly Melchizedec or some similar personage who was the founder of the Pyramid, had put forth and were upholding the doctrine that its founder was none other than "the Son of God in human form." If such views, however, as those expressed by Mr. John Taylor, Mr. William Petrie, Professor C. Piazzi Smyth, and the Rev. Dr. Seiss, represent the general sense of believers, they should not object to the tenor of President Barnard's essay. It must be regarded as fairly summarizing the general sense, as published, of believers regarding the metrological-religious significance of the Great Pyramid.

We are all disposed at the present day to examine and judge of everything upon its own merits as far as we can learn them, and not, as of old, to decide by snap-judgment as to credibility and incredibility in any given case. Thus viewing this matter, we, for our part, find in the Great Pyramid much that is extraordinary, much of even what might be called marvelous in design and execution. That it has metrological significance, in the sense that it was constructed by most competent architects and workmen, and that it has in its design, seen through its construction, geometrical and astronomical knowledge, we have not a shadow of doubt. But that it has, incorporated in its structure, indication of earth-dimensions and solar distance, and time commensuration, and other things attributed to it, there is no evidence whatever, except in arbitrarily derived numerical values which modern science has reached as approximate determinations. The length of the polar axis of the earth, for instance, being known to modern science only approximately, and being a quantity, too, which never can be determined with precision, the assumed length of it, derived from the Great Pyramid, while having a close agreement with the approximate length deduced from observations by modern science, is held by pyramidists to be exactly correct, and the error, supposing it to be represented by the difference between the two determinations, to reside in the modern scientific determination. Thus, the Pyramid arbitrarily-derived length of the polar axis of the earth is first proved to be right by the fact of its coming near to the value assigned to it approximately by modern scientific determination, and having been in this way proved virtually right,

is regarded as therefore absolutely right, and rules the modern scientific determination out entirely, as comparatively of no weight. According to Pyramidists, the uttermost refinements of modern scientific work are far below the accuracy discovered in the Great Pyramid. Naturally this must be the true view, if the points be conceded that, first of all, its revelation is as to the particular subject-matter alleged, and then that it is inspired. Pyramidists have over scientists a great apparent and real advantage in the argument, from the circumstance that whenever a number, however derived from the Great Pyramid, nearly coincides with the number which modern science has shown to be an approximation to the truth, they are enabled through their theory to claim that their figures are confirmed by the scientific approximation. How unfortunate it would have been for pyramidists if there had been no such thing as the approximations of modern science. Without them the revelations of the Great Pyramid would not have been revealed. Perhaps the whole function of modern science is to suggest revelations to the Great Pyramid, by offering approximations that draw forth the exact truth, lying otherwise buried for all time! How, if astronomers had not suggested within a half million or so of miles, the mean distance of the earth from the sun, could the Great Pyramid have ever been able to give up the secret of the exact distance!

A crucial test of the truth of the theory of believers in the extraordinary significance of the Great Pyramid should lie in their conclusions drawn from the length of the sides of the Pyramid, measured at the base. It so happens that there had been no satisfactory measurements of the base-sides until those made between 1880–1882, by Mr. W. M. Flinders Petrie. The Royal Engineers, it is true, and Mr. Gill, and Professor Watson had made, respectively, measurements of the base-sides of the Pyramid, which are good; but the discrepancy which those measurements showed with previous results brought it about that no confidence, generally, existed, as to the base-side lengths, until Mr. Petrie determined them and published his methods in full. The French Academicians, commissioned to make investigations by Napoleon I., when in Egypt, had long previously found the northeast and northwest corner-sockets of the base of the Pyramid, and, of course, could measure the line only between them, which they did. Theirs, and other measurements, however, were not deemed conclusive, although all four corner-sockets were eventually discovered and utilized. The French measure proves to be utterly bad. But good, bad, or indifferent, as the measurements of any or of all the base-sides may have been, even including Mr. Petrie's, if one choose to think so, the fact remains, that not until Mr. Petrie's

measurements was it taken into consideration that the length of a base-side of the Pyramid is not to be regarded as the line between the outside corners of any two sockets, taken around the Pyramid's perimeter. The corner-sockets, cut in the living rock, represent merely the Pyramid's foundation on the side of the hill. The real lengths of the base-sides of the Pyramid are to be regarded as the lengths of the four lines as projected above, with the Pyramid angles, on the horizontal pavement that originally surrounded the structure, vestiges of which remain to this day. Consequently, as the Pyramid (sacred) cubit is in one case, and that the most important, derived by pyramidists from the base-side as originally measured between any two corner-sockets on the slope of the hill, divided by the number of days and the fractional part thereof, in the solar tropical year, the same cubit cannot now be obtained by dividing the shorter line, proved by Mr. Petrie to be the true length of the base-side, by the same number as before. In other words, the Pyramid (sacred) cubit length, deduced by Professor C. Piazzi Smyth, from the formerly assumed length of the base-side of the Pyramid, divided by the number of days and the fractional part in the solar tropical year, being alleged by him to be one ten millionth part of half of the earth's polar axis, what becomes of the Pyramid (sacred) cubit, now that the base-side of the Pyramid is known to be of a different length from that which it was thought to be, and what becomes of the determination of the length of the earth's polar axis? Not only is what we have mentioned the fact,—that the base heretofore taken by pyramidists is not the true base of the Pyramid,—but their theoretical length of the base-side of the base adopted by them has been proved by Mr. Petrie's measurements to be incorrect.

As remarked, not until the advent of Mr. Petrie upon the scene were all the base-sides of the Pyramid measured satisfactorily, and the question disposed of as to which is the true base. He found that lines connecting the Pyramid's corner-sockets on the base-sides did not represent a true square; consequently, that the lowest sockets on the hill-side were farthest from, and the highest sockets nearest to the centre of the Pyramid. The base of the Pyramid had been so long assumed to be the ground-plan on the hill-side, that Mr. Petrie must have been startled at coming unexpectedly upon what is the contrary fact. Back of this lay a reason for it, and he proceeded to find that reason. That the Pyramid should be square at the base was involved in the conception of the architecture. He was soon rewarded by discovering the cause of the absence of symmetry in the ground-plan. It had been formerly assumed that, from the corner-sockets, the Pyramid had been built vertically until it cut, at a short distance above, the horizontal

plane that was eventually represented by the pavement around it; so that a base-side of the Pyramid measured on the ground between the corner-sockets would be of the same length as a base-side measured between the corners of the Pyramid as projected vertically on the pavement. Both of these original assumptions, one of which depends upon the other, Mr. Petrie found to be untrue. He found that the angle of the Pyramid started at once from the four corner-sockets on the hill-side, and consequently, that the length of a base-side of the Pyramid, measured on the ground between the corner-sockets, was longer than if measured on the level of the pavement between the Pyramid corners. The difference, which is about five feet, was easily ascertained by him, with the aid of levelling, by reducing to figures the length of the lines actually measured between the corner-sockets, to the length that they would be if projected by the corner-angles of the Pyramid upon the horizontal plane above, represented by the now fragmentary pavement.

Despite the fact that the ground-plan of the Pyramid has been found by Mr. Petrie to be askew, and not horizontal, and that the horizontal pavement, now discovered on all four sides of the structure, exhibits the Pyramid as there equilateral, if the plane of the pavement be constructively extended to the Pyramid's sides; and that it is therefore proved that the pavement-base of the Pyramid is, architecturally, to be considered the true base, there are still dissentient voices harping on the other base, when even by it the theoretical measure has been disproved. To reconcile discrepancies, pointed out through the labors of Mr. Petrie, his book had not long been published when the Rev. H. G. Wood, in an article in the *International Standard*, of January, 1884, started out with the assertion that there had always been doubt as to what to consider as the true base of the Pyramid, whether the pavement-plane or some other plane below it. Then, by the ingenious method of assuming the level of the floor of the southeast corner-socket (the lowest of the corner-sockets) as the datum of levels, and by hypothetically carrying down the Pyramid angle of the northeast corner through the rock on which it rests, until it reached the same level as the floor of the southeast corner-socket, the length of the east base-side of the Pyramid was made to conform nearly to the theoretical base-side length. By the process of thus arbitrarily projecting the northeast corner of the Pyramid, and correspondingly projecting the northwest corner, the north base-side length became theoretically nearly correct. Finally, by supposing the west and south base-sides respectively conformable to the other sides thus established, we have, ready-built, a theoretical pyramid on a theoretical base. After having established this imaginary

pyramid on this imaginary base, by imaginarily thrusting three extended corners of the real Pyramid through the rock until the base-lines had attained a length theoretically needed, a process which the writer informed us is according to the principles of geometry, he proceeded. He took up the question of the base-sides between the corner-sockets, as they actually are, according to Mr. Petrie, and imaginarily girdling the Pyramid with four links, represented by lines whose length was arbitrarily derived from astronomical considerations (lengths fortified by their approximation to Mr. Petrie's actual measures), he found in his results all that he had put there. But a little balance of adjustment still appearing to him desirable, an earthquake sufficed to set things nearly right. A genie, Slave of the Lamp, accomplished, like a skilful waiter, the task of tilting the Pyramid without leaving any record of his earth-tray having been lifted; for the ample floors of the corner-sockets remain level to this day.

The thoroughgoing pyramidist will stick to the ground-plan for his base, askew or not askew, horizontal or not horizontal, because the ground-plan supports, with the least apparent imperfection, his theoretical measures upon which other theoretical things rest. If actual measures be found not to agree with theory, it is easy enough to imagine a modified Pyramid, and an earthquake of a few thousand years ago can hurt no one of that time and may much benefit living men. There are certain dislocations in the interior of the Pyramid, which are certainly from settling, and which were probably produced by the shock or shocks of an earthquake. But that earthquake shocks could have affected the mass of the Pyramid to the degree ascribed to them by the writer in question is disproved by the fact that the floors of the four corner-sockets have retained their level so well that they stand the test of a levelling instrument. If the earth had permanently settled in one place, enough to satisfy the needs of this writer,—that is, settled four inches, so as appreciably to change the statical height of the floor of even a single corner-socket, neither it nor the floor of any other corner-socket would have remained level. The evidence as to the direction of the earthquake shock, adduced by this writer from the fact of the pavement in the middle of the west and on the middle of the south side of the Pyramid being slightly lower than the level of the pavement elsewhere, producing, as he claimed, a settling of the Pyramid towards the southwest, will not stand for a moment against the evidence existing on the ground, that the four corner-sockets are now, at the present day, as truly level as they were in the day when they were hewn to a perfect horizontal plane. The occurrence of earthquake shocks is not disputed. There can hardly be any question that there have

been earthquake shocks at the Pyramid, perhaps many and severe shocks; the evidence in favor of the supposition, in the wrecked condition of the interior about the King's Chamber, seems overwhelming in support of the theory. But shocks that would shatter with their wrench the integrity of interior, hollow spaces, pressed upon by enormous superincumbent weight, would not necessarily affect the integrity of the foundation of the Pyramid. That the foundation has not been affected has been amply proved.

It has not been doubtful, as this writer stated, where the base, architecturally considered, ought to lie. Pyramidists have always claimed the ground-plan base to be the true base, because that nearly agrees with theoretical measures, and no other base was much thought of; anti-pyramidists contenting themselves with showing that the measures of it presented by their opponents were unsatisfactory. Every one believed the base on the hill-side to be essentially square, the discordance of its proffered base-side lengths being supposed to be chiefly owing to imperfect measurements. When, not only was it found to be not square, but, on the contrary, the pavement-base was discovered, and found to be square, the requirement in every one's mind ought to have been satisfied; but this pyramidists now seem to wish to evade. Every one was unaware, not long since, that the Pyramid did not rise vertically from the ground-plan until it passed through the pavement, and at that point take the pyramid slopes. Many persons did not even know that there had probably once been a continuous pavement around the Pyramid. Mr. Petrie it is who has for the first time certified to the existence of pavement on all four sides. If the Pyramid had ascended vertically until it passed through the pavement, and if the ground-plan had been square, then, of course, the base-sides measured on the pavement or on the ground-plan would have been identical in length. But the fact being, as already set forth, that the Pyramid at the ground-plan is askew and not horizontal, but, on the contrary, at the level of the pavement is essentially equiangular and equilateral, taken in connection with the other fact that the pyramid slopes start from the corner-sockets and pass with those slopes through the pavement; the base-sides of the Pyramid, measured on the pavement, are considerably shorter than the base-sides measured on the ground-plan. Architecturally speaking, a pyramid's base must be square. As the earth is not formed primarily to support pyramids, in a spot in which the design is to place a pyramid the ground must generally be levelled to insure that the pyramid's earth base and its architectural base shall be horizontally of the same dimensions. In fact, in this case the earth base and the architectural base would be one and the same thing. But the ground was not levelled at the Great

Pyramid; hence, the earth base, which is merely the condition *sine quâ non* of the Pyramid's standing, is not the architectural, therefore not the true base. One should therefore say, it would seem, that as the base of the Great Pyramid on the level of the pavement is square, and the base on the ground-plan askew and not equilateral, there could be no question as to which base is to be regarded as the true one. But, unfortunately, pyramidists have a theoretical base-side measure (to which measurement does not conform), and, upon the faith that the theoretical measure is true, they still maintain a stout fight in defence of their theories. Now that an undeniable, actual measure has entered into the question, the theoretical measure must be upheld by some means; one of which, as we have shown, is by assuming the southeast corner-socket floor as the datum of levels, and at all the other corners the Pyramid as piercing the ground to such depths as will make the ground-plan sides accord with the theoretical measure. Let us not be misconstrued. We have no intention of stating or implying that these gentlemen wittingly manufacture and discard evidence at pleasure. All that we think and are responsible for stating, and frankly say, is, that we believe them to be so imbued, through long meditation on the mysteries of the Great Pyramid, with the truth of their theories, that now, when new lights have been thrown upon the subject, they are unable to overcome the force of their prepossessions.

All sorts of things have been supposed of the Great Pyramid's base. One, the wildest, is that there was originally a plinth extending all around the Pyramid, on which astronomers sat in rows, contemplating the stars. But the fact remains, nevertheless, that the Pyramid slopes up, with the pyramid angles, from the ground-plan, through the pavement; that the base on the pavement is, architecturally, the true base; that the ground-plan always was and is now askew; that it must needs have been askew to render it possible for the horizontal plane of the pavement to make the Pyramid square as it rose through that surface; that the ground-plan measures of the base-sides between corner-sockets have never been, through an earthquake or any other cause, other than they are now, for the all-sufficient reason that the floors of the corner-sockets remain perfectly level.

Even Professor C. Piazzi Smyth, although he lived for months on the ground, had very vague notions about the relations to each other of the pyramid slopes, the ground-plan, and the pavement-base, for he says (pages 139 and 140, vol. iii., of "Life and Work at the Great Pyramid"), referring to the casing-stones discovered by Colonel Howard Vyse (and the reader will please observe that the italics are Professor Smyth's): "These remarkable stones, accord-

ing to his [Colonel Vyse's] testimony, spring at once, with their oblique exterior slopes of 51° 51′ 14″, from the upper surface of a broad, flat, level area of exquisite masonry, known as the 'pavement;' which, in *that* part of the Pyramid, passes under it to some extent, is twenty-one inches thick, and four hundred and two inches broad from the outer line of the casing-stones. Hence, the extensive assumption has been made by some persons, that a pavement of the same breadth and thickness completely surrounds the Pyramid; but, so far as thickness is concerned, a portion of the pavement is shown in one of our stereo-photographs, taken near the northwest socket, and is found to be barely more than ten inches thick. By examining, however, the angles and positions of the joints of this fragment, the inference may be pretty safely made, that the lower part of the *corner-stone* of the oblique casing-stone sheet there must have been of rectangular figure, though pyramidally bevelled above, and that it did, by the depth of such rectangular part or base, go through the whole thickness of the pavement there, whatever that was, and into the socket-hole cut for it in the rock below. Hence, the horizontal distance from the outer corner of one, to outer corner of another, adjacent socket-hole,—measured *on* the pavement and by means of the rectangular edges of the holes worked therein,—is, or should be, the true measure of the length of the ancient maximum bevelled side of the Pyramid; and may be considered equal to either 9140 or 9142 British inches, as already indicated. But whether that number would be extended to 9159,—by the slope being carried symbolically through the pavement, and then measured on the level of its under side, or at a thickness nearly similar to that which obtains at the northwest corner,—is a residual problem that must be left, notwithstanding its importance, for future excavations to settle; seeing that the earth, and the earth only, still retains the secret."

Noting, as we pass, the incorrect statement that Colonel Vyse had made the angle of the casing stones, discovered by him, 51° 51′ 14″, for Professor Smyth himself says (page 23 of "Our Inheritance in the Great Pyramid") that Colonel Vyse had determined their angle as 51° 50′, we have only to add that 51° 51′ 14.3″ is the *ideal* angle of the Pyramid (of which we shall have more to say presently), and then proceed to discuss the gist of Professor Smyth's statement. From it several things are apparent as to his belief. He was inclined to think that, including the northwest corner of the Pyramid, about which he incorrectly thought he knew, wherever there was question of pavement, the plane of the pavement passed under the Pyramid instead of the Pyramid's passing angularly through the pavement. He believed, however, that, notwithstanding pavement might have existed all around the structure,

if it in any or all cases proved to be the fact, the measures of the base-sides on the pavement would prove to be the same as the measures of the base-sides on the ground-plan; which is only as much as to say that the Pyramid would be found to have ascended vertically through the pavement, and to have thence taken its slopes. He was inclined to doubt (although from other evidence we know that he suspected) the existence of pavement all around the Pyramid. It is a corollary of his belief that the base-side measures above and below would be found to be the same, that he supposed the northwest corner of the angle of the Pyramid to be cut away vertically, so as not to go over greater space below than above. In all these points he was wrong. The corner-angles of the Pyramid might, he granted, have been symbolically carried below the level of the pavement there. The Rev. Mr. Wood, without hesitation, after the earth had given up its secret, carried three corners of the Pyramid symbolically through the rock. We do not say solid rock, because symbolical work makes no account of material. Were it adamant, it must yield. Such is the pertinacity with which preconceived ideas sometimes assert their authority in the face of the most contradictory established facts!

In view of the facts heretofore recited, regarding the mere facts, omitting the precision with which they have been established by Mr. Petrie, how President Barnard's critics can maintain that Mr. Petrie's results confirm the assertions of Pyramidists, and that his work is a cherished contribution to their literature, is a mystery! President Barnard, on the contrary, says that if Mr. Petrie's book had come out in time for him, it would have saved him the trouble of writing his essay. The fact stares us in the face that the ground-plan length of the base-sides of the Pyramid, upon the incorrect assumption of whose length so much has been founded, are not of the length assumed, and, to cap the climax, that the ground-plan of the Pyramid is not its architectural base. Can the ground-plan base-sides be known to be of a different length from that formerly believed to be their length, and the conclusions which depended upon the error be allowed to stand?

With this pavement-length of the base-side of the Pyramid, what becomes, we ask, of the pyramid (sacred) cubit, at least as derived from the former base-side measurements of the Pyramid? What becomes of the determination of the earth's polar axis as twenty million pyramid (sacred) cubits in length? What becomes of the three hundred and sixty-five days, plus, of the solar tropical year being represented by a base-side's measuring three hundred and sixty-five, plus, pyramid (sacred) cubits? What becomes, too, of the length of the diagonals of the base, and with change in their length, what becomes of the belief that, divided into pyramid

(sacred) inches, they indicate the number of years in the great precessional cycle? As not directly related to the foregoing questions, but interesting as within the general topic, one should like to inquire, also, upon what principle pyramidists multiply. Why do they consider the ninth power of ten indicated as the power to which the height of the Pyramid is to be raised to represent the mean distance from the earth to the sun? There is no reason for it. The cause of it was that Mr. William Petrie, the father of Mr. W. M. Flinders Petrie, who has so notably departed from the Pyramid faith, jumped to the conclusion, that the base-side of the Pyramid referring to the number of days of the solar tropical year, and its height in relation to its perimeter, referring to the relation of radius to the circumference of the circle, its height must represent the radius of the earth's mean orbit around the sun, as one is to one thousand million, or, in other words, to the height of the Pyramid raised to the ninth power of ten. But why the *ninth* power of ten? Mr. William Petrie's reason was that the angle of the Pyramid at the corners is ten parts of base to nine of height. It will occur to the reader that, given a unit at discretion, and unrestricted liberty to raise it arbitrarily to any degree, by any power, one can produce, within inappreciable differences, any dimension—height, length, width, distance—known or assumed. Professor Smyth, according to Mr. Petrie, having, by mistake, made the pavement too low by twenty inches, these twenty inches deducted from the height of the Pyramid, and raised to the ninth power of ten, make it necessary to reduce, by over three hundred thousand miles, the original pyramid indication of the earth's distance from the sun. The amount is small, according to scientific views, as a margin of uncertainty regarding the earth's distance, but from the pyramidist's point of view, it must be excessive.

President Barnard goes so far as to deny that the Great Pyramid was probably intended to indicate in its main proportions the relation of radius to circumference of the circle, ascribing to the adoption, without that intention, of the slope of ten to nine for the corner-angles of the Pyramid, the fact of the proportions actually found seeming to indicate reference to that relation. This view is not borne out by the measurements in certain portions of the interior of the Pyramid where there is no question of angle. President Barnard also remarks, that Mr. W. M. Flinders Petrie's work "demolishes completely the pretensions of the pyramid religion, and buries, beyond all hope of resurrection, the ingenious theories of Mr. John Taylor and Professor Piazzi Smyth." It has buried, fathoms deep, the religious, and the exaggerated metrological significance of the Great Pyramid, but it has not buried its real, legitimate wonders. Much remains outstanding, when the

miraculous about the Pyramid is removed. It is not nearly so great as the pyramidist, nor quite so little as President Barnard believes.

The account of the labors of Mr. W. M. Flinders Petrie on the site of the Pyramid, in two winters, 1880–1882, published in 1883, in quarto form, with the aid of a subvention of one hundred pounds from the Royal Society, says the last word possible regarding the exterior and interior dimensions of the Pyramid. Knowing how averse the general reader is to figures, we do not attempt to give from the mass of material at disposal, for which we are indebted to his labors and those of Professor Smyth, Colonel Howard Vyse, and others, any tabulated statement of angles, dimensions, or any minute statistics of the perfection of its masonry. No adequate notion, however, can be formed of the stupendous character of this monument, both as to size and workmanship, unless some details be given relating to those features of the structure. We do not say that it may not be amiss to give them; it is positively necessary to a comprehension of the subject, that they should be given. The workmanship of something that may be held in a casket does not astonish, for smallness itself suggests to the artificer elaboration, and the mind of the beholder equally demands it. But when we find, as the work of man, elaboration conjoined with colossal size, giving an idea of immensity, we contemplate the work with almost stupefaction.

One mention by Mr. Petrie (many similar details will be found in Professor Smyth's volumes) will give an idea of the character of the workmanship of the Great Pyramid. Speaking of the final adjustment of the Pyramid angles, by inference from some of the few casing-stones still remaining *in situ* (casing-stones originally made of the whole of the outside of the Pyramid a smooth surface) to the steps of the core-masonry, he says: "Several measures were taken of the thickness of the joints of the casing-stones. The eastern joint of the northern casing-stones is, on the top [in inches], .020, .002, .045 wide; and on the face, .012, .022, .013, and .040 wide. The next joint is on the face, .011 and .014 wide. Hence the mean thickness of the joints there is .020; and, therefore, the mean variation of the cutting of the stone from a straight line, and from a true square, is but .01 on length of 75 inches up the face, an amount of accuracy equal to most modern opticians' straight-edges of such a length. These joints, with an area of some thirty-five square feet, each, were not only worked as finely as this, but cemented throughout. Though the stones were brought as close as one five-hundredth inch, or, in fact, into contact, and the mean opening of the joint was but one-fiftieth inch, yet the builders managed to fill the joint with cement, despite the great area of it, and the weight of the

stone to be moved—some sixteen tons. To merely place such stones in exact contact at the sides would be careful work; but to do so with cement in the joint, seems almost impossible."

Mr. Petrie found the length of the base-sides of the Pyramid, on the pavement, to be, in inches, as follows: north, 9069.4; east, 9067.7; south, 9069.5; west, 9068 6. The mean is 9068.8 inches, the maximum difference from the mean of all the measurements being only about an inch. The original height of the Pyramid, as determined by Mr. Petrie, is 5776.0 inches, plus or minus seven inches. These measurements give the ratio of radius to circumference of the circle to within three units in the third place of decimals. What mere mason-work could reach a result like this, in attempting to carry out in an edifice of four hundred and eighty-one feet in height, the slope of so many parts of base to so many of perpendicular?

What has been mentioned regarding the mere exterior of the Great Pyramid, leaving untouched the wonders of its interior passages and chambers, will suffice for the purpose in view. Let us summarize the original dimensions and angles of the Great Pyramid and perceive its pristine grandeur. It rested on a square base, at the level of the original pavement, of nearly seven hundred and fifty-six feet to the side, and rose above the pavement vertically to the height of a little over four hundred and eighty-one feet, its sides looking skyward from the pavement to the apex, nearly six hundred and twelve feet, and its diagonal slopes a little over seven hundred and nineteen feet. That this monument, adjusted on a hill-side so accurately that when it cropped out of the horizontal plane of the eventual, but then prospective, pavement should have been exactly square, is wonderful. But that such a mass, ascending equiangularly to such a height, had not, as has been suggested, for the construction of its determining diagonal slopes, something more for guidance than the "rule of thumb," of 10 to 9; that it had not in its design and execution comprehensive mathematical knowledge, as largely inclusive of the mechanical rules of its construction, is more wonderful still, too wonderful to believe. It may be said that we are not certain that the builders succeeded in making it perfectly equiangular in the slopes of its sides, for we find at the now truncated top, about thirty-one feet below the original apex, that the platform is not exactly square, differing from a square by a little less than eight inches. But Mr. Petrie leaves it scarcely doubtful, from his instrumental angular measurements from the platform down the sides of the masonry, and from his discussion of the thickness of casing-stones, of hollowing and grooving of core-masonry, and from other considerations, that the defect in the symmetry of the core-masonry was made up by the casing-stones.

As the final result of all his measurements, linear and angular, Mr. Petrie gives the mean angle of the Pyramid at 51° 52′, plus or minus two minutes. Let us assume, for a moment, that it was perfectly equiangular in its slopes, and then see how nearly the angle computed from the ratio of the radius to the circumference of the circle, upon the supposition that the Pyramid was intended to have reference to that relation, will come to the angle found by Mr. Petrie. The ideal angle so computed is 51° 51′ 14.3″.

When we consider what number of parts of base to what of perpendicular are represented by this ideal angle of 51° 51′ 14.3″ for the side slope, that they are as 7.8539 + to 10, we shall see, independently of other considerations, that the masons' work could not have been constructed to that batter. Taking, on the contrary, the diagonal slope, we find that, whether angularly measured as nearly as possible on the Pyramid, or derived from the relation of the ancient height to ancient perimeter of the Pyramid, or from the computation of the ideal diagonal of the Pyramid, from the ratio of radius to circumference of the circle, the approximation is so close to the ratio of 10 to 9 that we can say, with reasonable certainty, that it must have been so intended, if not as a primary object, yet as one involved in the general design. We can say, with reasonable certainty, putting out of question any other mode of nicer inclusive adjustment, that in laying the masonry of the Pyramid, it was built along the diagonal slopes to the batter of 10 to 9; for the ideal angle of the side slope gives for the diagonal slope in parts of base to perpendicular 10 to 9.0032, and the diagonal slope, derived from computation from measures of ancient height and ancient perimeter, is 10 to 9.0073. The difference from each other, and from the ratio of 10 to 9, is so trifling as to bring conviction to the mind that it was intended that the diagonal slope should be 10 parts of base to 9 of perpendicular. That would bring it out sufficiently close to the ratio of radius to circumference of the circle, which is indeterminate.

The ideal angle of the diagonal slope of the Pyramid, upon the assumption that the Pyramid had reference to the ratio of radius to circumference, is 41° 59′ 50.0″. The angle of the same slope computed from the ratio of 10 parts of base to 9 of perpendicular, is 41° 59′ 14.0″. The angle of the same slope computed from measures of height and perimeter, is 42° 00′ 36.6″. The greatest difference between any two is one minute, twenty-two and six-tenths seconds, and the least difference thirty-six seconds. Finally, deducing the angle for the side slope from the ratio of 10 to 9 for the diagonal slope, it is found to be 51° 50′ 39.1″. The difference is only thirty-five and two-tenths seconds from the ideal angle for the side slope, as already given, namely, 51° 51′ 14.3″.

The masonry ought to have been adjusted by the diagonal slopes, with the help, as Mr. Petrie suggests as having been actually employed (a suggestion whose correctness is justified by the fact of the horizontal inward general hollowing and central grooves of the core-masonry sides), of a finely-set line of casing-stones down the middle of the sides. Undoubtedly that would be the true way of adjusting the work in its details. But the question remains as to what kept up the rigid refinement of angle in the four diagonal slopes of over seven hundred feet long, so that they, in all probability, came out exactly at the apex of the Pyramid. Certainly not the 10 to 9 rule. The adjustment of the Pyramid on the hill-side, with its ground-plan there made with exactly the amount of irregularity to insure, as it did, that when the Pyramid passed through the horizontal plane of the eventual pavement, it should be equilateral and equiangular at the pavement-base, that, in other words, it should be square on the pavement, as it was, shows that its architect could deal with figures; and the precision of its slopes argues with equal force that this refinement was secured by adjustment with an instrument, of some sort, capable of taking vertical angles.

Considering the fact, which has now been dwelt upon with such particularity as to warrant the belief of its being impressed upon the reader, that the socket-sides' base was made unsymmetrical to just the degree necessary to insure that the Pyramid slopes, as they cut the pavement, would represent a square, the use of two things is strongly implied, one as a certainty, the other as a strong probability. The certainty implied is that, in laying out the ground-plan, the builders used a levelling instrument of some sort, whether spirit-level or water-level (*niveau d'eau*), to determine the relative heights of the floors of the corner-sockets. The probability implied is that they used, for laying out the angles of the ground-plan, an instrument capable of taking horizontal angles. Although it would be possible, upon a piece of ground similar to that on which the Pyramid stands, of slight eccentricity of surface, to lay out by direct measurements, tied together, a ground-plan representing that of the Pyramid, to fulfil the condition of a pyramid there being square as it rose through a horizontal plane; yet it would be difficult, without an instrument for horizontal angles, to do it with the nicety with which the operation was performed at the Great Pyramid.

The lengths of the socket-line sides of the Pyramid are, in inches, respectively: north 9129.8, east 9130.8, south 9123.9, west 9119.2. The greatest difference in any two sides is 11.6 inches, and the least, 1 inch. The relative heights of the corner-socket floors, taking the southeast corner-socket floor as zero, are, in inches,

as follows: northeast 11.4, northwest 7.1, southwest 16.9. The reader has now the opportunity to compare critically the unsymmetrical ground-plan base with the symmetrical pavement-base, previously given, and will perceive how nice must have been the adjustment to insure that the pavement-base should be exactly square; the levels of the socket-floors, taking the pavement as zero, being, in inches, below the pavement, respectively: northeast 28.5, southeast 39.9, southwest 23.0, northwest 32.8.

There is, then, so far none but presumptive proof that the builders had means of taking horizontal angles; but when we consider, as has been said, the extreme accuracy of angle of the diagonal slopes of the Pyramid, it is hard to believe that the builders had not means of taking vertical angles. One probability supports the other, and each gains force. We know positively, by finding it, that they used iron. We know, too, that in ancient times lenses were used, for one has been found at Kouyunjik, a precinct, which, with Nimroud, Khorsabad, and Karamles, formed the *enceinte* of Nineveh. We cannot say that they were used telescopically, but the fact that they were known is worth taking cognizance of in this connection.[1] Godfrey Higgins, the great antiquarian writer, asserts that the telescope was known to some Egyptian priests, and the use of it permitted only to those admitted to the arcana of mysteries.

We have seen that, whether or not the Great Pyramid was built by the process of its diagonal slopes being laid out by ten parts of base to nine of height, or these slopes were controlled in the nicety of their adjustment by an observed angle of 41° 59′ 14.0″, corresponding to ten parts of base to nine of perpendicular, or by the ideal diagonal angle of 41° 59′ 50.0″,—at least the relation of the Pyramid proportions of height to perimeter of base is so close to the ratio of the radius to the circumference of the circle, that if the Pyramid had been designed with that as one of the ends in view, it is mechanically impossible for it to have been closer to that ratio; for the difference of 36″ of arc in the last mentioned

[1] In this same connection, it will interest the reader to see Professor Sayce's account of the lens found at Nineveh, contained in the following letter to the writer:

QUEEN'S COLLEGE, OXFORD, April 12th, 1885.

MY DEAR SIR: Owing to absence in Egypt, I have been unable to send an earlier reply to your question.

A crystal lens was found by Sir A. H. Layard on the site of Assur-bani-pal's Library at Kouyunjik, and is now in the British Museum. It was examined about a year ago by two experts, who came to the conclusion that the lens had been ground. I fancy it was used (or rather intended to have been used, for it is not completely finished) in writing the cuneiform tablets, some of which are inscribed with such minute characters as to imply the use of a magnifying glass.

Yours faithfully,

A. H. SAYCE.

angles would, for the diagonal slope of 719 feet of the Pyramid make only 2.0256 inches. Are its proportions, then, accidental? All that can be said in reply, if one take the isolated fact of its main proportions, is that they might have been accidental, so far as intention of including reference to the ratio of the radius to the circumference of the circle is concerned. We should have to rest content with this doubt, if it were not in our power to go beyond this isolated fact. But the Pyramid has an interior as well as an exterior, and there are some dimensions as well established with regard to that as others are to the exterior, and these repeat the ratio of the exterior dimensions. Accidents repeat themselves, but, when things repeat themselves very many times, the conception of accident is violated, and men think and say this is design. Because literature does not record mankind's knowledge of the ratio of the radius to the circumference of the circle, at the period of pyramid building, it is not necessarily to be concluded that mankind did not possess that knowledge. Deciphered inscriptions on terra-cotta tablets have brought down to us astronomical information of the times, much more recondite than that knowledge. On those very tablets, or in some other form, inscription of that knowledge may still be lying buried, or it may have been destroyed. Again, it may have been so common as not to have been recorded in so lasting a form as inscription on clay or stone; but if, in one sense, it is not recorded in the Great Pyramid, then all record is in vain.

Mr. Petrie does not believe in the existence of the Pyramid (sacred) cubit. From many comparisons in several ancient structures, and from cubit-rods found, he has deduced the Egyptian cubit as 20.62 plus or minus one one-hundredth of an inch, and employs it as 20.62 inches. He remarks that, with the Egyptian cubit theory, the outside dimensions of the Pyramid exactly agree, the height being 280 even cubits, and the semi-perimeter, 440 cubits. This, he grants, agrees with the theory of reference to the relation of radius to the circumference of the circle. With the Egyptian cubit theory, he adds, the proportions of the Pyramid's passages, chambers, and other parts, also agree. By the theory of areas, he says, the outside form of the Pyramid, and several other things which he mentions, are given, such as that the level of the King's Chamber is where the Pyramid's diagonal equals its base-side. These, and other things not mentioned here, do not conflict with each other. If they do not show design, then it is impossible to discover design; it will never be understood whenever men do not give direct testimony, written or oral, as to their intentions. Mr. Petrie frankly says: "That, in a building whose design appears on good evidence to include the π proportion (reference of radius to

circumference) and the use of areas, some design of cubic quantities might be followed in the principal object of the structure, is not at all improbable. But any claim to even respectable accuracy and regularity in the coffer is decidedly disallowed by its roughness of work."

It is unfortunate that, in all controversy, credit for sincerity should not be accorded to each other by the disputants on the opposing sides. For a long time this discussion has waxed hotter and hotter, not failing, as usual, to beget a certain amount of acrimony. Yet there is really no reason for offence to either side. Both sides are striving for the truth. Even ridicule, for using which President Barnard's critics take him to task, is perfectly legitimate as one weapon. It is wrongfully used only when it is employed in serious matters as the sole weapon. It is used only as an auxiliary by President Barnard, who does not mainly rely upon it, but upon the solid array of facts and conclusions which he has previously marshalled to the front. In his final charge of raillery, he does but bring up reserves to share the triumph of seeing the enemy in full rout, and contributing to their discomfiture. That, at least, is evidently his view at the point of time; that the conflict of reason is over, that the enemy is routed. If, in the hypothetical case with which he concludes his essay, he has not succeeded in presenting a *résumé* of his preceding argument, clothed in facetious guise, we are much mistaken. If he has not succeeded, the ridicule recoils upon himself. If, on the contrary, he has succeeded, he has merely presented afresh his argument, condensed, in the attractive form of appeal to the imagination as well as to the intelligence.

Both parties to this controversy are perfectly sincere. Let them, then, formally concede to each other the merit of sincerity, and the consideration that ought to go with the concession. Men must believe what they believe; they cannot help it; the contrary proposition would be absurd; and yet how little is this truism recognized in practice! There are those who have remained unbelievers, who, in approaching this subject, did so with a certain awe. It would be awful, they felt, to read divine teaching graven on the rock, standing almost in the presence of the Most High. Yet to one who thought it might be that such a revelation existed for eyes willing to see, it must be duty to learn, if it were so, whereof the Presence spake. The bounds of credibility are not established; it is no more irrational to believe that, by special inspiration, God had chosen to communicate with mankind through a record in stone, than that He had inspired the Bible, or given the intuition by which men know of His existence. The evidence adduced in the case of the Great Pyramid was startling. If what

was alleged to be there actually existed there, insusceptible of other explanation than the supernatural, then the supernatural there was to be accepted; there could be no option, one must believe in it as the supernatural. It was in this spirit that many who do not believe in the record of the Great Pyramid as divine, approached the subject, and with the newest as well as the oldest light that has been shed upon it by researches. We, among many others, have reached the conclusion, that whatever ulterior significance, astronomical, astrological, metrological, the Great Pyramid may have, it has no relation to the New and the Old Law.

If, to a zealous pyramidist, it seems lamentable that any set of men, approaching the subject in the spirit described, should reach so lame and impotent a conclusion, all we can say is, what was before remarked, that one cannot help thinking what one thinks, and that we hope to be credited with the sincerity which we are willing to accord. Nothing more heinous can be attributed to us than invincible ignorance. Our opponents ought to remember that, if their belief has been sometimes ridiculed, they, on the other hand, have called the hard name of atheist. It seems to us perfectly consonant with belief in the convenience of the metric, or of some similar system, for a man to believe in the existence of God; to reject the teachings of the Great Pyramid as divine, and yet to believe in God. The question is whether they are divine. The attempt is made to prove them by their character to be divine, and at the same time, to assume their character, to prove the Pyramid divine. The truth will not suffer by contending for it; it is in danger only when men cease contending for it, having reached the condition of easy indifference to it and passivity. We recognize the worthiness of the conscientious conviction of the divine teaching of the Great Pyramid, and have the kindest feeling towards believers in the sacredness of the record, regretting that we cannot be with them one in faith.

THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF CHRISTIANITY.

"CHRISTIANITY is a fundamental condition of modern civilization." The design of these pages is to bring into view its influence upon the State. It has been done before, and done ably; but a wholesome truth can bear repetition, even if the changes emerging from the current course of events did not furnish fresh illustrations and applications.

These influences properly are indirect and pure, not those flowing from the union of Church and State. Such a union may appear under one of three forms.

A theocracy—where the Church dominates the State—is today unknown, at least among a people of any name. A government of this kind God enjoined upon His ancient people, under circumstances that cannot reappear; and we are to distinguish between the supernatural order of their polity and the natural order of the polity of other nations. From the Israelites was to arise a spiritual Prince, to whom the history of the nation was to bear witness. A theocratic regime, that better answered this extraordinary and singularly exceptional end, is not a precedent for the same form of government under ordinary and totally changed conditions; and the bearing of the new law seems altogether another way.

In Russia, the State rules the Church; for the Czar nominates the members of the Holy Synod, over whose deliberations he presides, and whose decrees he ratifies. The centre of spiritual and political authority, he is theoretically the most august sovereign in Europe, yet the outlook is promising neither for the throne nor the altar. Nowhere is treason so thoroughly intrenched. The reigning emperor, a prisoner within his own realms, is ceaselessly guarded against the hand of the political assassin, by which his father fell. As for the Church, her attitude is neither spiritual nor aggressive. Despoiled of her wealth by Peter I. and Catherine II., her clergy, outside of a few centres, barely subsist. Serfdom, indeed, no longer exists, yet ignorance and idleness abound, and there is not a feature to recommend the existing form of rule.

The union between Church and State, which is more usual in modern history, is regulated by a Concordat. It is a treaty in regard to the administration of ecclesiastical affairs, between a temporal ruler and the head of a Church; and supposed to be necessary when the former finds himself confronted by a powerful

religious organization. Under the most favorable circumstances—where the people are a practical unit in religious belief—the *à priori* grounds against its utility are sustained by experience. To governments the administration of ecclesiastical affairs has been vast and vexatious; but the balance of disadvantage has been greatly on the Church's side. Support for the clergy, which is her consideration in the pact, is very dearly bought. A State Church, especially to those in authority, tempts to formalism and hypocrisy, and "chills the life in her breast." A State Church so far forth surrenders her independence, is compelled often to sacrifice to state exigencies the better interests of religion, and retards development according to her true genius.

Hence, as the political world is now consolidated, either in fact or in its tendencies, which seem growing daily in intensity and loud utterance, the Church is not unwilling to accept the situation, and to allow the State to go free from what men call the "compulsory authority of religion." But she has a right to demand that this new polity must be founded in honesty and truth; and that if the State cease to be religious and Christian, it must not thereby become irreligious and anti-Christian. If it choose to devote itself solely to the development and promotion of material wealth and earthly advantages, it must not interfere with the Church, whose duty it is to make use of spiritual means to further man's best interests and eternal warfare.

So, it would appear, our Lord Himself taught. We speak here of His teachings as bearing upon the political order in His day. The subject of human law, it has been observed, and the relation of His mission to the State, must have been often in His consciousness. The immense pressure brought to bear upon Him, to declare Himself a temporal prince, is the ground of Renan's theory of the Temptation. In resisting the national aspirations of His countrymen, so profound and universal, He drew upon Himself complete isolation, and sympathy for His loneliness and admiration for His calm, heroic courage, mingle in the tribute to His unparalleled character. Yet, with these environments, He not even suggested a single State law. He disclosed the pith of moral and religious truth with a simplicity, depth, and precision "that leave nothing more to be said," but is silent upon human law and politics. For righting wrongs, reforming abuses, and the general discharge of political duty He sought to fit men by ennobling the interior motives. The independence of Church and State He expressly intimates: "Render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and to God the things that are God's"—a memorable sentiment, that statesmen may still profitably ponder. Such are His teach-

ings, and our own great and growing country, where religion flourishes but forms no alliance with the State, illustrates their wisdom.

The indirect and pure influences of Christianity upon the State are as valuable as they are powerful and far-reaching. These are gathered under two heads: (1) The ideal of character which the example of Christ has originated; (2) The bearing of the doctrine of a Future Life upon social order.

A people cannot rise above their ideals. Religious ideas have been the dominant ideas in nations; and, as these ideas have created their ideals, we find nations standing, in the order of advancement, in strict accordance with their conception of religion. Where the religious intuition has received an earthy development, as among pagan nations, the ideas are of the earth. The ultra-fierce temper of the ancient Scandinavians, for example, accords with their belief, that those who enter heaven—their ideal characters—engage in perpetual war, and, after daily combat, repair to a spacious hall, to eat plentifully of the flesh of the wild boar, and drink beer from the skulls of their enemies.

The superiority of European civilization to that of the East has been properly attributed to a superiority in respect to religious ideas; and for this, it may be said in passing, Europe may be remotely indebted to a poet's pen. To the Homeric poems, sung throughout Greece, must be chiefly traced that martial spirit which enabled so small a state to repel, from the gateway to Europe, the colossal invasions of Persia, and save that continent from an oriental civilization, and an obstruction to the entrance of Christianity. Mark the difference in material development, and every advanced characteristic of a nation, between Turkey and those neighboring Christian powers, whose mutual jealousies are the sole guarantee for her existence. No cause is found either in the age or character of the Turks. In times comparatively recent they issued forth from that fruitful source of ethnic inundation, central Asia, and, before the faith of which they became the representative had time to bear permanent national fruit, won, as Saracens in the East and Moors in the West, a brilliant record in war and in literature. The decadence is due to an inferior religion and a low ideal.

Mahometanism teaches that slaying an unbeliever is an act of piety—that all knowledge is despicable save that found in the Koran—that polygamy is lawful—that heaven is a paradise of voluptuous joys, where the gross pleasures of earth are but enlarged and intensified. The necessary issue for the Turk has been a cruel, sensual, unlettered characteristic, and national decay.

Christianity offers the highest possible ideal; since, unlike a human science elaborated from crude beginnings, it came at once

perfect from the hand of God. The founder of Christianity we adore as divine, not by way of mission or authority merely, but in His essential nature. His religion has received no earthly or national elaboration. In anticipation, perhaps, of such a cavil, it was decreed that the political destruction of the people among whom it arose should be contemporaneous with its origin. Its teachings, traced by the very finger of God, remain unchanged and unchangeable. Some of these teachings (such as the essential brotherhood of men), taught by the Church from the first, the state is beginning slowly to recognize—an evidence that Christianity has led, not followed, civilization. Others (as the precepts respecting charity) the best school of modern criticism, while commending them as sublime illustrations of Christian virtue, puts aside as wholly impracticable within the domain of the State—an evidence that political science is to receive further accessions from Christian ethics. Preserved throughout its course by the divine agency that created it, Christianity maintains an integral existence in the world as the visible and complete manifestation of God, and furnishes a pre-eminent ideal—an ideal which, diffused through its sacred writings, gathers with unequaled splendor in the character of its Founder.

The perfection of character stands in the exhibition of contrasted virtues. Pascal, therefore, rates Epaminondas first among ancient heroes, because he combined the extremes of gentleness and valor. Jesus Christ, appearing at a point where three strongly marked peoples met, excludes the peculiarities of each, the spiritual pride of the Jew, the intellectual pride of the Greek, the political pride of the Roman, and reveals a character unequaled in its poise and sublimity. He touched at every point the circle of virtue, embracing all its contrasts. His purity and self-abnegation, His fortitude and composure, the strange reserve of power displayed by His ease in discomfiting the premeditated assaults of the subtlest adversaries, the simplicity, tenderness, and penetration of His teachings, which a child may understand, yet philosophers explore without finding their depths—are the vestibule of a temple within whose courts dwells God. His Person, wherein human nature is allied with the divine, reveals man's essential worth and dignity. In His mediatorial office we behold the essential brotherhood of the race, where, in the necessary elements of being, all are equals, and where, therefore, there is liberty, under guidance of law. His example is humility, moderation, self-restraint.

The ideal, therefore, which Christ has originated, is that of a freeman, conscious of a noble nature and a noble heritage, guided by the sympathies of a universal brotherhood, with passion restrained, appetite subdued.

Towards this ideal, within the pale of a divine society endowed with spiritual means, His followers consciously tend. But without the Church, upon the mass of men in a Christian state, the Christian ideal powerfully impresses itself. Character turns upon environments. The infant of a savage, transferred to an enlightened home, will lose the traces of savagery, and assume the hue of the surroundings. In a Christian state—where Christianity is generally recognized, where Christian sentiments, issuing from custom, law, literature, and religious institutions, glide into the common thought of the people—in such a state skeptic and anti-Christian unwillingly yield to the environments. They unconsciously take on the enveloping atmosphere, and become fashioned on a Christian model, more or less realized, and by whatever name called.

The influence of this ideal, entering everywhere, consciously or unconsciously, into the details of public and private life, has been powerfully felt by the State. By teaching princes and magistrates a sense of accountability, it has greatly lessened personal rule. It has humanized the action of governments and turned legislation towards the needs of the multitude. It has raised the subject and liberated the slave, not by abruptly breaking legal relations, but by a constant upward pressure—by creating a humane public opinion, the prelude to law.

Whatever good has been effected by infidel advocates of human rights, we freely own. That their teachings have been commonly associated with violent agencies, cannot be denied. To those whose eyes are clear to see the movement of the forces that form and sustain society, what these turbulent reformers have done for real liberty and sound government, is insignificant by the side of the political benefits which the spirit of Christianity has gradually achieved. The French Revolution (for example), conducted in the name of liberty, was a state of insanity, and dates, it is thought, a downward course in Gallic tendencies. Voltaire began the work, followed up by Rousseau in his "Contrat Social," "Nouvelle Heloise," and "Confessions." "Seduced by their sophisms, enchanted by the magic of the style, the higher classes of society, followed by all France, went madly astray. Two souvenirs remain of that period, the goddess Reason enthroned on the altar of Notre Dame, the scaffold dripping with blood in the public squares." The teachings of these apostles of liberty penetrated Hayti, the fairest colony France ever owned. The negro slaves, indeed, became free —but alas! how? Through scenes of uproar, butchery, and beastly outrage, unparalleled in the annals of the world. What a contrast between the course of affairs in this island and that in Jamaica, where, under the ripened Christian sentiment of England, the slaves, without material disturbance, were gradually emancipated

through a term of apprenticeship, and an award made to the owners of more than six millions of pounds! The subsequent histories of the islands are parallel with these methods of emancipation.

In closing this section, we call attention to two facts, emphasized by one of the best minds of the age: (1) that the sensible advance made in the religious character of Europe within the past hundred years is in correspondence with an improved political condition—with a more refined moral sense in individuals and nations—with a more humane conduct of war—with less open bribery in legislative bodies—and with less dissimulation in diplomatic intercourse; (2) that the course of Christianity in history is, after all, one of victory and glory—that the most powerful states now profess it—that the feeblest European state is the anti-Christian one—and that, should the Christian powers combine their physical forces, they could speedily subdue the world. It is the rise of nations towards a grand ideal.

The discussion of the remaining point—the bearing of the doctrine of a future state upon social order—brings into view those forces which, under divers names, are menacing the present structure of society.

Nihilism, by which Russian radicalism is commonly designated, is refused as a name by its adherents, who style themselves "revolutionists." Originating in the ideas brought to the front by the French Revolution, it is ambitious to excel its parent. For years it has found favor among the young men and "short-haired" girls in the schools and universities of Russia. The attempt upon the life of Alexander II. in 1879, and his assassination two years later, rendered it notorious. It is a species of religion—its god being the "suffering people"; and its followers, in spreading the doctrines, show the zeal of devotees. To gain the vantage-ground of sympathy, Russians of birth and education, under assumed names, will take menial positions, as cooks and workmen, and descend with their mission to the side of the laborer and mechanic. In philosophy, it is materialism; in politics, radicalism, advanced to frightful extremes. In one aspect it is idealistic; for the visions of the Nihilists, founded upon the reorganization of society, discount the utopias. The details of this reorganization, however, they will not enter upon. Nothing (whence the name *Nihilism*) is to be done prior to the destruction of the present order, and this destruction the Nihilist proposes to make complete. A supreme pessimist, he sees only evil everywhere, and his doctrine is—down with the State, the Church, the King, and God, even to the ground.

Nihilism, as a whole, is peculiar to the Russian mind, which is

given to extremes, and to the despotic character of Russian politics, and a monster so odious could scarcely appear elsewhere. It may not be too late for political liberty to arrest it. The Russians, as a whole—especially the lower orders—are, or at least have been, distinguished for religious and political veneration; and had Alexander III. signalized his accession to the throne by granting a constitutional government, the back of this hideous conspiracy would in all likelihood have been broken.

Socialism is too vague a word for accurate definition. As a modified form of Communism, it assigns land and the implements of production to associations or the State; the fruits of labor, to the individual. Communism embodies a definite idea. It is wrong, it says, for one to possess wealth and live in jovial splendor merely by taking the trouble to be born, while others around him beg. It, therefore, takes from him who has, to give to him who has not, maintaining a perfect equality in the distribution of the means of living. The logical sequence is the universality of the idea. For to have things in common, men must labor in common—do tasks authoritatively imposed—lest individual freedom create an excess of production in this or that direction. Lest, too, the individual secretly use that portion of his product belonging to others, men must consume in common; and the family, as one writer expresses it, becomes transferred to the public square. In a word, under an enforced equality, pressing every thing to a level, all—goods, persons, education, love, religion—must be in common.

To effect this, the State is the necessary agent, armed with extreme authority, and furnished with an immense capital, to be drawn from no other source than the unprofitable spirit of coercive fraternity. Such, essentially, is the plan of society presented by Robert Owen, Saint-Simon, Fourier, Louis Blanc, Leroux, and others.

Successful organizations, founded on the "in common" principle, have existed. But these have been either voluntary associations, with free ingress and egress; or religious communities, distinguished by the spirit of discipline and self-denial; and neither has force as a precedent for the State.

The fundamental error of Communism is the attempt to reach equality by suppressing liberty. The sole equality among men resides in liberty. Equality in the state is regulated liberty. Outside of liberty there are only inequalities in the individual. These will be recognized by sound statecraft, and given free play, creating here and there *those* surpluses of wealth, essential to industry, commerce, science, and art. Communism, starting from a capital fallacy, finds its end in the slavery of the individual and destruction of natural rights, under the artificial regime of a limitless

despotism. Of late years, it has been assuming, more and more, the form of political conspiracy.

Under a supposable oppressive state of affairs it might acquire a temporary ascendency; but such a monster can never permanently influence the social order. A meeting in one of our cities, presided over by a negro woman, the wife of a white communist, and met to laud the London explosions, and glorify "a few cents' worth of a little hog's grease and a little nitric acid," as the avenging agent for the "fourth estate"—is the glimpse of a picture that ordinary human nature cannot be made to fancy. Unless the entire history of morals and of political thought is without a lesson, the instincts of the heart, and the deductions of reason, confirmed by the widest experience, will rouse the average public conscience to reject the communistic doctrine in any of its essential forms.

The advocates of revolutionary Communism are comparatively few, yet admit it we must, that among the working classes generally there is unrest, great and growing—a fact which has procured a hearing for those ultra plans of human society which, in modern times, have been drawn from Plato's "Republic"; and it requires wise recognition to avoid outbreaks and infinite trouble. Popular education has roused, among the masses, an ambitious spirit, and multiplied artificial wants, while, under the current conditions of labor, the poor have become relatively poorer. The working classes were told, in the pinching days of the past, that the application of steam would so increase production as to put the industrious man beyond a reasonable fear of want. The result has been bitterly disappointing.

It appears that as nations advance in wealth, the space between rich and poor widens. The profitable use of steam requires expensive machinery. Competition and narrow margins extend individual operations and outlay; and the benefits of steam force have been concentrating, more and more, in the hands of capitalists. No blame can attach to capital. At the peril of existence, it has been impelled towards such an issue. It is the outcome of its own powers and antagonisms.

The superior intelligence usually found associated with wealth, stimulated by the keen emulation of the age, has naturally won from this powerful steam agent disproportionate results for the moneyed class; and labor unions became necessary to save workingmen from being ground to powder between the unavoidable rivalries of wealth. Confessedly, the richest among nations, where laws have been modified in every way to cheapen food, and where steam has wrought its best work, is England. Yet the late Postmaster-General of that country, an authority on labor questions, thus

speaks of the condition of workingmen: "A majority of the people of England have a severe struggle for existence, and no inconsiderable minority live in abject misery and in degrading poverty. One out of every twenty is a pauper. To a great proportion of our loboring classes a life of incessant toil yields no other result than an old age of dependent mendicancy. In many rural districts horses are stabled far more comfortably than laborers are housed; and in cities the poor are so crowded and huddled together that in countless cases families herd together in a single room." The statement is true, in the main, respecting the condition of workingmen throughout Europe and in America.

Sympathy, too, between employer and employed has almost disappeared. In times past the manufacturer dwelt near his workmen, and was, so to speak, the head of a family among them. He now commonly lives far away, seldom sees his men, is personally unknown to most of them,—"the relation between them is commercial only, and labor is bought and sold like merchandise."

The workman broods over his social position. He finds himself stationary, or relatively losing ground, in the midst of the manifold inventions of the age, which wealth appropriates to augment wealth, and build up vast corporations, whose heads are hedged about with antechambers and ushers, after the manner of kings. The feeling is deep-set that the logical development of society is against him; and while he may own that there must be material inequality, yet he cannot be persuaded that the actual inequality is not disproportionate, and that, through State agency, ways should not be provided to make some of the redundance of the super-rich ease his lot.

In this sense "Socialism" has ground to rest on; its aims are pure and lofty; and its adherents are the multitude. It presents the problem of the age, and, unless wise measures of betterment are devised, the fear is that this vast body may, in a moment of despair and madness, go over to the ultra-Socialists, and seek relief through the violent overthrow of existing order.

This is a question, primarily, for the State. Let us point out, briefly, how Christianity comes to its aid.

If Christianity, in advancing the estimate of personal worth, advances sensitiveness to wrong and injustice, it applies the palliative in the Future Life it reveals.

The heaven of the Christians is a final home, which God has made worthy of Himself, where His throne is fixed and His unveiled glory displayed. The individual will remain himself, but himself wonderfully expanded—life unfolding under conditions as far superior to the present as these are to those of life before birth. Made possible by the Blood of the Cross, its attainment is due to no accident of wealth or station, but to the presence of certain in-

terior affections—as love, joy, peace, long-suffering—which constitute the spiritual life, and whose cultivation is alike within the reach of all.

The vivid apprehension of this truth finds expression in the confessors and martyrs. From such spirits the faith descends, with diminishing effect, through the various grades of Christians, and passes out, as an impression, into the general mass in a Christian State, unconsciously influencing character.

Its total effect upon social order is prodigious. The absence of all thought in respect to a future state and its dread sanctions, would be the harbinger of "political disintegration, and rise of individual passion and anarchy." It would render the rule of life utterly of the world, exacting towards others, indulgent towards self. It would retire the nobler tendencies, and make the animal emphatic, stimulating those tendencies towards brute force that only brute force can keep subdued.

The general presence of the thought sheds a calming, quieting influence upon society. The body of conscious Christians have a share in shaping public opinion far exceeding their proportion of the population, and their faith must here be taken fully into account. Not only does it promise an offset to the inequalities and ills of life, but sees in the endurance of these ills an enrichment of the reward. Hence, suffering is the expression of religion; and the union of the individual streams of Christian sentiment sends a powerful and preserving current through society.

But beyond a conscious personal faith, the general impression of a future life, entering into the habitual thought of a people has a material political bearing. It strengthens a principle which England illustrates more, perhaps, than any other modern nation—the organizing principle, or patience to work out reforms in a circumspect and orderly way, rather than resort to violent methods. When reforms are effected in this manner, they promise to be sound as well as abiding. Time and discussion test their merits, and settle them in the popular consciousness.

In fine, the influence of Christianity upon the State lies in general lifting tendencies, whose action is gradual, yet, acting continuously, aggregate vast results. Necessarily it is a movement toward reforms. Where reforms become practicable, the tendencies are towards rational and pacific means. Otherwise, the tendencies are to suffer. The conclusion, therefore, is fairly warrantable that, if a social crisis be near—such as the logical course of affairs apparently threatens—the wisdom of the solution will largely turn upon the prevalence and purity of the Christian element.

Let the discussion close with the following reflections from Bluntschli: That Christianity is a force which, at the end of two thousand years we find still spreading, and with to-day more vitality

than ever before to extend itself; that the opponents of Christianity speak of it now with more respect than they did a hundred years ago; that the assaults of criticism have revealed an unexpected wealth of spiritual and moral force; that Christianity has fairly kept abreast of intellectual progress; that it was a deceptive thought that modern civilization has so far gone ahead of Christianity as to be able to do without it; that in its essential idea there is a wealth and power which has not yet attained its highest development; and that its opponents should learn to respect a system which has guided them in their intellectual advance, and infinitely promoted their civilization.

THE CRISIS IN ENGLAND.

WHEN all is said and done, no doubt remains on the mind of any reasonable and impartial man in England that the recent defeat of the Liberals was a godsend to the Gladstone government. It seems to be a law of English administrations that they shall, when the fifth year of their existence comes, have fallen so low in the estimate of the English nation that any change is regarded as an improvement. The Gladstone government, instead of being an exception, was a striking exemplification of this law. It would scarcely be possible to mention an administration which in modern times had committed mistakes more disastrous, had met fortunes so stormy, had violated all the promises and pledges of its inauguration so absolutely. The loss of its prestige without had had the usual effect of provoking dissension within. It is the universal experience of political parties that while success brings union, defeat brings division. So it was with the Gladstone government. For several months past no people have been more disgusted with the government of Mr. Gladstone than many of the members of that government itself. Composed of heterogeneous elements, it required but small cause to bring about collision of principle and still more of temper. Between men like Mr. Chamberlain, on the one side, and Sir William Harcourt and Lord Spencer, on the other, there are differences of opinion almost as complete as those that separate the ordinary Liberal from the ordinary Conservative. Then Mr. Chamberlain is not a man to conciliate political opponents by personal demeanor. He is a man of

open, avowed, pushing ambition. He has not concealed for a moment since he entered the office the fact that he regarded his present position in the Cabinet as a temporary stepping-stone to the highest position in the country; and he has pursued his purpose with relentless steadiness; it might almost be said with ostentatious and aggravating steadiness. The great object, said a cynical member of the Liberal party, with Chamberlain is, having got into the Cabinet, to get out of it as soon and with as much flourish of trumpets as possible. On every occasion on which the principles of moderate and extreme Liberalism have come into contact, Mr. Chamberlain has taken care to let the public know that if Radical principles did not prevail, the fault was with the Whigs and not with the Radical members of the Cabinet. He has denounced the feudal tenure in land, which has representatives as wealthy, and to some extent as stubborn, in the Gladstone Cabinet as in any government that could be formed by a Conservative Prime Minister. At least half the prominent members of the Gladstone Cabinet are large landed proprietors; the Marquis of Hartington, the second in command to Mr. Gladstone, is the son of one of the three or four richest landlords of England. Nor has Mr. Chamberlain spared even the financial doctrines of Mr. Gladstone himself. Mr. Gladstone's fame—however assailed on other points—is admitted on finance; and one fine day his subordinate informed the world that the finance of Mr. Gladstone was all one great mistake. Sitting side by side with men trained in the most rigid school of political economy, Mr. Chamberlain has preached doctrines which, in spite of all explanations, have a dangerous resemblance to some of the utopian schemes that are associated with the name of Mr. Henry George. He has likewise on all occasions had his fling at the Established Church and at the aristocracy; amid wild cheers he on one occasion reminded an audience that he was a Dissenter, and had the memory of a Dissenter for the wrongs his fathers had suffered; and during the struggle with the House of Lords he almost implied that if the nobility did not give way, the democracy must resort to force. To sum up: member of a Cabinet composed in the main of landed aristocrats, churchmen, and economists, he has since assailed the aristocracy, the land, the Church, and orthodoxy, political economy.

The result has been even more exasperating. For beyond all question he is the one man who has made great and enormous strides in popular favor since he took office. To-day he has a firmer sway over the masses than any man of the Ministry except Mr. Gladstone. Sir Charles Dilke has also greatly advanced his reputation by his tenure of office; but his success has been a social and a Parliamentary rather than a popular success. In the

drawing-rooms of London, from which he was rigidly excluded in the hot days of his early republicanism, he has become one of the most welcome guests in clubs; he is voted a good fellow; and in the House of Commons a quiet, smooth, and apparently frank and kindly manner has made him the friend of all men. But he has lost rather than gained hold upon the masses; to some of them his silence and something like an apology for his earlier and fiercer utterances have produced a feeling of distrust. It is known that Dilke, like Chamberlain, has sworn to be Prime Minister of England; but he is not so popular; if he reach his ambition, it will be by a Parliamentary or a social cabal, and not through his hold upon the masses.

Mr. Chamberlain, then, is the man; and it requires little acquaintance with English politics to know how galling his prospect must be to many of his colleagues. He is but eight or nine years in Parliamentary life; most of his colleagues have been members for twenty or thirty years. He is a manufacturer; and in England still the manufacturer occupies a social position far inferior to that of the landed aristocrat. And then there is something about him personally that suggests smallness—and smallness aspiring to greatness is especially obnoxious. In strength of will, tenacity of purpose, cool self-possession, and bold, unscrupulous strategy, he is a born politician, and must extort respect. He speaks, too, with great vigor; strikes home; and has much command over those commonplaces of political vituperation which influence the masses. But there is something that suggests thinness in his mind, as he has a sectarian and venomous narrowness that repels rather than attracts; and his physical appearance and general air are not attractive. He has one of those smooth faces that make men look not much more than half their age. There is a story, of course not true, of his being called "the boy" during a recent excursion in Spain. Then this gives him a certain pettiness, something of that pettiness of air that is associated with the dry-goods clerk in all countries of the world. The only word that can describe it is the word "perky"; he seems to be filled with self-admiration; pauses between his sentences—which, it must be admitted, are delivered in a fine, musical, penetrating voice and with excellent intonation—as though to admire the sound of his own voice and the roundness of his own periods; and when you add that he has a nose with the fatal tendency to turn up which belongs rather to the Irish than the English face; that he wears the single eye-glass which has made the stony stare of the British the hatred and the abomination of all other nations—it will be seen that his exterior is not one to attract. His pretensions are those of a gigantic

leader of men; his stage presence is that of the aspiring and self-complacent "super."

And his colleagues? The Marquis of Hartington, though a man nearer Captain Hawtree—the proverbially apathetic and unemotional Englishman—is by no means so devoid of ambition as he looks, or would make believe. And he has every thing, too, to entitle him to the leading place in a British administration; enormous wealth, lofty position, a line of ancestors going back to infinite lengths, and long parliamentary experience and great parliamentary talents. When he succeeded Mr. Gladstone in the Liberal leadership some years ago, he had a heritage as difficult as any that ever fell to a political leader; yet he acquitted himself of the task in a manner that gained the approval of all men; and he developed a power of parliamentary debating that was not hitherto even suspected. He is hard to rouse; but when he is roused he can strike blows as hard and as straight as any debater in the House of Commons; he has that frank, downright manner that commends itself to Englishmen. Less loose-tongued and more self-controlled than Gladstone, he avoids making so many enemies or provoking so much animosity; and often, when he has been leading the House in the absence of the Prime Minister, he has suggested comparisons that were not altogether unfavorable. To the Marquis of Hartington Mr. Chamberlain must appear nothing but an upstart, more remarkable than other men simply in the amount of his gush and self-conceit. Then Sir William Harcourt is a man who, at one period of his career, fell foul of Mr. Gladstone himself, in the silly hope that he might thus climb to the first place on the ruins of his former chief. Of all the men in the House, there is not one of a vain ambition more vain and more unscrupulous. Then he loathes Radicalism almost as much as though he sat on the Conservative benches; and to him Mr. Chamberlain must be an object of even fiercer and more bitter hate than to the Marquis of Hartington.

Such was the general state of affairs among the men who formed the Gladstone Cabinet when a match was applied to the magazine of irreconcilable ambitions and fierce personal hatreds with the question of coercion for Ireland. The forces in favor of coercion within the Cabinet are well known. The leader of the coercionists was, of course, Lord Spencer. With him it was a matter of life and death. Unless coercion were a necessary agent of governing Ireland, then the verdict of the Irish people upon him was just; he murdered innocent men through packed juries and partisan judges; and his regime was that of a reign of legalized terror, not of restored order. His position was certainly a peculiar one; a position that led him to back his opinions by strong personal ap-

peals. He had risked his life to govern Ireland at a moment of unprecedented difficulty and danger; he was the friend and the associate of the men who had fallen victims to the knives of the Invincibles; and above all things, he had a hold upon large masses of Englishmen that gave him a strong leverage against the Ministry. If he did not get coercion, they would not have him; and his resignation, just on the eve of a general election, would supply the Tories with a new and a more dangerous cry in the announcement that another Kilmainham Treaty had been made, that the Ministry were in league with Mr. Parnell. The views of Lord Spencer were backed up fiercely by Sir William Harcourt and by the Marquis of Hartington, brother of one of the men who were assassinated in Phœnix Park; and the combination was, therefore, very powerful.

The attitude taken up by Mr. Chamberlain and Sir Charles Dilke was mainly regulated by the consideration of the altered state of parties that must come after the next general election. Neither they nor any other intelligent observers have the least doubt that Mr. Parnell will return with at least eighty followers; and that any political leader who has eighty followers can immensely influence —if he cannot entirely control—the fortunes of the two parties. It is this dread and inevitable portent of a great Irish party that commands all the considerations, and negotiations, and combinations of the present situation. It enters into everything; but more of that by-and-by. For the present suffice it to say that Mr. Chamberlain and Sir Charles Dilke have always preached and believed in the advent of the day when they could use the Irish vote to precipitate reform in England; and their own prepossessions are favorable to moderate concessions on the Home Rule question. Their calculation was that if they could defeat coercion they would gain the Irish vote in the English constituencies, and so secure a great Liberal majority; and, secondly, that they would gain for themselves the Irish vote in Parliament, and in that way break down, if necessary, the dominance of the Whig families, and compel the Liberal party to accept a Radical premier, either of themselves, and a thorough-going Radical policy. They accordingly resolved to oppose coercion. The conditions which they proposed are not of any great concern just now; the great fact is that they opposed coercion, and opposed it bitterly and obstinately. Here, then, was a difficulty that no Prime Minister, however dexterous, could patch up; it seemed as if Mr. Gladstone had no choice but a choice of evils; he must abandon coercion, and with coercion abandon all the Whig members of his Cabinet, or he must adopt coercion and lose all the Radical members of his Cabinet. The sacrifice of so many personal and political ties, moreover, brought

no promised compensation. If, by driving out the Whigs, he had a Cabinet entirely Radical, the Whigs would probably soon bring his Cabinet to an end; and the expulsion of the Radicals, by getting free of Chamberlain and Dilke, would insure the defeat of coercion, and the break-up of the government.

On the other hand, the position of Chamberlain and Dilke was not without difficulty. They were quite willing to go out, having had as much of office as they cared for, and the break-up of the administration was not a matter about which they would have had any particular qualms. But the break-up of a Ministry on the eve of a general election meant, in all probability, the break-up of the Liberal party also; and this was a serious responsibility, especially on the part of a man like Mr. Chamberlain, who has done so much to introduce into English life that rigor of party discipline which in America is comprehensively called "machine politics."

All through, the cynic observers of so many successive abandonments of principles by the Radicals thought that the quarrel would be patched up, and that Mr. Chamberlain and Sir Charles Dilke would be spared. But this view of the situation has not been confirmed by the information with regard to the state of things in the Cabinet which has oozed out since the ministerial defeat. On the Monday on which the fatal division on the budget took place, there was a Cabinet council. It was one of a whole series that had been held for the purpose of finding some compromise between the two contending sections. The attempt, like all those which had preceded it, was a failure; and it looked more than ever as if a break-up was inevitable. It was when things had reached this lamentable and perilous pass that the Opposition came to the rescue of the Government by defeating them on the budget. Never was a defeat more welcome. The ministers themselves made no attempt at concealing their satisfaction. The faces of Mr. Chamberlain and Sir Charles Dilke, especially, beamed with joy. And, naturally; they had been released from an intolerable dilemma.

Since the downfall of the Government this has been felt to be so much the case that a new and strange controversy has been added to those already existing in English history. The question most hotly disputed is whether the Government avoided or sought defeat. The Ministers hotly take up one side; the Conservatives as vehemently the other. There is certainly some explanation necessary when, on a great and vital division, there are no less than seventy absentees on the Ministerial side. The enterprising news agency has sent to the absentees for their explanation of their absence, and the whole political world has been laughing ever since at the grotesqueness of these different excuses. One man could

not come because he had to be by the side of his wife "invalided"; another was suddenly indisposed; a third got a wetting and did not care to risk a cold; no less than three missed their trains; one was in Switzerland, another in Egypt; two were on their honeymoon; a whole host protest that they did not know the division was important. The inevitable conclusion is, either that the party managers bungled their business, or allowed the incautious enemy to snatch a Pyrrhian victory.

The part the followers of Mr. Parnell took in the matter is of great significance. It was they who won the victory for the Conservatives. This is a fact that one can gather, not merely from the exultant comments in the Irish National press, but from the remarks in the speeches of the leaders of the fallen party. It is the favorite charge now in the speeches of Liberals that the Conservatives snatched their victory by means of the Parnellite vote, which is, of course, a confession that it was the Parnellite vote that defeated the Government. It did not require the excited shouts that came from the Parnellite benches on that night of "Coercion," "Buckshot," "Spencer," "Myles Joyce," to accentuate the meaning of the action of the Irish members. Mr. Parnell, and other leaders of the party, declared, when first coercion was spoken of, that coercion would in the end kill the Government; and the promise has been kept. And now, short as is the time which has elapsed since the overthrow of the Ministry, it has sufficed to justify the action of the Irish party, not only in this division, but their attitude for some time past to the Ministry.

There are many persons at some distance from the scene of conflict—in America their number is particularly large—who fail to understand the attitude of the Irish members towards the present Ministry,—and especially towards Mr. Gladstone. Such critics point out that the Liberals, as a body, are more friendly to the Irish people than the Conservatives; that the Liberals favor democratic government, the rights of the masses, the claim of the tenant to the fruits of his labors, the Irish householder to the same vote as the householder in England and Scotland. The Conservatives, on the other hand, it is pointed out, are allied with the Irish Tory party, the party of landlords, and rackrenting and evicting landlords; of bigots, who loathe the name and, if possible, would still persecute the religion of the Irish Catholic. And, after this, attention is called to the friendship which Mr. Gladstone has always professed for Ireland; to his constant kindliness of tone; and, above all, to the gigantic reforms which he has carried for the Irish people, —the ballot, the disestablishment of the Church, and the two Land Acts. How then, it is asked, frequently in surprise, can an Irish Nationalist reconcile it with his duty to his country to help in ex-

pelling from office the party that is friendly and the man who has proved his affectionate interest in the advance of the Irish people?

The events since the crisis are alone sufficient to supply the answer to these objections. What is the very first effect of the fall of the Gladstone government? Its first and most important effect is that coercion for Ireland is killed; it is dead, as though beyond all recall or revival. If the Liberals be the friends of Ireland, the continuance of whose power is certainly beneficial to Ireland, is it not a somewhat curious circumstance that the very first effect of the expulsion of the Liberals from office is to prevent the introduction of coercive legislation for the Irish people? And the full significance of this change is only understood by a comparison of the prospects of Ireland on this question of coercion before and after the fall of the Gladstone government. The state of affairs in the Gladstone Cabinet on coercion has already been described; it has been shown that on the very day of their fall the Ministers themselves were divided in opinion upon the question. It is possible, nay, it is probable—or lest we should put the case one hair's breadth more strongly than facts justify—it is certainly possible that the coercion section would have carried the day; that Mr. Gladstone would have continued to hold office, and would have introduced a coercion bill. Thus the case, put in the most moderate form, stands thus: as long as there was a Liberal ministry in power, there was a possibility of coercion; the moment the Liberals were powerless, coercion became impossible.

This paradoxical state of things is easily understood by anybody acquainted with the English political parties. Let us try to explain it to our readers; the point is well worthy of being thoroughly understood, because it lies at the root and foundation of the policy of the Parnellite party, both in the past and the immediate future. The *Times* newspaper, speaking with its characteristically shameless cynicism, explains the whole situation in a sentence: "To carry the Crimes Act, however mutilated, in the teeth of Parnellite and Radical resistance, and with no disposition to afford active help on the part of the retiring Ministers, would be impossible." In other words, the coercion which the Radicals and the Liberal leaders generally would have been ready to pass themselves they would most resolutely oppose if brought in by their political opponents. And that is just what the Irish leaders have always been saying. Their answer always has been to those who found fault with their hostility to the Liberals, that when the Liberals were in power they were friends, when they were in opposition they were enemies of coercion.

The chief cause of the fallacy so prevalent with regard to the effect of the two English parties on Irish affairs, is mistaking will for

power. So far as will to do injury to the Irish popular cause is concerned, the Tories are infinitely worse than the Liberals. It is quite true that between the English Liberal and the Irish Nationalist there are many points of agreement; and it is true that between the Irish Nationalist and the English Tory there spreads an impassable chasm on almost every subject under the sun. Nor is it to be denied, that if the Tories could have their way, they would treat all Irish national movements with the humane methods of martial law and drum-head courts-martial. But, then, where is the harm of an enemy who, while he may have all the venom of the most malignant and murderous hatred, is perfectly powerless? And that is the position of the English Tory; his power to do harm to Ireland is gone, and gone for ever. Here is how the English parties work with regard to Ireland. If a Conservative government be in office, it has no power of passing severe coercive laws for Ireland, because the Liberals in opposition always combine with the Irish party, and oppose almost as vigorously every repressive proposal of a Conservative administration. On the other hand, if a Liberal administration exist, and it proposes coercive legislation, its adoption of a Tory policy is, of course, hailed with delight by the Tory party; and the Tory opposition, instead of being a drag, and a critic, and an enemy, cheers, and helps, and stimulates the Liberal administration. And thus, while coercion bills brought in by a Conservative administration are certain to be watered by a Liberal administration, or a coercion bill brought in by a Liberal administration is the more welcome to the Conservative opposition in proportion to its stringency. Thus the statement is literally true, that a Liberal government is much more potent for evil to Ireland than a Conservative government could possibly be.

And this further is true, that a Liberal administration is often less potent for good than a Conservative administration—that is, if the Conservative administration be not more powerful than the Liberals and Irish Nationalists combined. When a Conservative administration brings in a measure of reform, the converse position is established to that of the Liberal government bringing in a coercion bill. The Conservative administration introducing reform is stimulated and encouraged instead of being obstructed and opposed by the Liberal opposition. On the other hand, when a measure of reform is introduced by a Liberal administration, it is opposed obstinately and at every step and by all the forms and expedients of filibustering and obstruction by the Conservative opposition in the House of Commons; and if the Conservative opposition fail to defeat or reduce the measure in the House of Commons, there is the permanent Conservative majority, at once irremovable and irresponsible, in the House of Lords, and

that majority can only be got to swallow reform when reform comes backed by the ugly spectres of terror and force. But the Conservative Ministry has nothing to fear from the House of Lords; what the Conservative Prime Minister orders, the House of Lords will obey. And if a Conservative Minister order that there shall be a regime of reform in Ireland, the House of Lords will swallow reform without a gulp. Thus, then, reform proposed by a Conservative administration would pass rapidly and easily through the House of Commons, would be fortified, not weaked, by the opposition in that body; while in the House of Lords the sanction of a Conservative Premier would be more potent than a cyclone of popular passion, an epidemic of wild crime, or the surly roar of enraged masses. To end this part of the subject as it began, a Liberal government is more potent for ill, and a Conservative government is more potent for good to the Irish cause.

All this reasoning, as will have been observed, is guarded by an important proviso; that proviso is, that the Conservative administration is not so powerful as to be independent alike of the Liberals and the Irish. If the Conservatives were able, on a division, to beat both the Irish and the Liberals, it would be bad for Ireland, for there would then be no proposals for reform. This is what took place in the last Parliament, when the Beaconsfield Ministry passed a life of six years without giving Ireland any particular measure of reform. This would be a bad state of things to recur; but it is, in the first place, impossible,—as will be shown presently,—and, secondly, even if possible, an overwhelming Tory majority has not dangers as grave as an overwhelming Liberal majority. For,—as has already been seen,—any coercive proposals by a Conservative administration would be certain to meet with strong hostility from a Liberal opposition, and so would be reduced in severity, and a Liberal opposition would also join an Irish party in putting pressure upon the Conservative government to introduce measures of reform.

But a strong Conservative government, independent alike of the Irish and the Radical party in the House of Commons, is a very improbable contingency. It would want to be very powerful indeed, for it would have to displace a majority of 100 which the Liberals at present have, and, besides, to be able to beat the Irish reinforcement of 80 men. The Liberals have this majority of 100 in the present Parliament over the Tories alone, and all the probabilities of the case point to their having as great, if not a greater, majority after the next general election. Two million voters have been enfranchised; the first impulse of these voters is to vote for the men who gave them the franchise, and the Liberals, of course, gave them the franchise. Then, times have been bad in the rural

districts, and the agricultural laborer has been an ill-treated serf for centuries; ill-treated alike by the farmer and the squire. It is not unnatural to suppose that the first impulse of the laborer will be to go against the politics both of the squire and the farmer; and the farmer and the squire have been Conservatives from time immemorial. Hitherto the counties have been the strongholds of the Conservatives, as the great towns have been their weakness. If a number of the counties turn against them, the Liberals must have a majority in excess of any they have hitherto won. The probabilities, then, point to a large Liberal majority, and the last five years have conclusively shown what a Liberal majority means. It means coercion of a savagery that a Conservative administration could not even dream of, and the reforms cut and pared down to such proportions as the Conservative opposition in the House of Commons and the Conservative majority in the House of Lords may be willing to accept. The national question will have to be dealt with soon. If a Conservative administration, dependent on the Irish vote, were in power, the scheme proposed might not be originally large, but it would be broadened by a combined Irish and Liberal opposition. If a Liberal government propose a home rule measure, it will not be large in the start, and before it is carried it will have to be brought to the irreducible minimum which will be taken by the Conservatives in the two Houses of Parliament.

These are the reasons, and not the childish spirit of mischief, or the idiotic spirit of pure and uncalculating vindictiveness, that have lain at the root of the hostility of the Irish party to the Liberal Ministry, and of the comparative satisfaction with which Irish Nationalists received the intelligence that a Conservative administration was likely to be called into power. Much of this satisfaction was due to the prominent place which Lord Randolph Churchill was made to occupy in all the combinations suggested. Less satisfaction could, of course, be felt with the Premiership of the Marquis of Salisbury. The Marquis of Salisbury and Lord Randolph Churchill are potent figures in English politics, whether they come into office now or at any future time, and a sketch of their character and tendencies will not be without its uses.

The Marquis of Salisbury is a tall, thick-set, and very ungainly man. He has a heavy stoop; his face, which is unhealthily pale, is surrounded by a very black and stubbly beard; his eyes are deep-set; and, on the whole, the look of the face is not attractive. His speeches read very well, but they are not pleasant to listen to. He has a bad voice, a hesitant delivery, and in speaking he has a habit of lolling, which detracts very much from his forcibleness. He was a younger son when he began life, and not very well pro-

vided for. Falling in love with a very brilliant woman—the daughter of a judge—he insisted on marrying her in spite of the vehement opposition of his father and family, who regarded the match as a *mésalliance;* and as a result he was almost cut off and left to his own resources. Fortunately his brother-in-law, Mr. Beresford Hope, a wealthy *dilettante*, conceived the idea of starting the *Saturday Review*, and Lord Robert Cecil, as the Marquis of Salisbury was then known, was one of its first and most frequent writers. He has in his writings, and to some extent in his speaking, the qualities which provoked at once the admiration and hostility for the *Saturday Review* in its earlier and better days. He is antithetical, has a biting, sardonic humor, and coins magnificent phrases. He writes better than he speaks, and even during the last few years an article from his pen in the *Quarterly Review* was a literary as well as a political event. His earlier years are defaced by some of the most brutal as well as some of the most stupid things said by any public man against Ireland and against democracy. He probably wrote some of the vile sentences of brutal rejoicing over Irish expatriation which were among the many parents of such offspring as the dynamite policy and the Invincibles. Against any share of the masses in the government of their country, he raged, after a fashion somewhat similar to the ravings of Prince Bismarck's earlier parliamentary outbursts. His quarrel with the late Lord Beaconsfield was due to the resolve of the latter to give the working-classes a share in the franchise. But he has grown out of some of these prejudices with the advance of years and of the power of the masses. Since the death of Lord Beaconsfield he has been the acknowledged head of the Tory party, and has taken his turn on the stump after the manner of the most plebeian courtier of the electorate. His great cry a couple of years ago was, "Appeal to the People,"—a cry more worthy of a democratic Cæsar than an aristocratic scholar consumed with contempt for the judgment and ideals of the profane crowd. He has shown the first symptoms of repentance and enlightenment on the Irish question by dropping all thought or mention of coercion; and, like other politicians, he will have to do as the times and the great political forces demand, and these two factors are on the side of Ireland.

His hostility will probably be transformed into at least a seeming of friendship.

Lord Randolph Churchill has fewer foolish things to forget and fewer convictions to give up. It may be doubted, indeed, if he have any very strong convictions on any subject. He is well described in a Liberal paper as an electioneerer before all things. He is a curious example of the kind of man that can come to the front and to a position of extraordinary power and popularity in English

politics. The son of a needy duke, he was several years in Parliament without attracting any notice. He did speak about once in a year, but his speeches were remarkable above all things for audacity, and for a certain irreverent habit of laughing at his own side that made him the despair of his own family and the dread of the politically orthodox. Everybody took him for a young man of fashion, who sauntered into the House of Commons in search of some fun that might stimulate an appetite jaded with the inanities of the theatres or the flirtations of the ball-room. On one occasion he committed an indiscretion even more serious than his exploits in Parliament. At the very moment when his father was Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland and when Mr. Parnell and Mr. Biggar were starting out amid a tempest of British execration on the policy known as Obstruction, Lord Randolph, at a meeting in Dublin, entered on something like a defence of the universally loathed Irishmen.

It was not till the downfall of the Conservative government and the return of a great Liberal majority that Lord Randolph's opportunity came. The fight he had to undertake might well have appalled any but a very brave spirit. The Liberals were in the very insolence of their extraordinary triumph. They had over a hundred majority, while the Conservatives were broken in numbers and still more in spirits. Terror-stricken sheep, they were left without their shepherds, for after their expulsion from office the Tory leaders took a disgust to public life, and many of the most prominent among them ceased to attend the House of Commons at all. It was then that Lord Randolph Churchill organized the little party section known as the "Fourth Party." The idea was borrowed from Mr. Parnell and Mr. Biggar, and the tactics employed were pretty much the same. The proposals of the Ministry were met at every point. They were fought wholesale and in detail, and an incessant guerilla warfare was thus kept up, which had the effect of deranging the best-laid schemes and of defeating the most portentous combinations. This kind of warfare naturally did not recommend itself to the Ministerialists. They found that after their immense victory at the polls, with all their overwhelming majority, and with a Ministry with all the talents, they were being brought to nullity and futility by this little band of four determined and resolute and tireless talkers. An attempt was made to put Churchill down by terror, and he was bracketed with some of the Irish members who had made themselves most conspicuous and most unpopular—unpopular in England, *bien entendu*—by the activity of their opposition to the government. Then, when terror failed, ridicule was tried, and the Fourth Party became one of the jokes of Parliament. Finally, an even greater danger menaced Churchill and his party. The leaders of the Conservatives looked with no

great favor on this servile imitation by members of their own party of the tactics associated with the hated Irish, and there were collisions between Lord Randolph Churchill and Sir Stafford Northcote and the other orthodox leaders of the party. Several times Churchill flouted his seniors and superiors, and soon he made no concealment of a feeling of utter contempt for the whole official hierarchy of his party. To be one of four men, or of three, for the party had come down to this, owing to the secession of Mr. Arthur Balfour; and to oppose the whole party and all its time-honored leaders, was one of the boldest enterprises that a young man of thirty-six ever entered upon. Most people, even those who had a sneaking liking for him, voted Churchill imbecile or mad. But he went on, and the final result is seen now. He has driven Northcote, the leader of the party, from the House of Commons; has put his own nominee, Sir Michal Hicks Beach, in his place, and has forced the Marquis of Salisbury to eat his own words and to take back his own insults. In fact, he has shown a firmness of purpose that makes him a potent force for good or for ill in the future of England.

It is hard to say what his official career will be in case he takes office. He has committed some great and almost unintelligible blunders; and one of the many blunders he has committed in opposition would be enough to damn him as a Minister. In any case, whether in office or out of office, he has shown an independent spirit about Ireland that distinguishes him from the rank and file of the Tory party. There is no use in going into the motives of politicians, especially of English politicians, dealing with Irish affairs. Lord Randolph Churchill may have good motives or bad. The essential fact is that he fully appreciates the enormous power of Mr. Parnell and his party, and that he has good sense enough to recognize strength when he sees it, and boldness enough to carry out any policy which he believes to be made inevitable by the circumstances of the time.

THE CATHOLIC DOCTRINE OF BAPTISM.

De Baptismo. P. Alberto a Bulsano. Taurini, 1857.

De Baptismo. Honoratus Turnelius. Parisiis, 1841.

The Westminster Catechism. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication.

IN the Presbyterian Assembly, held at Cincinnati, on May 22d, a delegate, said to be a judge from Washington, D. C., offered the following strange resolution:

> *Resolved*, That it is the deliberate decision and decided judgment of this assembly, that the Roman Catholic Church has essentially apostatized from the religion of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, and, therefore, cannot be recognized as a Christian Church; and as we do not recognize it as a portion of the visible Church, we cannot consistently view its priesthood as other than usurpers of the sacred functions of the ministry, its ordinances unscriptural, and its baptism as totally invalid.[1]

Fortunately this stupid and bitter attack upon the Catholic Church found sympathy with only a small minority of the Presbyterian body. The sane majority saw how impolitic and ridiculous it would be to give to the world as Presbyterian doctrine, that the largest and oldest of the Christian churches is pagan and to be put below even the Mormons in the scale of orthodoxy; that a church whose members, even in this country, far outnumber the Presbyterians, is no longer "to be recognized as Christian," although engaged in converting and sanctifying mankind for fifteen centuries before the birth of the Geneva autocrat, who caused Michael Servetus to be burned alive for denying Presbyterian articles of faith. The more distinguished of the clergy saw this man's mistake. Drs. Schaff and Nevin, of Pennsylvania, men of solid learning, opposed the resolution, and prevented the assembly from making itself "the laughing-stock of the world," to borrow the words of Dr. Alexander, a distinguished Calvinistic divine from the Pacific coast. The Presbyterians of the United States may thank these gentlemen for preventing the judge from appending to the head of their church a longer pair of ears than were ever worn by a Calvinist condemned to the stocks in the days of cavalier persecution. Had the resolution passed, it would have been an admission that Presbyterianism was founded by a pagan

[1] The Philadelphia Press of May 23d, 1885.

who had never been validly baptized, for John Calvin never received any other than Catholic baptism. We shall see, however, later on, that the judge's great error in regard to the validity of baptism administered by persons not considered orthodox, is only a flitting reminiscence of a heresy as old as the third century, and repeatedly condemned by the Catholic Church. But in order that all men like him, whose sincerity and whose ignorance we do not question, may have an easy opportunity of knowing what Catholics believe regarding the first of the sacraments in the order of time, we proceed to explain briefly the matter, form, minister, subject, necessity, and some of the ceremonies of baptism as now administered in the Catholic Church. Let us first see, however, by way of preface, what the Presbyterians hold in regard to this sacrament, and in what their teaching differs from Catholic truth.

The Presbyterian catechism defines baptism as "a sacrament, wherein the washing with water, in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, doth signify and seal our ingrafting into Christ, and partaking of the benefits of the covenant of grace and our engagement to be the Lord's."[1] The catechism of the last Catholic Council of Baltimore defines baptism as "a sacrament which cleanses us from original sin, makes us Christians, children of God, and heirs of heaven;" and adds: "Actual sins and all the punishment due to them are remitted by baptism, if the person baptized be guilty of any."[2] It will be observed that both catechisms call baptism a sacrament; but by a sacrament the Presbyterian means "a holy ordinance instituted by Christ; wherein, by sensible signs, Christ and the benefits of the new covenant are represented, sealed, and applied to believers."[3] Disrobing this thought of its theological garment, a sacrament is a mere outward sign, which confers no inward grace; it does not cleanse from sin; it does not justify, "faith alone" being the cause of justification; and it is a mere ceremony of initiation like those necessary to become a member of a lodge of Free Masons. The Catholic catechism defines a sacrament to be "an outward sign instituted by Christ to give grace." According to St. Thomas and all other Catholic theologians, three things may be distinguished in baptism: firstly, the external sign, which is the water applied with the proper form; secondly, the thing signified, which is the interior ablution of the soul by sanctifying grace; thirdly, the thing signified in all of the sacraments but three is, sanctifying grace; but in baptism, confirmation, and holy orders, there is, in addition, an indelible

[1] Westminster Catechism, Philadelphia, p. 47.
[2] Catechism of Third Plenary Council, Baltimore, p. 26.
[3] Westminster Catechism, p. 46.

character impressed on the soul. This character in baptism gives a right to the reception of the other sacraments. (3 pars Summæ, quæst. 66, art. 1)

Adam sinned and thus forfeited the rights and privileges of the supernatural citizenship with which he was endowed by his Maker. His posterity are all born disfranchised outlaws. Baptism restores them to citizenship. Or to use a comparison familiar to American ears, baptism is the Christian's naturalization. The Church is our Lord's republic. To become a citizen of it, the infidel, the pagan, must become naturalized, and baptism is the means to that end. The baptized person becomes at once a member of the visible church, sharing all its rights and duties. He becomes capable of receiving the other sacraments. While the external result of this sacrament is to make him a member of the body of the Church, the internal effect is to cleanse him from original and actual sin, sanctify him, and unite him to the soul of the church. The Catholic doctrine of original sin throws light on the Catholic doctrine of baptism.

In the Catholic Church there are two extreme schools as to the nature of original sin. The one which we may call the Augustinian, represented by Berti, and also seemingly by the theologians who made the catechism of the third Plenary Council of Baltimore, teaches that by the sin of our first parents "our nature was corrupted"; and that "this corruption of our nature and other punishments remain in us after original sin is forgiven." (Cat. Third Council of Baltimore.) The opinion of the other school is expressed by Father Perrone, S. J., who teaches that original sin consists in the mere "*privation* of sanctifying grace, and that justice which ought to be in us according to the order established by God," and that "death, concupiscence, diseases, etc., are only effects, or punishments of original sin." (Perrone, *De Homine*, c. iv., ed. Migne, Paris, 1841.) Between these two opinions the Thomists hold their course, although Perrone quotes a text of St. Thomas which seems to favor his view: "Thus, therefore, the *privation* of original justice, by which the human will was subject to God, is the *formal* part of original sin." (S. Th., 1a. 2æ, q. 82.)

The Presbyterian doctrine of justification by faith alone, of the impotency of human nature to do good works, of the destruction of free will by the fall of our first parents, must be all taken into account in judging the Calvinian theory of baptism. Calvin writes:[1] "It is clear that the teaching" (Catholic) "is false, which holds that baptism cleanses us from original sin, and from the corruption

[1] Instit., lib. 4, cap. 15.

which was propagated by Adam into his whole posterity." Other errors of the Presbyterians regarding baptism will be noted in their place.[1]

The Council of Trent summarized the Catholic doctrine on this sacrament in fourteen decrees, passed in the seventh session. In them, among other things, it was defined that water is the matter of the sacrament; that baptism conferred by heretics in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, with the intention of doing what the Church does, is valid; that baptism is necessary to salvation; that a person once validly baptized, and afterwards apostatizing, should not be rebaptized after conversion from apostasy; and that children should not be rebaptized when they come to the use of reason.

I. Luther, in his "Table Talk," holds that anything which serves to wash in, may be used as matter for baptism, consequently baptism in milk or wine would be valid. Theodore Beza held the same opinion. The second canon of the Council of Trent on

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[1] The following is an authentic explanation of the actual teaching of the Presbyterian church regarding original sin:

In the Confession of Faith, which is the formula to which all clergymen of the Presbyterian church are required to subscribe before ordination, chapter vi. treats of "the fall of man, of sin, and of the punishment thereof," in the following words:

"(1.) Our first parents, being seduced by the subtility and temptation of Satan, sinned in eating the forbidden fruit. This, their sin, God was pleased, according to His wise and holy counsel, to permit, having purposed to order it to His own glory.

"(2.) By this sin they fell from their original righteousness and communion with God, and so became dead in sin, and wholly defiled in all the faculties and parts of soul and body.

"(3.) They being the root of all mankind, the guilt of this sin was imputed, and the same death in sin and corrupted nature conveyed to all their posterity descending from them by ordinary generation.

"(4.) From this original corruption, whereby we are utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil, do proceed all actual transgressions.

"(5.) This corruption of our nature, during this life, doth remain in those that are regenerated; and, although it be through Christ pardoned and mortified, yet both itself, and all the motions thereof, are truly and properly sin.

"(6.) Every sin, both original and actual, being a transgression of the righteous law of God, and contrary thereunto, doth, in its own nature, bring guilt upon the sinner, whereby he is bound over to the wrath of God, and curse of the law, and so made subject to death, with all miseries spiritual, temporal, and eternal."

The same doctrine is differently phrased in the answer to the eighteenth question of the shorter catechism, also an authoritative standard of the Presbyterian church. The question is: "Wherein consists the sinfulness of that state whereinto man fell?" And the answer reads: "The sinfulness of that state whereinto man fell, consists in the guilt of Adam's first sin, the want of original righteousness, and the corruption of his whole nature, which is commonly called original sin, together with all actual transgressions which proceed from it."

These doctrines are quite strictly interpreted by the majority of the clergymen now officiating in the Presbyterian church. Some may be more lax than others, but the majority would doubtless maintain these two statements with great emphasis.

baptism is against this error, and that of Calvin, who held that by water in the text, "unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God,"[1] is meant the blood of Christ, on account of the similarity of water and blood in cleansing and purifying.[2] A branch of the Manicheans of the twelfth century, called Cathari or Puritans, baptized in fire. "They place many candles around the wretch who is to be baptized or puritanized (*catharizandus*), and the archpuritan, holding a book in his hand, assists him, and puts the book on his head; the rest praying aloud, and thus is baptism performed."[3] So writes Eckbert, a priest, against them about A.D. 1160.

Thus, instead of pouring water on the head or immersing the catechumen, the ancient Puritans half roasted him. The Socinians and the Quakers also deny the necessity of water in baptism; as did the ancient Marcosians and the Beguards of the Middle Ages.

That natural water is the remote matter of baptism has been universally held in the Catholic Church, which has ever interpreted the text, "Teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost,"[4] and the verse already quoted from St. John, "Unless a man," etc., as implying the necessity of water in baptism. Indeed the text "Unless a man," etc., is one of the few which have received a dogmatic explanation from a general council. The second canon of the Council of Trent on Baptism embodies it in the doctrinal decree defining water as the necessary matter of the sacrament. The text, Acts viii., 36, "And the eunuch said: See, here is water, what doth hinder me from being baptized? . . . . and they went down into the water, both Philip and the eunuch, and he baptized him," shows the usage of the apostles and their immediate successors.

We need not quote the authority of the Fathers, who are unanimous on this point. Their testimony is summed up in the words of St. Augustine: "Take away water and there is no baptism."[5]

The Catholic Church, however, has been accustomed, from the remotest antiquity, to bless the water to be used in baptism, and to put into it a small quantity of blessed oil and consecrated chrism. St. Thomas gives the reason of this when he says: "The blessing of the water is not of necessity for baptism, but adds to it a certain solemnity by which the devotion of the faithful is excited."[6] Tertullian, in the fourth book of his work on Baptism, speaks of this blessing of the water as a very ancient custom. So does St. Cyprian in his seventieth letter to Januarius: "It is necessary," says

[1] St. John, chapter iii., v. 5.
[2] Calvin's Inst., lib. iv., c. 15.
[3] Quoted by Turnelius, p. 305.
[4] St. Matt. xxviii., v. 19.
[5] "Tolle aquam, non est baptismus." Tract. 15 in Joan.
[6] Summæ, 3a pars, q. 66, art. 3.

he, "that the water should be first purified and sanctified by the priest," before being used to baptize. St. Ambrose and St. Augustine both speak of the consecration of the baptismal font. The text of St. Basil,[1] "We bless the water of baptism, and the oil of unction, yes, even the very one who receives baptism. By what scriptural authority? Is it not from long-continued and secret tradition?" clearly shows the usage of the early church on this point. But perhaps the authority of these doctors will have no weight with Presbyterians of the Washington judge type; for the holy fathers belonged to that Church which, according to him, "has essentially apostatized from the religion of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ." Which of the two is more likely to be right, St. Basil and the Catholic Church, or this judge and his gradually evanescing minority in his own evanescing sect?

Although natural water is the remote matter of baptism, its application, either by immersion, infusion or aspersion, is the proximate matter of the sacrament. Up to the thirteenth century both the Greek and the Latin Churches used immersion in the solemn administration of baptism. In fact, our Lord and His apostles baptized with this rite. Christ Himself was baptized in this way by St. John, for in St. Matthew, iii., 16, we read: "And Jesus, being baptized, forthwith came out of the water." Why, then, do Presbyterians baptize by aspersion, since our Lord's practice is against it? Will the judge tell us why his sect has given up the scriptural mode of baptism, which the Baptists logically preserve? The Catholic Church, as the infallible custodian of the matter and form of the sacraments, claims the right to interpret them, and modify them with accidental conditions. No such claim is made by the Presbyterians. May we not justly, therefore, tax Presbyterian baptism with being invalid, judged by this judge himself, since it is not administered as St. John the Baptist, as our Lord and His apostles, and as the whole Christian Church generally administered it up to the thirteenth century, that is, by immersion? Is there not apostasy here?

A change in the mode of baptizing was made in the Latin Church in the thirteenth century. St. Thomas, who died on March 7th, A.D. 1274, writes: "It is safer to baptize by the mode of immersion, because such is the common usage."[2] St. Bonaventure, his contemporary, bears similar testimony.

As we have already hinted, the Catholic Church claims the right to modify in accidentals the matter and form of the sacraments. When good order and the common weal of Christians require it, she makes such modifications in her discipline. She is the inter-

[1] De spiritu Sancto, cap. 27.

[2] 3a pars, Sum. q. 66, art. 7.

preter of Christ's law, and the visible judge of His doctrine and precepts. In virtue of her supreme authority, she changed the day of rest from the Sabbath prescribed on Mount Sinai to Sunday; and the Presbyterians in this humbly follow her example. She took away the cup from the laity in the administration of the Blessed Eucharist, because she judged it better to do so; and using the same authority, she gradually substituted the rite of infusion and aspersion for immersion in the public and ordinary administration of the sacrament of baptism.

Infusion or aspersion was, however, always considered a valid mode of baptizing, although licit only in certain cases.

Thus, in the baptism of invalids unable to leave their beds, St. Cyprian tells us that aspersion was used; and he quotes in justification of it the words of Ezekiel (ch. xxxvi., v. 25), which are interpreted as a prophecy of Christian baptism: "And I will pour (*aspergam*) upon you clean water, and you shall be cleansed from all your filthiness."[1] In various parts of the Church and on various occasions from the earliest times, infusion or aspersion was used in case of necessity, although immersion was the ordinary public ceremony. We refer the reader for facts in proof of this assertion to any text-book of Catholic theology.[2]

II. The Catholic Church specifies and formulates the form of baptism: "I baptize thee in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost." The Presbyterians use the same form. Where do they get it? From the Church which the poor judge and a number of Presbyterians call an "apostasy." Our Lord never used these words in baptizing. He told His apostles to go and baptize in "the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost;" but He left it to the infallible Church to formulate the words. The Greek Church baptizes with these words: "The servant of God N—— is baptized in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost." Why do not the Presbyterians use this form? One would think that their dislike of the Roman Catholic "apostate" Church, whose baptism some of them consider invalid, would prompt them to reject her form, and accept that of their more congenial schismatic sister. But consistency is not a characteristic of error. The Greek form is recognized as valid by the Roman Church. We may remark here that the form and matter of the sacrament of baptism must be applied simultaneously. There must be a moral union between them. The words, "I baptize thee, etc.," must be used while the party is being dipped or aspersed. Further, there should be a real lotion

[1] St. Cyprian, epist. 69.

[2] Tournely, pp. 324, 325, 326, gives numerous historical proofs of the truth of this statement.

in the sprinkling. A drop of water would not suffice. It must wash and flow to be matter of baptism. In this point many of the sects confer baptism invalidly. The Baptists, although they immerse properly, yet sometimes separate the form from the words so as to make their baptism doubtful. Our friends the Presbyterians are also very slovenly in this respect. Not believing in the sacramental character[1] of baptism, they sprinkle so carelessly that hardly a drop touches the head of the person baptized; and baptism administered by them is therefore doubtful.[2] This is the consequence of their "apostasy" from the mode in which our Lord was baptized, *i. e.*, by immersion. John Calvin's belief in fire was much stronger than his trust in water. Yet his followers ought to be strong champions of immersion, for he held, contrary to the Catholic Church, that the baptism of St. John and of Christ are the same in effect,[3] and no one can dispute the fact that St. John's baptism was by immersion. Those who were baptized by him went into the river Jordan.

III. In the early ages, for a long time, when the bishops were more numerous than now, they alone baptized. By degrees, however, when the Christians multiplied, priests and deacons were deputed to perform the duty. It is but proper that the sacrament of naturalization, which confers spiritual citizenship, should be conferred by those only who are officers in the spiritual Republic of Christ. But in His mercy, which embraces all men, He conferred the power on all mankind to administer this sacrament of regeneration in case of necessity. The Church has always held this clement and merciful view of the subject, and in this contrasts favorably with the bigoted limitations and restrictions of heresy.

She has ever taught that although the usual minister of baptism is a priest or a bishop, yet in case of necessity any lay person, man, woman, or child, even a heretic, or an infidel, or a civil judge, may validly and lawfully administer it. The reason for this broad doctrine is found in the necessity of this sacrament for salvation. One of the reasons given by St. Thomas for the institution of water as the matter of baptism is also applicable to the extension of the ministerial power for this sacrament to every human being in case of

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[1] "The sacraments become effectual means of salvation, not *from any virtue in them*." Westminster Catechism, p. 45.

[2] On the 17th of September, 1830, an answer was given by the Pope to the following question: "Whether Calvinists and Lutherans, living in regions in which their baptism is doubtful and suspected, should be considered infidels, so that between them and Catholics the diriment impediment of marriage, *disparitatis cultus*, should be held to exist?" To this the authoritative reply was that in case of doubt, the baptism is to be held valid in order to the validity of marriage—*in ordine ad validitatem matrimonii*—(Roman Ritual, Baltimore, 1880).

[3] Calvin's Institutes, lib. 4, cap. 15, n. 7.

necessity. "Because water is common and universal, it is a matter adapted to the necessity of this sacrament; for water can be found easily everywhere."[1]

Calvin[2] denied that a layman could administer this sacrament, even when the person to be baptized was in danger of death. The reason of this denial was because he denied the necessity of baptism. Thus Calvin denies to the Washington champion of his doctrines a privilege which the Catholic Church liberally concedes to him. All of the followers of the Geneva autocrat are not, however, of the same opinion on this subject.

We have no clear Scriptural text to prove that laymen can baptize in case of necessity. It is true that some hermeneutists say that Ananias, who baptized Saul,[3] was a layman. But this is doubtful. Tradition, however, is clear as to the custom and the obligation of laymen baptizing in certain cases. Tertullian[4] teaches that bishops, priests, and deacons can baptize; bishops as primary, priests as secondary ministers, with permission of the bishops; and deacons, with the same permission, if specially deputed; and that laymen in case of necessity not only can baptize freely, validly and licitly; but that they are bound to do so or be held responsible for the fate of those who die without the sacrament.

St. Jerome pithily puts this doctrine against the Luciferians in these words: "If necessity compels, we know that lay persons can baptize." The fourth council of Carthage, at which St. Augustine was present, decreed: "Let no woman baptize, unless necessity compels."[5]

Pope Eugene IV., in his instruction to the Armenians, decrees: "In case of necessity, not only a priest or a deacon, but even a layman or a woman, even a pagan or a heretic, can baptize, provided he uses the proper form, and intends to do what the Church does."[6]

The Church condemned even the great St Cyprian and his followers for teaching that the baptism of heretics and of unbaptised laymen was invalid because conferred by heretics or by unbaptized laymen. The error of our judge, who would insist on rebaptizing "papists," is only a travesty on the error of St. Cyprian.

IV. The Presbyterian doctrine regarding the subject of baptism is laid down in the Westminster Catechism as follows: "Baptism is not to be administered to any that are out of the visible Church till they profess their faith in Christ, and obedience to him; but the infants of such as are members of the visible Church are to be

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[1] Sum., 3a pars, quaest. 66, art. 3.
[2] Lib. iv., Instit. c., 15 par., 20 *et seq.*
[3] Acts of the Apostles, ch. ix., v. 18.
[4] De Baptismo, cap. 17.
[5] Turnelius, p. 469.
[6] Idem.

baptized."[1] According to the judge, the two hundred millions of Catholics now in the world are all outside of the "visible Church," and they and their children are not even Christians; yes, all the Catholics that ever lived, both before and since John Calvin, were invalidly baptized! The Catechism considers children of members of the "visible Church" as capable of baptism; but it does not tell us what or where the "visible Church" is, or how to find it, or whether the children of those who do not belong to it are capable of baptism or not? The theological judge, or the physician who seconded his stupid "resolution," would be sadly puzzled to answer these questions.

The Catholic Church teaches that baptism is to be given to all human beings, not excepting children. Her custom is to baptize them very soon after their birth, and her theologians hold that it would be a grave sin for parents to neglect, for a considerable time, to have their children christened.

The Waldenses taught that baptism need not be given to children, as it could do them no good. The Petrobrusians, another sect of the Middle Ages, taught the same thing. The learned Peter, Abbot of Cluny, refuted them in two letters. The Cathari, or mediæval Puritans, denied the necessity and attacked the use of infant baptism, as did the Anabaptists of the 16th century, who rebaptized in adult age all those who had been christened in infancy.

Theodore Beza, with all the old Lutherans and Calvinists, held that only the children of believers should be baptized. What the present opinion of the different sects on this subject is, it is hard to tell, for the new sectaries have slipped from the old moorings. There is no unanimity of teaching among them either regarding baptism or anything else.

The whole history of the Christian Church shows that infant baptism was practiced even in the earliest days. In the sixteenth chapter of the Acts of the Apostles (v. 14 and 15) we read that Lydia and her whole household were baptized by St. Paul—the children included. In Corinthians I., chap. xvi., v. 15, St. Paul intimates that he had baptized the whole household of Stephanas, the children not excluded. Just as the Jews circumcised their children, Christians baptize theirs, baptism being the fulfilment of the type circumcision: "In whom (Christ) also you are circumcised with circumcision not made by hand in the despoiling of the body of the flesh, but in the circumcision of Christ, buried with him in baptism."[2]

In the Council of Carthage, held A.D. 253, under St. Cyprian,

[1] P. 47, Philadelphia edition.

[2] Coloss., chap. ii., v. 11 and 12.

Bishop Fidus held that the baptism of children should be delayed till the eighth day after their birth, as was usual in the case of Hebrew circumcision. His opinion was rejected. "No one agreed with your opinion," writes St. Cyprian,[1] "and all held that the mercy and grace of God should be withheld from no one, especially not from children, who, recently born, have no sin except that of Adam." St. Augustine strengthens this testimony:[2] "Blessed Cyprian made no new decree in this case, but kept the faith of the Church against those who thought that no babe should be baptized until after the eighth day after its birth; he and his fellow bishops holding that babes just born should be baptized."

The strongest reason, however, for insisting on the necessity of infant baptism is its necessity for salvation.

V. From the earliest date there were sectaries who denied the necessity of baptism. The Caians and Quintilians, in the second century, held that faith alone saves, and that consequently baptism is unnecessary. A similar heresy of the Wiclifites was condemned in the fifteenth session of the Council of Constance. Calvin, the founder of the Presbyterian religion, distinctly teaches, in a passage already quoted, that baptism is not necessary for salvation; that the children of the faithful are saved by the "covenant" made between Christ and Christians, in virtue of which original sin is not imputed to them. Baptism does not purify children from original sin, but is only a sign of the divine promise. Nor is this sacrament necessary to adults, since they are justified by faith alone, and baptism is given to them only to nourish and strengthen their faith.[3]

In order to understand Catholic doctrine on the necessity of baptism, we must distinguish with the scholastics between necessity of means and necessity of precept. A thing is necessary as means when it is indispensable to attain the end; necessary as precept when, although commanded, yet, if it is inculpably omitted, the end may still be attained. Thus, to illustrate from well-known Catholic doctrine, contrition or heart felt sorrow is indispensable in adults to obtain the remission of their sins; the sorrow is necessary as means to the end; while confession to a priest is only necessary of precept, for, if the sinner has no opportunity to confess, his heart felt sorrow and love of God will save him.[4]

We must also distinguish three forms of baptism, two of which are improperly so called. There is baptism of love, and baptism of blood.[5] Baptism of love is perfect charity, and contrition for

[1] Letter 59, to Fidus.

[2] Letter 166, to St. Jerome.

[3] *Quatenus erigendæ, alendæ, confirmandæque fidei nostræ datur, sumendu sest.*" Calvin's Instit., cap. xv., n. 14.

[4] Bulsano, p. 318.

[5] "Baptismus *flaminis, fluminis, et sanguinis,*" Theologi, *passim.*

sin, including the desire of baptism by water. Baptism of love can exist in adults alone, for babes are incapable of contrition, or the desire of baptism by water. To have baptism of love, perfect charity or love of God is required, so that the adult loves God above all things, and is ready to observe all the divine precepts. Imperfect contrition will not suffice. There must be also, in baptism of love, a disposition and explicit desire to receive baptism by water in him who knows that it has been instituted and commanded by Christ. An instance of baptism by love is the penitent thief on the cross, to whom, on account of his contrition, Christ promised paradise.[1]

The Council of Trent (sess. vi., de justif., cap. 4) decreed that since the promulgation of the Gospel there is "no translation from the state of old Adam to the state of grace without the laver of regeneration or the desire of it." Thus, then, in case of necessity, baptism in desire with the requisite conditions suffices for salvation. The practice of the Church from the sixth century has been according to this doctrine, for since that time she has said mass and offered prayers for catechumens dying before receiving baptism by water.

Baptism by blood, or by martyrdom, is another substitute for baptism by water. Even unbaptized babes, murdered out of hatred of the Christian religion, or of Christ, have always been considered saints in the Church;[2] hence the feast of the "Holy Innocents" in Christmas week. Martyrdom in the case of adults must be voluntary and accepted from supernatural motives. Hence, soldiers killed in a religious war are not considered martyrs. "Whosoever shall lose his life for My sake and the Gospel shall save it." These words of our Lord[3] justify Catholic teaching as to the efficacy of baptism by blood. St. Thomas epitomizes the faith of the Church on this point in these words:[4] "The shedding

[1] St. Luke xxiii., v. 43.

[2] What is the fate of children dying without baptism? Some Catholic theologians, like Pighius and Catharinus quoted by Bellarmine, teach that they enjoy a certain natural felicity, a species of terrestrial paradise. Cardinal Sfondratius, towards the end of the 17th century, taught that they are indeed excluded from the kingdom of heaven and the beatific vision, but not from the possession of natural good, nor are they condemned to everlasting punishment, nor liable to sin. He was denounced to Pope Innocent XII., A.D. 1697, for holding this opinion, but the Pope never condemned him. Bishop Frayssinous, in his celebrated *Conférences*, t. 3, writes: "We know that some theologians teach that children dying without baptism suffer on account of original sin not only the privation of eternal happiness, but also the sensible pain of fire; but the great majority of doctors, as St. Gregory Nazianzen, St. Thomas, and St. Bernard, deny this, and their benign opinion has never been condemned."

It is the opinion of Frayssinous himself that these children are like "dethroned kings, deprived of a kingdom to the possession of which they could have aspired; like exiles, who grieve for a country which they shall never see again." They are happy, but their happiness is not without alloy.

[3] Mark viii., v. 35.

[4] 3a pars Sum., q. 66, art. 11.

of blood for Christ, and the interior operation of the Holy Ghost, are called baptisms because they have the same effect as baptism by water."

Baptism by water is properly the sacrament. It is the gate of the Church. It is necessary both of precept and of means, subject to the qualifications already specified. The text in St. John iii., v. 5, proves this: "Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God." Our Lord commissioned His Apostles to teach and baptize all nations; but the command to the Apostles to baptize has its correlative in the duty of the nations to be baptized. If the former must preach because they are ordered to do so, the others must listen; if the Apostles have the office to baptize, the nations have the duty to receive the baptism. He that only believes is not the one who is to be saved. Faith alone suffices not. He must also be baptized. "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved."[1]

The Presbyterian Assembly and its judge admit, as John Calvin did, that faith is necessary to salvation. But our Lord puts baptism in the same category as faith. He says that both are necessary to salvation. By what authority do the Presbyterians separate them? Are they not the "apostate" church instead of the Catholic, since they rebel against the teaching of Christ, and refuse to acknowledge the necessity of a sacrament which He declares to be indispensable to salvation? "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved." These words of Christ stamp Presbyterian doctrine as a rebellion against the meaning of a self-evident text of Scripture.

The condemnation of the Pelagians, who denied the necessity of the sacrament of baptism in the early centuries, and the fifth canon of the seventh session of the Council of Trent, clearly show how the Catholic Church has always thought and taught on this subject.

VI. This matter becomes considerably clearer if we consider what are the effects of the sacrament of baptism. The Calvinists hold, with their founder, that sin remains in us even after baptism. The Catholic Church teaches that it cleanses from original sin, as well as from actual sin previously committed, destroys even the temporal punishment due to it, confers grace by its own intrinsic efficacy (*ex opere operato*), and imprints on the soul a spiritual character which can never be destroyed. St. Peter teaches that baptism obliterates sin, for he said to his hearers in his great sermon, recorded in Acts ii. (v. 38), "Do penance and be baptized, every one of you, in the name of Jesus Christ, for the remission of your sins." In this text no distinction is made between original and actual sins;

[1] St. Mark xvi., v. 16.

all are remitted by baptism. Ananias told St. Paul (Acts xxii., v. 16), after his conversion, to "rise up and be baptized, and wash away thy sins." This indicates a real action, an internal purification, not a mere covering up or hiding of the foulness of the sinner. "But you are washed, but you are sanctified," writes St. Paul to the Corinthians,[1] thus indicating the inner efficacy of baptism by comparing its action on the soul to the action of water on the body. If baptism were a mere ceremony of initiation, the language of the Scripture regarding its cleansing powers would not be so strong. St. Justin[2] thus addresses the Jews in the second century of the Christian era: "There is no other way for the remission of sins,"—he includes both original and actual,—"except to acknowledge Christ, and to be washed by baptism." The fifth canon of the fifth session of the Council of Trent, treating of original sin, expresses the teaching of the whole Church in these words: "If any one denies that by the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, conferred in baptism, the guilt of original sin is not remitted, or asserts that the whole of that which constitutes the true and proper reason of sin is not taken away, but only not imputed, let him be anathema." The meaning of these words is illustrated by the Catholic doctrine that justification consists in the interior purification of the soul by sanctifying grace, and that in the case of adults the coöperation of their own free will is essential to it. In order that a grown sinner should be justified, he must have the supernatural virtues of faith, hope, love of God above all things, sorrow for sin committed, and a purpose of amendment; and besides these dispositions he must receive baptism, the instrumental cause of justification.[3]

The terms employed in holy Scripture, "to be born again," to be "regenerated," and "renewed," when speaking of the effects of baptism, show that it takes away all penalty, even temporal, due to sin. St. John Chrysostom, who certainly represents the early Greek Church in this matter, writes:[4] "Why is it" (baptism) "called the laver of regeneration? Because it not only remits our sins and cleanses us from them, but acts on us, as if to make us be born again. It creates us anew, not making us out of the earth, but from another element—water. It does not simply wash the race, it moulds it anew; for things that are only washed retain some vestiges of foulness; but things recast in the furnace, and renewed by fire, come forth without spot or stain, and assume all their first splendor."

In consequence of the belief thus expressed, the Catholic Church has never imposed canonical penance on baptized adults for crimes

[1] 1 Cor. cviv., v. 11. [2] Dial. contra Tryphon, n. 44.
[3] Bulsano, p. 302, and Catholic theologians passim.
[4] Catech. I., ad Illum, n. 3.

committed before baptism. In all the early canons for public penance for those who were obliged to suffer temporal punishment in this world for sins confessed, and remitted in the sacrament of penance, there is not one for converted pagans, unless their sin was subsequent to their baptism. If catechumens were sometimes forced to do works of penance, it was only to prepare them better for the great sacrament of regeneration. Contrition, confession, and satisfaction are the parts of the sacrament of penance. A temporal punishment always accompanies it under the head of "satisfaction." But baptism is more sweeping in its effects, and washes away all penalty as well as all guilt.[1]

Each and every one of the Presbyterians holds that baptism justifies or sanctifies no one. The imputation of the merits of Christ does this. The mantle of Christ's redemption is thrown over the sins of the predestined, a paltry few out of the whole human race, so that their sins are hidden from the eyes of God. But their sins are there, nevertheless. Even the elect are foul and unclean, and nothing but sin. Even the elect are totally depraved, incapable of good or of merit. They have no free will; and certainly no will at all that can help them in the work of salvation. The elect, the handful of saints, are saved without any merit of theirs; and the immense majority of mankind are foreordained to hell's eternal realms of fire without any fault of theirs. God elects the few for His glory; and damns all the rest for His glory. Baptism is only a ceremony of initiation; it is no sign of grace, nor even of election; for even the majority of the Presbyterians are most likely to be damned, according to the judge's belief. The only ones sure of salvation are those who, like the learned judge, feel certain that they are confirmed in grace; and that all the hundreds of millions of the "apostate" Church are to be roasted for all eternity. This doctrine of blind predestination is abhorred and detested by the Catholic Church. She asserts the necessity of free will in adults for salvation; and proclaims the grand and ennobling truth that no man is damned without his own personal fault; and that it is possible for every member of the human race to work out his salvation by using the natural light of his intelligence, and the natural powers of his free will, in coöperation with grace, which is denied to no one. "*Facientibus quod in se est Deus non denegat gratiam*," is a well-known axiom of Catholic theology.[2] Baptism is not only the gate of initiation into the Church. It is also a sacrament which gives to the one who receives it a right to the other sacraments, and sanctifies the soul upon which it has been conferred. It washes, it justifies, and it

[1] Council of Trent, sess. vi., cap. 14, says in penance "not always is the whole penalty remitted, *as it is in baptism*."

[2] "Do your best and God will help you," is a free translation.

sanctifies.[1] "For as many of you as have been baptized in Christ, have put on Christ."[2] "He saved us by the laver of regeneration, and renovation of the Holy Ghost."[3] This putting on of Christ, what is it but the donning of the white robes of sanctifying grace? And this salvation by the laver of regeneration, what is it but justification through the waters of baptism, which washes away all sin and pours sanctifying grace into the soul? By baptism we put off the old man, and put on the new, who was created according to God; we become innocent, immaculate, pure, guiltless, beloved of God, heirs of God, and co-heirs of Christ.[4]

Baptism is one of the three sacraments which imprint an indelible character on the soul. This character is defined by St. Thomas as "a mark by which one of the faithful is deputed to receive or to give to others those things which pertain to divine worship."[5] Baptism imprints a character which entitles the baptized to receive the other sacraments; confirmation, in addition, is a mark of spiritual strength; while Holy Order imprints a character entitling the recipient to administer the sacraments to others. John Wiclef, in the fifteenth century, denied that any of the sacraments impressed a character on the soul; and so did the founder of the Presbyterians. These are his words:[6] "What they babble about an indelible character was unknown to the ancients, and savors more of magical incantations than of evangelical doctrine." But while the heresiarch thus ridiculed the teaching of the Church and refused to admit the existence of the character impressed on the soul by baptism, he invented a character of his own, and stamped it alike on the souls of elect and reprobate. He held that the "elect" are so confirmed in grace that they can never lose it; that "election" is ineffaceable and indelible; and that all the crimes, murder, adultery, or sodomy committed by the "elect" count for nothing. A Calvinistic "saint" is so confirmed in grace that he might sell himself to the devil, and yet never lose his "election"; while a Calvinistic reprobate might perform the most heroic acts of virtue and work miracles, and yet never be anything but a "reprobate." The character of "reprobation," as well as the character of "election," is indelible. Thus do men deny the reasonableness of what is divine, and substitute for it what is shocking to reason and common sense. St. Paul, according to St. Thomas and other great commentators, speaks of the character impressed by baptism in his Second Epistle to the Corinthians, chap. i., v. 21: "Now he that confirmeth us with you in Christ, and that hath anointed us, is God; who also hath sealed us." The Greek word

[1] 1 Cor. vi., v. 11; Ephes. v., v. 25. [2] Gal. iii., v. 26. [3] Tit. iii., v. 5.
[4] Council of Trent, sess. v., can. 5. [5] Sum., 3d part, q. 63, art. 3.
[6] Calvin's Antidote, Concil Trid., Sess. VII., Can. 9.

for sealed, σφραγισαμενος, is very expressive. It signifies stamping, or imprinting a mark. The mark of circumcision, which certainly left a character, is called by St. Paul σφραγιδα—the seal of justice;[1] and circumcision was a most striking type of baptism. St. Jerome, speaking of baptism, says that by it God imprints a character on the soul.[2] So speak all the fathers and the councils, and thus teaches the infallible Church regarding the spiritual and indelible mark impressed by this sacrament. The sacraments which impress a character can be received only once. This doctrine was clearly vindicated in the celebrated controversy between Pope St. Stephen and St. Cyprian regarding the validity of baptism given by heretics. The Catholic Church rejected St. Cyprian's error.

In that controversy, however, St. Cyprian, Firmilian, and the other rebaptizers, did not insist on their practice, because they doubted that baptism imprints a character, but because they denied the validity of heretical baptism.[3] The indelible character and unity of this sacrament, according to the Fathers, is clearly intimated in the text: "It is impossible for those who were once illuminated"—a term frequently applied to the newly baptized in early Church history— ". . . . to be renewed again."[4] As circumcision, the figure, cannot be repeated, neither can baptism. Thus argues all Catholic antiquity; for, as there is but one Lord and one faith, so must there be but one baptism.[5]

The Presbyterians and others object also to the ceremonies used by the Catholic Church in administering baptism. They say we mix oil with the water, and thus destroy the matter of the sacrament. But since they attribute so little efficacy to it, deny its necessity, and consider it a mere sign of initiation, why strain at so slight a modification of the matter of it as is effected by the infusion of a drop of blessed oil or chrism? Fire swallowers who have such iron-clad throats as to gulp down John Calvin's eviscerating doctrine of total depravity and predestination, ought not to gag at a little oil infused into the water of baptism. Indeed, oil is what Presbyterianism wants, for the whole system is too acid for any ordinary man's digestion. The use of blessed oil, as we have already seen, is spoken of by St. Basil. St. Justin and Tertullian mention the exorcisms. St. Augustine speaks of the breathing on the head of the child by the priest. Origen speaks of the salt to be put on the tongue of the Catechumen. St. Ambrose writes about the spittle with which the ears and nose of the person to be baptized were touched. The use of this ceremony is sanctioned by

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[1] Rom. vi., v. 11. [2] Bulsano, p. 151. [3] Turnelius, p. 526.
[4] Epis. to Heb. vi., v. 4. [5] Ephes. iv., v. 5.

the example and by the very words of Christ Himself.[1] The anointing of the Catechumen with oil on the breast and shoulders before baptism, and with chrism afterwards, is mentioned by St. Clement, St. Chrysostom, and St. Ambrose. The proofs of the antiquity and universality of these ceremonies in the whole Christian Church may be found in Tournely, or in any Catholic theology treating of this subject. With these ceremonies was John Calvin christened; with these was the devil expelled from him that afterwards returned, bringing seven others with him; with oil and chrism was Calvin blessed by the Catholic priest of Noyon, in the north of France, A.D. 1509; and if that baptism was invalid, as our misguided friend, in the Presbyterian Convention, would have us believe, then, we repeat, the founder of the Presbyterian sect was a pagan.

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[1] St. John ix., v. 6: "He spat on the ground, and made clay of the spittle, and spread the clay upon his eyes." "And spitting, he touched his tongue . . . . and said to him, Ephetha, which is, Be thou opened." St. Mark vii., v. 35.

THE NEW VERSION OF THE ENGLISH PROTESTANT BIBLE.

The Holy Bible containing the Old and New Testaments. Translated out of the original tongues: Being the version set forth A.D. 1611, compared with the most ancient authorities and revised. Cambridge: University Press, 1885.

MORE than fifteen years ago, in February, 1870, the Convocation of the Church of England, in its province of Canterbury, took action for a work that had long been felt to be sorely needed, a thorough revision of the English translation of the Bible published in 1611 with a fulsome address to King James I. That version is often called "the authorized version," although it was never directly authorized by any competent person or body. In fact, the term seems to have crept in from the mention on the title page of the lessons "appointed to be read in churches." And it would be curious indeed that the selection by the Catholic Church of portions of scripture could become in time a supposed approval of a Protestant version condemned by the Church. Certainly, though King James appointed translators, and the Convocation of Canterbury instituted companies for revision, this does not officially adopt in advance the work to be done. The revision of 1885 appears, like the edition of 1611, without any official authorization by the Head of the English Church, or by the Church of England convened in council. Yet though the revisers in their preface to the New Testament first guardedly speak of the 1611 Bible as "commonly known by the name of the Authorized Version," they constantly after that call it definitely the "Authorized Version."

The basis of the English Protestant Bible which has for the last two centuries been in general use is to be found in those published by Tyndale, 1526, and Coverdale, 1535, both ostensibly translated from the Hebrew and Greek, but really, to a great extent, mere versions of Luther's German Bible, which thus becomes the real parent of all the English Protestant versions. In regard to Tyndale Dr. Mombert in his recent work, issued by Bagster, leaves no manner of doubt. He is represented as a fair Greek scholar in 1523. "Yet any one who will impartially compare Tyndale's New Testament with Luther's will see," says the London *Athenæum*, "that our English translator is as much indebted, to say the least, to the German as to the Latin of Erasmus and to the Greek original."

"Luther's and Tyndale's New Testaments exhibit more than simple translations of the Greek. They contain introductions to the respective books, as well as marginal notes. As without a direct miracle the two translators could not write in two different languages exactly the same introductions and give literally the same comments upon the same passages, it will readily be conceded that Tyndale, who published his New Testament in 1525–6, copied Luther, whose Testament appeared in 1522." Tyndale copied nearly half of Luther's introduction, and 190 of 210 marginal references, without correcting errors in them. Of 69 glosses on St. Matthew, Tyndale transfers 59, often copying Luther so slavishly that at times we must go back to Luther to find what Tyndale means. In the translation, where Luther is free, Tyndale follows him. Where Tyndale left Luther he frequently went astray, and in the marginal notes which are clearly his own his violent abuse of the Pope, bishops and clergy exceeds even the virulence of Luther. So much for Tyndale's New Testament and its German origin.

As for Coverdale's, the case is equally clear. The original title as set up by Van Meteren at Antwerp in 1535 reads: "Biblia. That is, the holy scripture of the Old and New Testament faithfully and truly translated out of Douche and Latyn in to Englishe MDXXXV. Printed in the yeare of our Lord MDXXXV and fynished the fourth daye of October." A copy of this volume was lent by the Earl of Leicester to the Caxton celebration in 1877. When the sheets reached England, Nicholson set up a new title page, omitting the words from "and truly" down to "Latyn"; but the book as printed at Antwerp tells the story. The source was not the Hebrew and Greek, but Luther's "Douche," modified here and there by reference to the Latin, and, as Henry Stevens claims, the translation was made by Van Meteren, a Hollander.

The original English Protestant Bible was not made from the Hebrew and Greek, but from Luther's "Douche." The subsequent revisions were made to approximate it to the original languages; but as every reviser needed revision, the attempt has not been very successful.

Yet this is the volume so long held up as a model of English undefiled! In no literature but English could a work if so mongrel and motley a character have ever attained the position of a standard for purity and elegance. In other tongues works that attain such eminence are the work of one individual full of his genius, representing the language in all its highest purity and elegance. Yet here a work made from a *Douche* original, with foreign ideas protruding at every pore, becomes a standard not

only for matters religious but even for purity, elegance and symmetry!

As a knowledge of Greek and Hebrew increased, revisions were made to try and bring the current versions into greater conformity with the original languages. This gave rise to Matthews, in 1537, Taverner's, 1539, Cranmer's, 1540, the Geneva, 1557–60, the Bishops' Bible, 1568. These last two represented two diverse schools, the Bishops' that of the Church of England, while the Geneva was the work of the followers of Calvin. The last early revision, that made under the direction of King James, was an attempt to reconcile these two, but the Bible issued in 1611 did not supersede the Geneva or "Breeches" Bible, which was that adopted by all the Puritans, Presbyterians, and Independents in England and New England. The Geneva held its own till the time of Charles II., when the printing of the Bible was vested in the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, which issued only the King James version. The Geneva thus ceased to be printed, and the non-conformist bodies had no alternative but to adopt the version which they disliked. If the Puritans in Old and New England accepted the King James at last, it was only as a matter of necessity; it was as repugnant to their feelings as it is to those of Catholics, on whom of late they delight in forcing it.

It has been the fashion to extol the King James Bible as a model of English, but the German Luther influence from the outset gave the Protestant versions a foreign tinge, and the violence of Tyndale against the Pope and the Bishops, against the Church and all connected with it, made him avoid, as much as he could, the terms and expressions which seemed to recall devotional use in the Church; this required the adoption of new, local, or antiquated words. The same spirit prevailed in all the revisions, and after a time, by constant reprinting, the new words came into general use. But the Bible of 1611 is not the English of any part of England at any particular time. Philologically it has no real value. Its influence for the last two centuries has undoubtedly been great, its very errors and misprints being so ingrained in the minds of the people that the revision, though adopted, will scarcely in a century consign them to oblivion.

The original Rheims-Douay (1583–1609), which we Catholics have unwisely discarded for Bishop Challoner's, is, on the contrary, the work of one man of acknowledged learning, in the best English of his time, not avoiding but embodying all devotional language to which the faithful had long been accustomed. It is, moreover, universally recognized as extremely faithful, while not one of the Protestant versions, from the Tyndale to the King James, has escaped severe censure for unfaithfulness, and the constant revi-

sions are an acknowledgment of the charge. That the King James revisers were influenced by the Catholic version has long been known, and the present revisers acknowledge it frankly.

Indeed Catholic labors in translating the Scriptures and presenting them to the people seem never to be matters of indifference. If the revisers and translators of King James' day awaited the appearance of the complete labors of the Catholic scholar, Gregory Martin, as his volumes successively issued from the foreign presses to which penal laws had compelled him to resort, the translators of the Victorian era seem to have been no less observant. Besides the weightier matters of substance which occupied the minds of the latter, there were considerations of form engaging their attention, and to two of these they refer especially. One of these, the consecutive printing of the verses with the figures not breaking in on the sentence, but ranged in the margin, brings the new Protestant Bible to the wholesome look of the grand old version issued from the presses of Fogny at Rheims in 1582, and of Lawrence Kellam at Douay in 1609–10—those noble volumes of our forefathers which it was a penal matter unto death for them to possess in the days when Protestantism denied the authentic scriptures to the Catholics, who could read them only by stealth and in secret. Another point is the presenting of the poetical portions of the Holy Scriptures in the form in which poetry is habitually given, and in this they follow the idea of the learned but most erratic Catholic priest, Rev. Alexander Geddes, two volumes of whose very curious version of the Bible appeared at London in 1792, dedicated to Lord Petre, whose present successor sits in the House of Lords in his priestly garb.

In their version of the New Testament the present revisers follow no printed Greek text, and no one ancient manuscript; but formed a text of their own, which they translated. In regard to the Old Testament they made no such attempt to create a text. "The Massoretic text of the Old Testament Scriptures," they admit, "has come down to us in manuscripts which are of no very great antiquity, and which all belong to the same family or recension." The most ancient Hebrew manuscript at the time of Luther was only about six hundred years old, and was penned nearly a thousand years after the birth of our Lord. But Protestants are committed to the Hebrew, and the revisers "have thought it most prudent to adopt the Massoretic text as the basis of their work." The text used by the Septuagint translators no longer exists; that employed by St. Jerome is lost. The earlier Protestant translators and revisers rejected the aid of the Septuagint and of St. Jerome, who translated in Egypt and Palestine, with older Hebrew manuscripts and greater aids to secure accuracy than scholars in Eng-

land, where Hebrew studies were then in their infancy, could possibly enjoy. Nothing could exceed the arrogant presumption of the small body of scholars who had acquired a smattering of Hebrew, and could thus refuse to profit by the labors of far better scholars, who translated with far superior advantages and with deep reverence, translating as faithfully as possible into Greek and Latin the Hebrew Scriptures, as they stood before and soon after the Christian era, when the original text had not been manipulated in the anti-Christian school of Massorah.

Independent of the sanction given to the Septuagint by the habitual use which our Lord and His disciples made of it, its value as an early rendering of an uncorrupted text by competent scholars must, even to an agnostic, be of great weight.

The Hebrew language, from the time in which Moses wrote the Pentateuch, to that when Esdras wrote, a period of more than a thousand years, must have undergone great vicissitudes in its vocabulary, grammatical forms, and expressions. The literature of no country covering such a period could be read as one work, the earlier writings would be archaic and obsolete to those who could read fluently those of the later period. A nation which had been in bondage to Chanaanite, Philistine, Egyptian, and Assyrian, must have adopted, from time to time, many terms from their conquerors, and we know that their proper language was, in the end, virtually superseded by the Greek, in the ordinary intercourse of life. More than a general knowledge of the Hebrew of any one period is requisite for the understanding of the Old Testament, while the New Testament demands merely a competent knowledge of the Greek spoken in one district for a period of fifty years, and for the intelligence of that dialect of Greek, the language of the deutero-canonical books, and of the Septuagint, habitually used by the sacred writers of the New Testament, affords immense aid.

For the intelligence of the Hebrew scriptures, there are no contemporaneous literature for any period, no codes of laws, no royal proclamations, no history, biography, poem, or tale. This renders such adventitious aid as that afforded by the Septuagint translators of the highest value. The dictionary to be formed from their work is the basis of our knowledge of the Hebrew.

The Hebrew text was not made the corner-stone of Christian teaching, but the Septuagint version was. With that and the deutero-canonical books, and the New Testament in Greek, the Church carried her teaching throughout the Roman Empire, and from them in time made her Latin translation. She multiplied her manuscripts in Greek and Latin. When the various heresies arose, not one of them attempted to justify its error by setting up the superiority of the Hebrew text. It was not till the 16th century

that this idea was put forward, and it was then no longer possible to revert to the Hebrew text as it stood in the time of our Lord. All that the heresiarchs of that time could rely upon was the Massoretic text adopted after the Christian era, and as a Jewish safeguard against Christianity. The school of Massorah rejected all the books in Greek as having led to Christianity, and rejected the New Testament. Ben Sira or Ecclesiasticus, which existed in Hebrew, this school rejected because it favored the doctrine of the Holy Trinity. If Protestants reject the book, it must be on the same ground as will justify any one of them in rejecting the New Testament. The Hebrew school at Massorah, influenced by such feelings, necessarily adopted every reading unfavorable to Christian claims, just as Protestant scholars do every one unfavorable to Catholic doctrines. Thus the Hebrew text as it stands is imperfect, biassed, modern, and we possess no authorities to effect the restoration of the true text. How, then, can the current Hebrew text be a safer basis for translation than the version which the Apostles and their successors employed when converting the world to Christ?

In no part of the Scriptures was the presumptuous ignorance of the King James translators more manifest than in their rendering of the terms relating to the natural history of the Holy Land. It is inconceivable how men, living in England, utterly ignorant of the fauna of that portion of the world where the events described in the sacred pages took place, could assume to be better able to give a proper equivalent for a Hebrew term than men living in Egypt and Palestine while Hebrew was yet spoken and Greek in daily use, and who knew every animal and bird, as well as the learned and ordinary terms for each of them, the names yet in use as well as the names that had ceased to obtain.

Probably the most absurd error in the King James version was in Gen. 36: 24. "This was that Anah that found the mules in the wilderness." Discovering herds of wild mules would certainly have been worthy of note. But in the Revised Version the animals disappear, and for "mules" we read "hot springs," recognizing the accuracy of the Vulgate, "aquas calidas," rendered "hot waters" by Gregory Martin and Challoner. Almost as gross an error occurs in Isaias 14: 23. "I will also make it a possession for the bittern;" this last word occurring again in 34: 11. Now the bittern is a bird, and belongs to the heron family, but the revisers translate the Hebrew word *kippôd*, not bittern, but "porcupine," admitting that the vaunted translators whose work had been held up to us as almost divine confounded a quadruped with a bird, and did it as an exercise of the right of private judgment, for the Septuagint and Vulgate were there to caution them, rendering kippôd by ἐχῖνος

in Greek, and *ericius* in Latin, which Gregory Martin, in the original Douay, translated plainly "hedgehog," though Bishop Challoner, apparently fearing to hurt the feelings of our separated brethren, left untranslated "ericius." Another instance of confounding creatures totally different occurs in Proverbs 30: 28, where the King James version reads: "The spider taketh hold with her hands." The Revised Version introduces us to an animal of another genus, and gives: "The lizard taketh hold with her hands," recognizing the fidelity of the Vulgate, which reads: "Stellio manibus nititur," our English translators retaining the name of that species of lizard. In Leviticus 11: 16, the King James translated "bathaya'nah" by the word owl, and "shachaph" by cuckoo. The revisers render these words by ostrich and sea-mew, recognizing the accuracy of the Latin terms "struthio" and "larus" of the Vulgate, rendered ostrich and larus or stern by the Douay and Challoner.

In a similar manner, the ferret becomes the gecko, and the tortoise a great lizard, and the snail a sand-lizard. The badger-skins which cover the tabernacle become sealskins, neither being likely to be found in sufficient quantity in the desert. As to the term "tô" or "teô," which the King James translators rendered wild bull, and the Vulgate gave as oryx, the revisers follow the Vulgate, and translate antelope. The old Douay retained the word oryx, correct and now intelligible; but Challoner, deferring, as he often did, to the Protestant version, gave "wild goat" in one place (Deut. 14: 5), and "wild ox" in another (Isaias 51: 20). "Dayah," translated formerly vulture (Lev. 11: 14; Deut. 14: 13; Isaias 34: 15), is now rendered kite, as in our Catholic Bibles. In the same way, "dukipath," instead of lapwing, becomes, as in the Douay and Challoner, the hoopoe (Lev. 11: Deut. 14).

In Gen. 11: 3 and kindred passages the utterly indefinite word "slime" is now aided by "bitumen" in the margin, the word used in our old Douay, though Bishop Challoner substituted "slime" for it.

The gnat recalls a blunder not in the original King James of 1611, but in later editions, which has given rise to a proverb in common use that will not readily give way to the true rendering. In Matt. 23: 24, "Strain out a gnat and swallow a camel," was misprinted: "Strain at a gnat and swallow a camel," and the erroneous reading became general, although it never crept into our Catholic Bibles. The revisers restore the correct reading, "strain out."

The "linen yarn" which the translators of King James' day contrived to find in 3 Kings 10: 28, has disappeared with the peacocks in Job 39: 13.

These glaring errors have long been recognized among Protes-

tants, but in popular works on the Bible, in order apparently to avoid shocking the unbounded confidence of the ignorant masses in this faulty and corrupt translation, the attempt was made to throw the fault on the Scriptures themselves and the holy men inspired by God who penned them. Thus they would speak of the porcupine as the "bittern of scripture," of other animals as "the ferret of scripture," "the wild ox of scripture," etc., making the Word of God and the inspired writers responsible for the presumptuous and self-willed ignorance of the men who under the direction of King James and his regulations gave the edition to English readers. A more honest feeling, compelled in no small degree by the movement for a purer translation, begun in this country among the Baptists, has at last forced authorities in the Church of England to make this tardy effort to present the Word of God in a better form, more conformable to the original.

Ignorance of Oriental customs was profound in England after the Reformation, while among Catholics, in consequence of pilgrimages to the Holy Land and the constant residence there of Franciscan Fathers, more general knowledge prevailed. The King James translators knew nothing of the use by Eastern women of kohl or antimony to make the eye look large and lustrous. They knew, however, that English ladies painted their faces. Hence they rendered 2 Kings 9 : 30, "she painted her face;" and Jerem. 4 : 30, "thou rendest thy face with painting," certainly a very curious performance. But the revisers translate "eyes" "eyes," and not "face," and give us "she painted her eyes" in the first text, and in the second "thou enlargest thine eyes with paint." Here the last word is very vague, while our old Douay was definite, "shalt paint thine eyes with stibick stone." The name of one of Job's daughters alludes to this cosmetic, Kerenhappuch (horn for antimony).

In the perversions of the Scriptures against which Catholics have constantly protested, the revisers have been evidently afraid to do right. Most of them remain. The spurious additions to the Lord's Prayer in St. Matthew and St. Luke have, indeed, been abandoned, and 1 Cor. 11 : 27 they at last give honestly, "eat this bread *or* drink this cup," instead of "and" as the translators have hitherto persistently done. In Jeremias 11 : 19 they admit "bread" to be the real translation of the Hebrew, though they do not put it in the text. The passage in 1 Cor. 9 : 5 undergoes a curious change. The revisers will not translate ἀδελφὴν γυναῖκα, "a sister, a woman," or "a sister, a wife," as in the King James, but "a wife that is a believer," with "Gr. sister" in the margin! A Mormon elder will probably find authority here for leaving some wives at home on account of their scepticism. "Mar-

riage is honorable in all" (Heb. 13 : 4) reads now : "Let marriage be in honor among all." In St. James 5 : 16 they at last "confess their sins"; good works are allowed to appear in Apoc. 19 : 8 as "righteous acts," the Blessed Virgin is "endued with grace" in the margin (Luke 1 : 28). As in the New Testament the pagan God Hades, whose name in the possessive case was used in Greek for hell, is used directly for hell, so in the Old Testament "sheol," the Hebrew term, is retained and replaces hell in some texts and "grave" in others. In the Concordance of the Revised Version the word hell will disappear in a host of passages. "In Isaiah xiv.," we are told, "where 'hell' is used in more of its original sense, and is less liable to be misunderstood .... the revisers have contented themselves with leaving 'hell' in the text, and have connected with other passages by putting 'sheol' in the margin." The word is, therefore, not uniformly rendered, and this involves great confusion.

The American revisers urged the introduction of Jehovah throughout for the ineffable name, but the English revisers adhered to the old version, printing Lord or God in small capitals to express it. As Jehovah is a word of very doubtful accuracy, they certainly acted wisely in not filling their volume with a word for others to alter hereafter. The uniform usage of Jew and Christian, in expressing the ineffable name by Adonai, or Lord and God, ought to prevail against any rash change at this late day to a word which many hold to be utterly incorrect.

"Abaddon," for destroyer, and "ashêrah," for grave, are, like "sheol," instances where they now follow what the Douay translators were condemned for, that is, retaining words of the original untranslated.

The language of the King James has not been generally modernized, although the American revisers called for very sweeping changes in this respect. The substitution of "plough" for "ear" is one of the few. "Bolled," in the sense of "podded for seed," is retained, and its use in the cotton districts of this country makes it sufficiently intelligible.

The suggestions of the American Old Testament Revision Company fill nearly sixteen pages of close type, and show that had their counsel been followed a radically new translation would have been the result. When we remember the persistence with which Protestants in this country have insisted on forcing the King James Bible on Catholics in schools, courts, and institutions, it seems strange to find a learned company from among them insisting on such sweeping changes and corrections, to which the English revisers hesitated to agree.

On the whole, the new revision of the oft-amended English Prot-

estant version is far from meeting the wants of the intelligent and honest Christian. The Protestant expected a translation of the Word of God, on which he could ground his salvation as a Rule of Faith. The English-speaking Catholic expected, at least, as the nineteenth century was drawing to a close, that a body of English Protestant scholars, selected as the ablest in knowledge of Hebrew and Greek, most profound in all studies regarding the weight and critical value of the earliest known manuscripts of the Sacred Volume or parts thereof, well versed in all the secular learning that contributes to a due intelligence and comprehension of the time and places in which the Sacred Writers lived,—expected from such an array of Protestant learning a translation which on the selection of the text and the fidelity, clearness, and harmony of the Version given would, for purposes of study, replace to the general reader the original texts, and give the reader, with good editions of those texts before him, a reflex of it which he could respect and to some extent rely upon in occasional and incidental studies of his own. Both these classes have been sadly disappointed.

It may be said that the revisers were not free, that they were limited by rules, and that these rules or principles kept up the fable that the King James Bible was authorized, and was something so sacred that it must not be touched by rude or profane hands, when in fact its shortcomings were so notorious.

"The text to be adopted," they were told, was to "be that for which the evidence is decidedly preponderatory." Now the text of the Hebrew used by the King James translators was certainly not a critical one for which any great merit could be claimed. Yet here the learning of Protestant scholars was required to adhere to that text as translated in the seventeenth century, unless they had decidedly preponderating evidence against it. Such evidence was almost unattainable. As they themselves say: "The Received, or, as it is commonly called, the Massoretic Text of the Old Testament Scriptures, has come down to us in manuscripts which are of no very great antiquity, and which all belong to the same family or recension. That other recensions were at one time in existence is probable from the variations in the Ancient Versions, the oldest of which, namely the Greek or Septuagint, was made, at least in part, some two centuries before the Christain era." It is astounding to hear this collected learning term the existence of other Hebrew texts rather than the present recension of the Massoretic merely and only "probable," for if they concede that the Septuagint was made two centuries before the Christian era, they must not probably, but most certainly and assuredly, have had something pre-

massoretic; and that at that time other recensions were in existence is certain, not probable.

The revisers were required "to introduce as few alterations as possible into the text of the *Authorized* Version consistently with such faithfulness," and "to limit, as far as possible, the expression of alterations to the language of the Authorized and earlier English Versions."

Compelled thus to render a kind of cultus to the King James, "which," they say, "for more than two centuries and a half had held the position of an English classic," they departed from it only "where they disagreed with the translators of 1611 as to the meaning or construction of a word or sentence; or when, for the sake of uniformity, to render such parallel passages as were in identical Hebrew by the same English words, so that an English reader might know at once by comparison the difference in the translation corresponded to a difference in the original; or where the language of the Authorized Version was liable to be misunderstood by reason of its being archaic or obscure; or finally, where the rendering of an earlier English Version seemed preferable; or where by an apparently slight change it was possible to bring out more fully the meaning of a passage."

Thus terms of natural history were changed "only where it was certain that they were incorrect and there was sufficient evidence for the substituted reading."

In this department, as in many others, the doubtful and unauthorized renderings were left, simply because they could not find preponderating evidence that the rendering was wrong, and that some other rendering was right. Yet if Jehovah was to be introduced as a supposed Hebrew word, and Sheol, and Abaddon, and Asherah, Asherim, Asheroth, why could not Hebrew names of certain animals be retained where the English equivalent was uncertain or did not exist?

To adhere to error merely because it is old can never be justified; truth is older than the oldest error, and in mere point of time is more respectable. So, too, in regard to proper names. The translators of 1611 adopted a system of transliteration of their own for giving Hebrew names in English. They cut away from the names used in Catholic works in their own country from the early times, and were apparently guided to no little extent by Luther's "Douche" Bible. The names as they gave them were in many cases neither Hebrew nor accepted English, and with that freedom which they assumed unto themselves they did not follow out their own system. Here was another difficulty for the revisers. They accordingly tell us that they "endeavored to ascertain the system of transliteration adopted by the translators of the Authorized Version, and to carry

it out with somewhat greater consistency. They have not, however, attempted anything like rigid uniformity, and have left unchanged all those names which by usage have become English; as, for instance, Moses, Aaron, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and the like." The unauthorized translators of 1611 had no such respect for names which by usage had become English; why should those of 1885 be bound to follow their errors? Is not this deliberately preferring darkness to light, and clinging to error simply because it is old?

One point they do not mention at all, and it is a curious one. The Reformers rejected the Septuagint, the version of the Old Testament which, with the deutero-canonical books, was borne by the envoys of Christ throughout the world as they announced the Gospel and established the Church. They rejected this and went back to pick up a Hebrew text formed to preserve the unbelieving remnant of the house of Israel from becoming influenced by faith in Christ as the Messias. They made this anti-Christian recension the basis of their retrograde Christianity, but Providence permitted that they should retain the Septuagint names for most of the books of the Old Testament, as they do to this day. The revisers do the same, apparently without a thought—certainly without a line of apology. Translating the opening book of the Scriptures, why do they say, "The First Book of Moses, commonly called *Genesis*," and ignore entirely its Hebrew name? Why do they retain the Greek term Genesis, when they discard the Greek version? They do not even in any note or otherwise give the Hebrew, while our Catholic Bibles do, and tell us that "The Hebrews call it *Beresith*, from the word with which it begins," following the Vulgate, "Liber Genesis, Hebraice Beresith," in which, as on the Cross, the Hebrew, Greek, and Latin combine.

The Revised Version is after all only a cramped revision of a faulty and patched translation, made originally from the bold German rendering of Luther, altered by reference to the Latin, and then repeatedly by such Hebrew as they could get. The English Protestant Bible is presented to its unfortunate adherents as their religion, to quote Chillingworth's saying. If it is to be their religion, ought it not to be made from the best possible text, with the utmost sincerity, and entirely free from any subserviency to errors, no matter how respectable they had grown by age? If man's salvation is to depend on a translation, if man's damnation may be the result of wrong rendering, why should the opinions of fallible men of other days, or their ignorance, or their prejudice, or the commands of princes or popular opinion stand for a moment to sway translators, who if they touch the Sacred Volume at all, should do it only to present God's eternal truth to men in an intelligible language?

In the words of a book they reject (Wisdom, v. 6), they may well exclaim: Ergo erravimus! "Ergo erravimus a via veritatis, et justitiæ lumen non luxit nobis, et Sol intelligentiæ non est ortus nobis."

THE SCHOOL QUESTION IN BELGIUM.

BELGIUM is a country in which we are readily interested. The kingdom is new, but the country and people are old friends of ours. We separate Fleming and Walloon from Hollander as easily in the past as in the present. Flanders, Brabant, Namur, Liége, Hainaut, Limburg are grouped in our mind quite as well under Austrian or Spanish, as under Burgundian rule. To disunite the united Netherlands costs us no effort. Around Bruges, Ghent, Brussels, Antwerp, Liége, we gather historical associations that are quite independent of Utrecht or of Amsterdam. Two centuries and a half of a beautiful art, of painting, of architecture, and of engraving, make us intimate with our Belgium, rather than with the Netherlands. From the story of the so-called Reformation we have become especially familiar with the people who are Belgians to-day. The French Revolution, the Napoleonic wars, fatal Waterloo, the constrained union with Holland, have served to keep alive an interest, not abated by the revolution and separation.

A peaceful nation for fifty years back, Belgium has attracted little notice. The wonderful political changes of the last half-century have not affected her. In Germany, France, Austria, Russia, Italy, more active forces have been at work. With the internal and external movements in these powerful nations the daily press keeps us acquainted. Each morning brings its telegrams about their government pŏlicy, diplomatic mŏves, economic conditions. Thus informed in the daily history of the greater nations, we are prepared to frame intelligent opinions concerning their rulers and affairs. But Belgium has dropped out of notice. We are unable to follow her history day by day. For long spaces of time it seems as though the country had ceased to make history. Suddenly, however, the foreign correspondent telegraphs of an election, a riot, or a ministerial change. He not only states facts, but expresses judgments. Having but one version of the

facts, unable to assure ourselves of its truth or falsehood, we are compelled either to take the judgment of the correspondent or the editor, or to suspend our own. If we accept the facts as stated, we are as likely as not to be misled. The facts generally have to do with the action of a Liberal party and of a Conservative party. Whatever is called "liberal" finds favor with Americans; wherefore the American editor willingly sees the facts with a Liberal eye, and out-liberals Liberals in the expression of Liberal judgments. Having us at a disadvantage, he seems determined to keep us where he puts us. We have but one side of the story; he sees that we get no other.

The events of the last twelve months forcibly illustrate our position in regard to Belgian affairs. In June, 1884, a Conservative replaced a Radical ministry, and in the following August a bill concerning primary education was carried through both houses of the Belgian parliament. Of these two facts the press informed us, at the same time giving us to understand that the school-bill was an especially iniquitous and inexcusable measure. Nothing more was heard about Belgian affairs until the 20th of October, when we learned from the cable of a great Liberal victory in the elections, and of a popular condemnation of the school-law. Later dispatches reported slight disorders, and a few arrests, and then came a story of mobs, rioting, the smashing of convent windows, and the interference of the civic guard. On the 24th the news was that the Premier, Malou, had resigned, and that the king had requested the withdrawal of two of the ministry. From Paris, on the 25th, it was telegraphed that an attempt had been made on the king's life. Brussels dispatches of the 27th stated that a new ministry had been formed, and had received the king's approval; while the telegrams of the 28th assured us of Liberal disapproval. After this date the wires ceased working, and we have since heard little or nothing of Belgian politics.

From the dispatches here quoted, and they include all that were published, no one could gain a correct view of the real course of events, and, much less, of the questions at issue. The facts are hinted at, rather than completely and fairly stated. Most of the editorials on Belgian affairs, written at the time, are excusable on the supposition that the writers had no closer acquaintance with the internal politics of the country than the telegrams gave them. But an intelligent view of Belgian parties and issues, and more especially of the school question, can be had only by one who is fairly acquainted with the political history of Belgium since the allied powers handed over the country to Dutch rule. The issues that have so recently agitated the country are not to be judged by a superficial consideration of the immediate circumstances.

They are bound up with the history of Belgium, and with the life of the people. The dividing line between Liberal and Conservative has long been the religious question. But it was not always so.

Under the Dutch government the people of Belgium were a unit on the religious question. Inasmuch as there were Belgian Liberals, as distinguished from Belgian Catholics, the Liberal was not so much anti-Orange as pro-Catholic. The liberality he proclaimed found its chief and practical argument in the government's illiberal treatment of Catholics. The freedom of the Catholic press was hampered by the law and the ministry; the Catholic religion was aimed at, when religious education in the schools was forbidden, the policy of the Dutch government being to Protestantize Belgium. Against Catholic, more than against Liberal writers and speakers, was the law directed which made public criticism of the acts of the king, or of his officials, punishable with fine and imprisonment.

What made a Belgian Liberal was opposition to anti-Catholic laws. The Liberal wanted a constitution, so did the Catholic; the Liberal wanted relief from Dutch official preponderance, so did every Belgian. Practically, the Liberal was neither more nor less than a Catholic, and the Catholic was a Liberal.

So united in aim were Liberals and Catholics that in 1825 they combined their forces for the attainment of Belgian rights, emphasizing their unity of aim in the name they chose for their organization—"The Union." For three years the Union labored through the press—almost wholly a Catholic press,—to create a public opinion; and it was only in 1828, when this public opinion had been formed and in some degree unified, that the Union began to act as a real political body, with the announced purpose of obtaining an enlargement of the liberties of the citizen and religious toleration. Zealously did the Union now pursue its patriotic aims. The able men of the country were all of one mind, and all ready and determined to speak that mind.

Non-Catholics are not apt in any wise to associate the Jesuits with so-called Liberalism; and therefore it may somewhat surprise the non-Catholic to hear that the Jesuits gave the first great impulse to the Union, and to the cause of Belgian independence. Giving this impulse, the Jesuits do not appear in the time-honored rôle of adroit political schemers; unfortunately for themselves, they were playing the part so many modern governments have found it convenient to cast them for,—that of political scapegoats. To the Belgian of the Union, this was intolerable; he rallied to the cause of the Jesuits. De Potter, that Liberal of Liberals, took up his bold and biting pen. In the *Niederlandische Courier* he

sharply rebuked the ministry for its treatment of the Order. The Jesuit was a man like other men, and De Potter claimed for him the same liberty and the same rights that other men claimed or enjoyed. He taunted the ministry with playing the transparent, but effective, trick—as transparent and unfortunately as effective in our day,—of dubbing all honest men who opposed its policy as Jesuits. Arrested for this, De Potter was tried on December 20th, 1828, fined a thousand guilders, and condemned to imprisonment for eighteen months. His condemnation moved the whole Belgian people, and, more than any other single act, prepared the revolution.

What question did the Belgian leaders now choose to unite and assure the country, and to gain its confidence? The question of the State monopoly of education. Through the press, and through a systematic publication and distribution of pamphlets, this monopoly was bitterly attacked during the year 1829. At the same time the Catholics, through committees, drew up and signed petitions, asking guarantees of liberty; and the Liberals, in the same organized way, presented petitions, asking guarantees for the Catholics. The representatives of the people gave official expression to the popular demands; the Liberals De Celles and De Brouckère, and the Catholic De Gerlache, claiming from the Chambers, in December, 1829, freedom of instruction, of speech, and of the press.

De Potter's condemnation for his defence of the Jesuits had unexpected consequences. The tyranny of the condemnation excited all men against a government that seemed to acknowledge no rights in the governed. Secretly, societies were formed with a view of drawing up a constitution, and of preparing the people for its acceptance. However peaceable the intentions of the Union, and of the constitution societies, a new and stringent press-law, De Gerlache's daring speech against it in the Chamber of Deputies, and the wholesale prosecutions under this law, supplied material to those who looked to a forcible separation from Holland.

The king's birthday (August 24th, 1830) saw Brussels barricaded; by the 8th of September a "Committee of Safety" had been elected. On the 29th of the same month this committee pronounced itself the "Provisional Government of Belgium"; on the 4th of October the independence of Belgium was proclaimed; and on November 24th the freely elected representatives of the people assembled at Brussels as a "National Congress," and declared the Orange-Nassau family forever deprived of authority in Belgium. A draft of a constitution was submitted on the next day. The three great guarantees of this constitution were free-

dom of the press, freedom of education, and freedom of association. Whatever differences of opinion were disclosed during the debates as to the modes of election, the division of powers, and the character of the government, there was unanimity as to these three principles, for which the whole country had so long and so patiently worked, and for which, in the end, it shed its blood.

On the matter of education, the constitution, adopted without dissent on the 7th of February, 1831, spoke with no uncertain tone: "Education is free; every measure impeding its freedom is forbidden." The large interest that Catholics had in this freedom may be judged from the fact that out of a population of 4,000,000 there were not 10,000 who did not profess the Roman Catholic faith. Evidently the liberties that Belgium enjoys are liberties won by Catholics; without the support of Catholics, who were the nation, those calling themselves distinctively "Liberals" were powerless to gain for themselves one single right they now enjoy.

De Gerlache, De Theux, De Mérode, Deschamps, the Abbé de Foere, Vilain XIV.,—behind these Catholic leaders were the clergy and the people. They organized the country for liberty of speech, of the press, of worship, of education. These rights they had determined to compel from the Dutch government, but not by revolution. There they stopped. But when the people moved, and the Orange army threatened the land, they went forward in the field and in the council. With a large and generous patriotism they gave the honors of office to Liberals, not distinguishing religious profession, and freely sacrificing the personal to the great aims of freedom and political unity. By Catholic votes the Liberal leaders were placed in office, intrusted with the Presidency of the Congress, the Regentship, and the first Ministry, in which not a single representative Catholic name appears; but through the Catholic leaders the negotiations with the intervening powers were carried on, through them were effected the transactions with the candidates for the new throne. The great names were Catholic, the great families were Catholic, the wealth of the country was Catholic, the producing power of the country was Catholic, all the great forces and interests were Catholic. The freedom fought for, and won, was not the freedom for ten thousand who did not profess Catholicity, but freedom for the country, and the country was Catholic.

When there was question of nominating the Duc de Nemours to the throne, it was not De Gerlache alone that opposed his election, but, with him, the Liberals Lebeau and Devaux; and their joint opposition was based on the ground, that close relations with France might endanger the freedom of religion and education, which Belgium had so dearly gained. Prince Leopold, who was

elected king July 7th, 1831, understood the country. When De Mérode, De Brouckère, Vilain XIV., and the Abbé de Foere went to London to consult with him, in the April before his election, he showed his knowledge and his wisdom, saying to them: "I am especially pleased to see that the Belgians are a truly religious-minded people; a country that lovingly holds to its religious convictions is usually moral, and on that account more easily governed." Now, the religious mind that Leopold saw in the Belgians was a Catholic mind; and nothing can be truer than that Catholic-mindedness and Catholic convictions make a moral country, and one easily governed.

The clause of the constitution which established freedom of instruction, and forbade any measure impeding that freedom, provided that public instruction given at the expense of the State should be regulated by the law. Not till 1834 did the government take up the question of State-aided schools; then the ministry presented a draft of a law concerning elementary education, whereby the State would have an influence over elementary schools in communes where the schools were founded and supported by State funds. This bill was thrown out, and the whole school system placed in the hands of the communes.

There it lay undisturbed until 1840, when the ministry announced its intention of bringing in the regulating law suggested by the constitution. This law, the ministers proclaimed, should be drawn in the spirit of the constitution, and should guarantee to the youth of the country the fullest liberty of moral and religious instruction in all schools dependent on the commune, the province, or the State. However, it was not until 1842, and under a new ministry that a school-law was passed. How well this law met the wishes of the country is apparent from the vote by which it was carried. The Senate was unanimous, while in the Chamber of Deputies there were but three opposing votes. An examination of the measure will show that this remarkable agreement of the Liberal and Catholic members of the two Houses was due to the fact that the law was drawn in the spirit of the Union, of the political traditions before and since the revolution, of the revolution itself, in fine, in the spirit of the Belgian people. The law aimed to give them that liberty of which they had been so long deprived, and to obtain which they had gone to the length of making a new nation.

The education of the people was left with the people, where it had been placed in 1834. There were, in 1840, some 2600 communes in Belgium, with 5189 schools. Of the schools, 2109 were communal schools. The State, having no means, had thus far contributed little or nothing to primary education. But it is ap-

parent that the people had not been idle. They desired that their children should enjoy the benefits of education.

The purpose of the law of 1842 was to assure the further extension of primary education, and to systematize the management of the schools. It provided that every commune should have at least one primary school. The commune, however, was not required to build a school; it might arrange with a private school, within the commune limits, to furnish its children the primary education specified by the law. Such private schools were to be known as "adopted schools." Equally reasonable and liberal was the further provision, that any commune which could show that its private schools sufficed for the primary instruction of the children, should not be required to found a communal school, or to "adopt" a school.

Article VI. of the law made clear what was meant by primary instruction. This "comprises, *necessarily*, instruction in religion and morals, reading, writing, arithmetic, the elements of history, etc. The instruction in religion and morals shall be given under the direction of the minister of that denomination to which the majority of the pupils of the school belong." The religious instruction is to be given in the school by the teacher, before or after class hours; but in no case in presence of those of another belief. The curé has the right to enter the school to supervise this instruction. The bishop is authorized to appoint priests, whose duty it shall be to visit the schools within his diocese, at certain times, and to report the results of their inspection as regards the religious instruction. Any denomination sufficiently numerous to maintain a school has the right to establish a school of its own. The communal authorities are to fix the class hours, time and period of vacations, and the school-tax. Gratuitous primary instruction has never been admitted by Belgian legislation. All who are able to pay must pay. Those who are unable to pay are admitted free, but it rests with the communal and provincial authorities to designate those who are relieved of the tax. The law likewise places the appointment of the teacher in the hands of the communal authorities. The teacher may be selected from among the pupils of State normal schools, or of private normal schools accepted by the State. A special council, wherein the clergy are represented, passes on the class-books, but the books having to do especially with religious and moral instruction are subject to the approbation of the bishops. Where the resources of the communes are not sufficient to meet the school expenses, the provincial councils are authorized to grant subsidies out of the provincial funds.

This law of 1842 will impress any thoughtful man as the work

of true statesmen. It is a law made for a living people, made to meet real conditions, made to contribute to the welfare and peace of all the citizens. There is in it no touch of the doctrinaire's hand, trying to cast a whole nation in one mould. Our own republic, which we are pleased to hold up as the model of true liberality, can point to no school-law conceived in so democratic and so liberal a spirit.

To the people is left the organization and control of the school. The State imposes no direct charge on the people, beyond that of supplying needed instruction. The commune has to see that its children are provided with this instruction; it can effect this in its own way. If it prefers to build schools, it may do so; if it finds it more to its advantage to make use of existing schools, it may do so. The aim is, properly, to instruct the youth of the nation; let the commune take the readiest means to effect this desirable end, provided only that the means be fitting. The country is a religious country; it has suffered for religion's sake; it has fought for freedom of religion; it must be protected in that freedom. Still, no one form of religion shall be protected, but all forms. The constitution—the first of European constitutions—has separated Church from State, wherefore the State has not to control religion, much less make war upon it, but to secure it in its rights. Primary instruction means not only the teaching of reading, writing, history; it is, first of all, the teaching of moral and religious truths. The youth, then, according to the beliefs of their parents, shall be instructed in the moral and religious truths which go to make up those beliefs, and the correctness of this instruction shall be assured by placing its control in the hands of the recognized teachers of religion. Paying the expenses of the instruction of its own children, the commune shall select the teachers and direct the school. The commune having the greatest interest, who can better do the work? To assure that the law is faithfully carried out, the executive of the nation, the king, shall, by selected officers, under the control of the State, supervise the whole system. No link is wanting in the logical chain.

For thirty-seven years, from 1842 to 1879, the Belgian school system was governed by this same law. The development of the system, during that time, seems to be an unanswerable argument in favor of the law. We have seen that, in 1840, there were 5189 schools in the whole country; there were 5857 in 1875. The communal schools numbered only 2109 in 1840; in 1875 they numbered 4157, and there were in addition 457 adopted schools. The whole number of children receiving primary instruction in 1830 was 293,000; by 1845 the number had increased to 426,000, while in 1875 the total was 669,195. Between 1830 and 1875 the

increase of population was rather less than 25 per cent., while the increase in school attendance was more than 125 per cent.

To the impartial inquirer these figures give the strongest proof that the school law of 1842 had effected its purpose—the spread of primary instruction; and consequently that it must have met the wishes of the people, that it must have been a popular law.

However, in 1879 this law was radically changed; or rather, it was obliterated from the statute-book, and in its place was substituted a wholly new law, whose provisions were based on far other views of education, of the rights of the State, and of the people, of liberty, of justice, of religious freedom. Before giving our attention to the details of this second law, it will be helpful to us to have some further insight into the development of political parties in Belgium.

From 1830 to 1846 the traditions of the Union were in force. Liberal leaders and Catholic leaders worked for the unity of Liberals and Catholics, and for mutual concessions on dividing questions. All the ministries, within these sixteen years, depended on a combination of Liberal and Catholic votes. Liberal members were elected to either house by Catholic votes and influence. We have seen that, up to the election of the king, the Catholics freely gave the political leadership to the Liberals. Indeed, the Catholics had no representative in the ministry until 1834. In that year two of their ablest men, De Theux and De Muelenaere, went in. The ministry of 1842 gave the Catholics four portfolios; and in 1846 the king called upon De Theux to form the first Catholic Ministry. The Catholics had not held the premiership in any of the previous ministries.

De Theux's government was short-lived. It fell in 1847, when the Liberals under Rogier took control of affairs. Rogier remained in office until 1852. The French revolution of 1848 had disturbed the country but slightly. The Catholics patriotically declined to hamper the government by any active opposition; and a few companies of soldiers sufficed to repress the impotent uprisings of March 25th and 29th. However, the Liberal party became more and more divided year after year, and Rogier, to retain a working majority, was again and again obliged to adapt himself to Radical views. In 1851 the party divisions led to a ministerial crisis; the Senate was dissolved, and an appeal was made to the country. Though the elections left Rogier in a minority, he continued to hold office until the temper of the deputies compelled him to resign. He was succeeded (Oct. 31st, 1852) by De Brouckère, a moderate, who was supported by the Catholics and moderate Liberals. Under Rogier the country had passed through five years of continuous and increasing political

excitement. De Brouckère's administration was wholly in the interest of internal peace. Dependent on the opposition for a majority, his position was difficult and uncertain. The Conservatives making considerable gains in the elections of 1854, the Ministry resigned, and, for the second time the Conservative-Catholic party came into power under the leadership of De Decker and Vilain XIV.

The Catholics were not in a majority, but the ministerial majority was secure, and so remained until 1857. In that year the ministry proposed a law enabling religious corporations to acquire the right to receive donations and legacies; and recognizing the right of a citizen to dispose of his fortune in favor of the poor, and to choose at his will special administrators for the purpose. Not satisfied with a parliamentary opposition, the Liberals organized a system of mobs and riots in the large cities. These revolutionary proceedings being long continued, the king advised the majority to suspend the discussion of the law. The ministry, protesting against the disgraceful means by which the opposition sought to overturn them,—a minority appealing to force to overcome a majority,—closed the chamber and appealed to the country. The elections gave a Liberal gain, and the Conservatives resigned.

Rogier now took office, with Frère-Orban as his most prominent co-worker; and, though there were occasional changes of premier and portfolio, each change being in the direction of Radicalism, the Liberals governed the country continuously up to 1870. Then, for the first time in thirteen years, the Conservatives regained power, under the leadership of Baron d'Anethan and Malou, and they held the control of affairs until June 12th, 1878, when Malou was succeeded by Frère-Orban, the father of the new school law.

As early as 1839 a fraction of the Liberals had separated themselves from the Union and combined to control the ministry; but the leaders of the Union were as yet too strong for them. However, the first step had been made in the way of a new political movement. Defacqz, grand master of the Freemasons, made a second step in the same direction in 1841. He formed a political society called "The Alliance," whose membership was restricted to Masons, and whose object was to control the elections in the Liberal interest. In 1842 membership was extended to non-Masons. Even then its members did not exceed a thousand. Still the Alliance played an active part in the elections, carrying on a bitter anti-Catholic canvass. De Theux had been but a short time in power when Defacqz called a "congress" at Brussels, to consider the best means to insure the overthrow of the ministry. A plan of Liberal action was adopted; Liberal clubs were established in all the large centres, and the party was fully organized for political

action. A split in the Alliance did not undo its work, Verhaegen, another active Mason, combining all the Liberal forces in the "Liberal Association."

At once the liberality of the Belgian Liberals assumed a new face. The ministry of 1847 adopted an advanced policy. Rogier, the success of whose early career was largely due to the clergy, announced this policy: "The clergy were to have nothing more to say in State affairs." Simple as this sounded, it meant neither more nor less than opposition to Catholics as Catholics. The Belgian Liberal who had started out as the defender of the Jesuits, the champion of religious liberty, and of freedom of association, had become, in 1857, a Radical incendiary, who stirred the country with the contemptible cry of "Down with the convents." To satisfy their large aspirations after liberty, the Liberals of 1858 were compelled to take an old leaf from the statute book of the House of Orange. The liberal measure whereby the Dutch government made criticism of king or ministry a misdemeanor, was now offered to Belgian citizens by Belgian citizens. A truly "liberal" spirit, however, confined the law to a class. To criticize, *from the pulpit*, the ministry, any law, or any act of the king, was made punishable with fine and imprisonment. Religious associations also felt the generous influences of the Liberal policy. They were deprived of all bequests, and compelled to hand over to the State those whose use they were enjoying. The graveyards were made a living Liberal question. Hereafter Christian and infidel must be buried side by side. The illiberal custom of burying Christians among Christians shall give way to the Liberal system of promiscuous burial. Electoral laws were carried with the avowed object of weakening and impeding the non-Liberal vote; while every attempt to enlarge the franchise was speciously opposed, for the reason that enlargement of the franchise meant increase of the non-Liberal vote.

This hasty review of the growth of the Liberal party and of Liberal legislation, may help us to realize the difference between the Liberal of 1825 and of 1875. The one is the negative of the other. If the former deserved the name "Liberal," what shall we call the latter? We have seen the Liberal of 1849 barring out the clergy from state affairs; the Liberal of thirty years later seeks to bar out the Catholic layman. From anti-clerical to anti-Catholic is short—if there be any step. The political action of the party was clearly anti-Catholic, unmistakably so. If we could be mistaken about the meaning of this action, the leaders took care that their words should quickly and wholly correct our error.

The Liberal leaders have further disclosed to us, indeed impressed upon us, the interesting and curious fact that in Belgium Liberalism means Masonry. We remember that it was a Mason,

Defacqz, who first organized the Liberals on a new basis, and another Mason, Verhaegen, who completed the work. From 1847 onward, Masonry controlled the party and its policy; indeed it is rare to find a Liberal minister not a high Mason. But let us hear representative Liberals and Masons on the relations of Liberalism and Masonry, the principles of the Liberal party, the principles of Belgian Masonry, more especially with a view to an understanding of the school question.

Said Brother Goblet, in 1877, when laying the corner-stone of a temple at Brussels: "Masonry is traditional, progressive, local, cosmopolite. She labors in the cause of freedom and reason. She has a beauteous and mystic symbolism, and a ceremonial intended to consecrate all the festal occasions of life. The completeness of her organization makes her a fitting rival to her greatest enemy, the Church; and, at the same time, the natural, nay necessary, complement of the Liberal party. Masonry is the philosophy of Liberalism, and the Free-thinkers' church."

"What are the weapons to be used by a Democratic State against Ultramontanism?" This is a "prize-subject," proposed by the Grand Orient in its sitting of March 18th, 1877.

"Catholicism," said Van Humbreck, an active Mason and active Liberal, more than once minister, on March 4th, 1879, "the Catholic religion is, in my eyes, a corpse; the Catholic religion, in its dogmas, is dead; these dogmas nullify conscience. We must fight it, and drive it out from elementary education."

Verhaegen, the Mason who reformed the Liberal party, had more moderately expressed the Masonic-Liberal ideas as early as 1856: "The intervention of religion in teaching is the abdication of the prerogative of the State."

"In demanding that the Church cease to be a power, we demand the abdication of the Church," writes M. Laurent, the Liberal authority on the relations of "Church and State." "There is but one way of freeing the people; it is to secularize heaven as well as the earth. And the great means of this emancipation is, to take away education from the Church." Again, the first condition of this emancipation is "to do away with Christian spiritualism, the terrors of a future life, the preoccupation with an imaginary salvation." Belgian Masonry and Liberalism are not to be distinguished by any difference in the breadth of their views; but it is remarkable how united they are on the subject of education. In 1863 the Grand Orient placed the question of obligatory instruction before all the lodges for study. The results of this study have been made public.

"The intervention of the clergy in instruction, under the title of authority, completely nullifies the action of the teacher, para-

lyzes it, and robs the children of all moral, logical, and rational instruction. The teaching of the catechism is the greatest hindrance to the development of all the faculties of the child. If freed from these things, the mind of the man would become normal and moral." Thus answered the Antwerp lodge.

"Morality," said the Namur brethren, "has nothing in common with the catechism. The characteristic of obligatory instruction consists in this: that it does not at all concern itself with religion, and, *perhaps*, not even with morals."

Louvain is more original, elegant, and philosophical, as one would expect a university town to be. "It is saddening to have to remark the negative influence of Catholicity on the progress of the masses. Protestanism has understood better than Catholicity what a moral and utilitarian religion ought to be. Pauperism and ignorance find their support in the gospels."

At Liége, the lodge expressed dissatisfaction with the existing laws on education, "inasmuch as they gave an unwholesome influence to the members of a *positive religion*, whose objects were diametrically opposite to those of liberalism."

These men may wear the same dress as did the Liberals of 1830; they may affect the same poses, interlard their wild speeches and cunning phrases with some of the ringing, honest words of the men of the Union,—but they are no Liberals. Haters of the Gospel, spurners of all religion, despisers of morality, declared enemies of the Church, men whose aim is to free the people from the yoke of spirituality, to release them from their foolish preoccupation with an imaginary salvation, *to secularize heaven*,—what a portrait of a "Liberal"!

In the Belgium of to-day, then, we see a party with a double organization, the one politico-Liberal, the other Masonic, fighting boldly, openly, studiedly, to injure a majority of its fellow-citizens. The warfare is bitter beyond our conception. From the hustings, the lecture platform, the legislative desk, the morning journal, the pamphlet, a constant stream of anti Catholic abuse flows, odorous and bountiful. As the worshipper leaves the church door on a Sunday morning, his ears are split by the loud cry of an "emancipated" boor, excited by offering some scandalous uncatechetical song, or broadside, or caricature, insulting to those to whom it is offered. The Cathedral "Place" affords the choicest advantages to these disciples of Van Humbreck, who would have a Sabbath kick at the "corpse." The "Freethinkers' church" is the "place"; his worship-ribaldry, insult. There may be mysticism and beauty in all this, but only the philosophical mind of Brother Goblet could discover and expose it.

Such was the party that brought in the new school bill in 1879.

Frère-Orban was at the head of the ministry; he had been connected with every Liberal ministry since 1849. Radical of the Radicals, Mason of Masons, he had ever been ready to press onward in the path marked out by the Grand Orient. Indeed Frère owes a great deal to Belgian Masonry; he may be called a born Mason. His mother, who was portress of the Masonic lodge at Liége, concealed his father's name, or did not know it, so that the lodge there adopted the boy as "brother," and brought him up. Rogier always seemed to be greatly attached to him, and introduced him to political life. In good time he replaced his patron, and soon left him behind. But we shall know Frère-Orban when we have made ourselves acquainted with the law of 1879.

The Malou cabinet had resigned on June 12th, 1878. On June 20th the new cabinet was formed. Its members besides Frère, were Van Humbreck, Rollin-Jacquemeyns, Sainctelette, Bara, Graux, Renard. Four of these, Frère, Bara, Van Humbreck, and Rollin-Jacquemeyns, had for years stirred the country with bitter anti-Catholic speeches. Indeed, the sum and substance of their policy can be best conveyed by the well-worn motto "Down with the Church." It is not surprising, then, to hear the speech from the throne setting forth as a fundamental truth the proposition that "public instruction should depend on the civil power exclusively." The ministry forthwith announced the creation of a new portfolio, that of public instruction, which was committed to Van Humbreck, the gentleman who has so bluntly told us that his great object is "to kick the corpse." The new minister, in the name of the government, outlined its policy in the Senate on the 21st of August. It is impossible to misunderstand Van Humbreck: "The teaching contained in the ten commandments of God, and in the laws of the Church, is the absolute negation of liberty of conscience, the teaching of a sect; on this account, from this time forward, this teaching would not be put before the pupils by the teacher, it would be excluded from elementary education."

The project for the revision of the law of 1842 was not presented until the 21st of January, 1879. The debate on the measure was a long and excited one, opening on April 22d, and closing only on the 6th of June, when the bill was carried by the small majorities of seven in the House and two in the Senate.

The new law made it obligatory on every commune in the kingdom to establish at least one communal school. This school should be "*neutre*"; which means, without religion, or, if you please, "Liberal." The commune could no longer "adopt" a school. Article IV. provided that religious instruction was to be left to the care of the family. In the schools religious instruction was replaced by the teaching of "universal morality"—*la morale*

universelle. The priest might give religious instruction to such as desired it, either before or after class, in a room to be set apart for the purpose. The curé's right of inspection was withdrawn. No inspectors, other than those appointed by the state or municipal authorities, were recognized. The clergy were no longer represented in the matter of the examination of school books. While every commune was obliged to have and to maintain at its own expense a primary school, the government determined the minimum number of schools in each commune. The government also fixed the number of classes in each school. The communal councils, as of old, nominated the teachers, but the councils could choose no person not a pupil of a State normal school. Religious instruction no longer formed a part of the course of studies in the State normal schools. The supervision of the schools was divided between the communal councils and certain principal inspectors, cantonal inspectors, and school committees. The principal and cantonal inspectors were appointed and removed at pleasure by the king. The territory each one supervised was fixed by government decree. Over each territory or circumscription there was, in addition to these inspectors, a special school committee. Where the schools of a commune were all within one circumscription the communal council appointed the special committee; but where this was not the case, the minister named the committee, subject to an appeal to the king. The communal councils still had the right to determine all questions as to admission of pupils, school discipline, days and hours of work, and vacations. Attendance at school was not obligatory.

Compare this law with that of 1842, and it will be seen how completely the old law has been overturned. The family receives a beautiful tribute in the fourth article, wherein religious instruction is committed to its tender care; but throughout the rest of the bill there is consideration only for the paternal Liberal government. The "religious country" of Leopold the First is dealt with as though it had become an irreligious country under his son. The country wherein, less than fifty years before, Liberals had objected to a candidate for its throne because there was a possibility that freedom of religion and of instruction might be jeopardized under him, is now subjected to a law which practically denies the one and effectually minimizes the other.

Primary instruction, which in 1842 "comprised *necessarily* instruction in religion and morals," comprises now and as necessarily instruction in no religion, with the unknown morals of "universal morality." Logically, the teacher of religion has gone with religion; logically, he is not to supervise "neutre" books. Difference of denomination is no longer recognized. The children

are the children of the government, and in this government the differences are not of sect, as they say, but rather of degree, of a mad hatred of religion. The teacher must logically be "neutre." To be "neutre," he must logically come out of the "neutre" normal school. The commune may choose the teacher; not the teacher the people want, but the teacher the ministry prescribe. Thus, the rights of the commune are respected! In return, the commune is obliged to provide schools whose number and expense is to be fixed by the government, and by a very skilful maneuvre the measure of the control that the commune shall exercise over the simplest details of the school is placed in the hands of the government. The system of inspection has been designed with this purpose. By the king are appointed the principal and cantonal inspectors, whose circumscription the ministry fixes. There is also a special school committee in each circumscription, and this committee is chosen by the communal council, but only when all the communal schools are within the one circumscription. The government, which fixes the circumscriptions, thus controls the school-committee. The communes are not liberal; the schools are divided between two circumscriptions. Now steps in the law; the government appoints the school committee. The communes may not be Liberal, but the school committees shall be. We of the States have no patent in our own native-born political trick of gerrymandering.

The law of 1879 was, like the law of 1842, well-suited to effect its purpose. The purpose of the law of 1842 was to spread education; that of the law of 1879 was to impede the spread of a certain kind of education, and to assure the diffusion of another kind of education.

This law was effectually carried out in so far as it depended on the government. New school buildings beautified the communes at the expense of the exchequer. Within five years the budget of public instruction was doubled; and though new loans were issued to the amount of eighty millions of dollars, and five millions of new taxes were laid on the country, Frère-Orban went out of office with a deficit of two millions.

The communal treasuries were compelled to honor requisitions over which the communes had no control. The inspectors and committees appointed by the government rigorously carried out the ministry's instructions. Where the organic law of the province or commune interfered with the school-law, as the ministry interpreted it, the ministry boldly superseded or modified the communal laws. Where communal magistrates declined to violate their oaths in order to give effect to the illegal orders of the ministry, special commissioners were appointed to do its bidding. All

difficulties, all obstacles, were overcome by means of these special commissioners, who were multiplied in the land. Every local liberty was violated. The law accorded subventions to the communes to aid them in building and carrying on the schools. In the hands of the ministry this provision became a powerful political weapon. It was not the needs of a commune that were considered, but its political influence and its Liberalism.

We have read the answers of the lodges to the question of the Grand-Orient in 1863. After studying these answers, the Grand-Orient worked up the sketch of a law. According to the Orient, "it is the parents' duty to send their children to State schools, and if the parents cannot be *forced* to do their duty by means of fines and imprisonment, then the children shall be simply taken away from them." Force is evidently a principle of that "universal morality" which has suspended ordinary morality in the conscience of the Belgian Liberal. By force the law of 1879 was executed; and had it not been for the courageous action of a Christian people, to that force would speedily have been added the Masonic force to drag the child from the fined and imprisoned parent in order that conscience might be freed from the slavery of the Ten Commandments.

As the law of 1842 fitted the country, so the law of 1879 did not fit the country; and as the people worked with a will under the old law, so they would have none of the new law. The bill had hardly passed when the country was in revolution. The spirit of 1825 was still living and strong. From 1879 to 1884 the revolution grew in power. Throughout the five years it was constant, open, bold, peaceful. Let us see what it did.

It left the "neutre" schools to those who were neutral. For itself it wanted religious schools, and these it made. Committees were established throughout the country: parish committees, provincial committees, cantonal committees. The parish committee built a school, found the teachers and the pupils. The cantonal committees, made up of delegates from each parish, supervised in a general way the free schools of a circumscription, and dealt with all the difficulties in the way of the establishment of the schools. The provincial committee, a committee of "select men," under the bishop, was made up of clergymen, lawyers, business-men, farmers. Divided into sub-committees, these attended to matters of law and finance, arranged public meetings and lectures, and organized a propaganda of good books and conservative journals. A "Free Schools Pence Society" was formed throughout the country; contribution-boxes, wherein might be dropped the weekly subscription of a sou, were placed in the churches, shops, restaurants, even in private houses. Special collections were taken up at the church-

doors, at concerts, at lectures, at private social gatherings. To help on the good work some gave lands, others buildings. Wealthy families built schools at their own expense. Many persons bound themselves to pay an annual sum into the provincial or parochial school-treasury. Laborers and mechanics gave donations in money, or in kind. Teachers were wanting, especially male teachers; the curé or the vicaire became the teacher. Fresh work was put into the existing Catholic normal schools, and new ones were forwarded.

How zealously, determinedly, intelligently the Catholics worked, is best told by a few figures. The new school-law was promulgated on July 1st, 1879. The government report of December 31, 1878, showed that the total number of children in the primary schools was 687,749, of whom 597,624 were in schools subject to state inspection. On the 15th of December, 1880, within less than eighteen months after the passage of the new law, the figures stood thus: Total number in primary schools, 749,535; of this number 455,179 were in Catholic schools, and but 294,356 in government schools. In the province of Antwerp 75 per cent. of the children were in the Catholic schools; in that of West Flanders, 83 per cent; East Flanders, 80 per cent.; Limburg, 84 per cent.; Brabant, 56 per cent.; Luxemburg, 52 per cent. In only three provinces was the percentage less than one-half: these were Namur, with 47 per cent.; Hainault, with 41 per cent.; and Liége with 39 per cent.

By the 31st of December, 1881, the Catholics had erected 2064 new school buildings for primary instruction. In 1884 the number of Catholic schools had increased to 3885, with 8715 teachers. Was not this a revolution? Surely; and one whose rapidity of action and complete success should not be lost on other people and other governments of the day.

"*La Loi de Malheur*," so the Belgian Catholics named the Frère-Orban law. Still, out of it came good to them. Their organization in the cause of religious education united them against Liberal tyranny, bound them together for the re-acquirement of their rights under the constitution, and rallied to them all fair and liberal-minded men. What liberty, whose liberty was secure when the law of the land was the crazy whim of a Frère, a Van Humbreck, or a Bara?

The majority by which the law had been carried would have made a ministry having at heart the interests of a whole country hesitate before committing itself to a policy of prejudice, of passion, above all, of ignorance. But no; the ministry was blind and reckless. We have seen how it executed the law; mark now how it labored to embitter and excite the country, to assure its power,

to complete its illiberal work, and to "drive out the Catholic religion from elementary education"!

Having tried, by artful schemes, to divide the people, bishops, and Pope, on the very question of the school-law, and having failed, diplomatic relations with the Holy See were broken off, in a rude, undignified way. Through modifications in the electoral law, some six thousand electors were excluded from voting for senators and representatives. The electors so excluded were principally landholders, farmers, curés, classes notably conservative. Uniformly opposed as the party had been to an extension of the franchise, a law was brought in to increase the Liberal vote. In Belgium the right of franchise had been determined by the measure of taxation. The ministry's law gave a vote to specified employés and officials, regardless of the payment of taxes; and further, authorized certain persons to vote who, after examination, should receive a diploma.

But these measures to reduce the Conservative and to increase the Radical vote were vain. The temper of the country was shown at the elections for provincial councils, held on May 25th, 1884. The Radicals lost 47 seats. In the provinces of Antwerp and Limburg, they did not elect a single representative; while in Brabant, Hainault, Namur, old strongholds of Liberalism, the Conservatives made notable gains.

On June 10th the country was relieved of the incubus of the Frère-Orban ministry. The elections for deputies on that day proved disastrous to the anti-Catholics. All the ministerial deputies who presented themselves for re-election, excepting only two, were defeated. Even Brussels did not return a single supporter of the ministry. The Conservative majority in the lower Chamber was 34.

Frère resigned on the 11th of June. On the next day the king called in Malou to form a ministry. The Senate holding over, and having a Radical majority of five, Malou at once dissolved it, and appealed to the country. The senatorial elections were held on the 8th of July, with the result of a Conservative majority of seventeen.

The Catholic victory was complete, but it was not a victory gained by Catholics alone. The strain of the men of the Union had not exhausted itself; the intelligent youth of the country had rallied to the cause of liberty. Brussels elected its sixteen deputies, not as Catholics, but as Independents. The temper of the people is well shown by an incident that occurred shortly after the meeting of the chambers. "You claim to form a group," said the Liberal ex-minister Bara, addressing the Independents, "and yet you have no common platform." "We had one," answered Van

der Smissen, the leader of the Independents, "it was to disembarrass the country of your government; on that point we were one."

The Chambers were convoked on the 22d of July. Two subjects were at once placed on the order of the day: 1st, renewal of diplomatic relations with the Holy See; 2d, a new school-law. The first measure was carried without discussion; not so the second.

Malou's cabinet was made up of able men,—Jacobs, Bernaert, Woeste, Pauters, Moreau d'Audray, and Vandenpeereboom. Jacobs, Bernaert, and Woeste were men of large experience in affairs. Like Malou, they had long been active in the cause of freedom and religion; and like him, they had been leaders in the opposition to the Radical policy, and in the work of establishing Catholic free-schools. Frère-Orban's creation, the separate ministry of public instruction, was abolished, and the portfolio again combined with that of the interior. To Jacobs, the minister of the interior, was given in charge the new school-bill which the Cabinet presented to the Chambers on July 25th. We shall examine this law.

Each commune shall have a communal school. The commune may adopt, or subsidize, one or more private schools. Where it does this, the king, on the advice of the permanent deputation of the provincial council, may dispense the commune from the obligation of establishing a communal school. This dispensation cannot be granted, however, if twenty heads of families, having children of school age, demand a school for the instruction of their children. As to religious instruction, the commune may place it at the head of the school programme. It shall be given at the beginning or at the end of class. Children whose parents make the request are to be dispensed from assisting at it. Should twenty fathers of families request it, the king may oblige the commune to organize a special class for their children. In case the commune refuses to give religious instruction, and twenty Catholic heads of families demand it for their children, the commune is not compelled to grant it; but the government may adopt and subsidize a free-school agreeable to the parents, provided that the school adopted meet the requirements for a communal school. In adopted schools the religious instruction shall be given at the beginning or at the end of the class, as in communal schools; and in the one, as in the other, pupils may be dispensed from attending the religious instruction at the request of the parents. The communal primary schools are subject to the direction of the commune. In all normal schools, absolute respect for liberty of conscience is guaranteed to each pupil. To the communal council the old power of appointing and suspending the teacher is restored. The teacher must have a diploma from a normal school, but normal

schools inspected by the State are put on a footing with State schools. Should any teacher of an official school, appointed under the law of 1879, lose his position by the operation of the present law, he shall receive a stipend of not less than one-half, nor more than three-quarters, of his former salary, until such time as some fitting place has been provided for him, the expense to be divided between the commune and the State.

The bill was passed on the 22d of August, by a majority of 32 in the House, and of 15 in the Senate, two deputies and two senators being absent.

"You are going back fifty years," cried a member of the Left, on the last day of the debate. "You are right," answered M. Woeste, "and we are proud of it. It is of the very essence of our politics to bring back into their old place of honor the real principles of the constitution. One of the bases of the constitution is complete respect for the communal prerogatives. We have faith in the communal liberties and in their workings."

In one sense the ministry had gone back fifty years, in another sense it had not. The foundation of this law, said M. Jacobs, "is respect for the liberty of the communes, for liberty of instruction, for the free will of fathers of families. Not that there is ever unlimited liberty, any more than complete constraint. It is a question of limit. We propose a considerable *recoil on the side of liberty*." The expression is happy. Progression is one thing, liberty another; they are not inseparable. The ministry had gone back fifty years for liberty's sake.

Is the law of 1884 a just law? After careful perusal, it is hard to find a flaw in it. We qualified the law of 1842 as a law of statesmen; the same qualification is even more applicable to this of 1884. The old law of 1842 was formed in times of political peace, when the aim of all was to satisfy all, when no passions had been aroused. Then, it was not hard to be just. But now, circumstances were very different. The Catholics had seen their rights taken from them by the law of 1879; they had been made to feel the harsh hand of a government whose avowed aim was to destroy their faith, to wrest their children from their religion; they had been forced, for five years, to suffer injustice, and to make rare sacrifices. It is not often that a party, victorious over oppression, lifts itself above itself. The natural impulse is to retaliate. But in the law of 1884 we find no trace of a retaliatory spirit. The makers of the law seem to have aimed solely at a practical application of the Christian maxims of liberty, fraternity, equality. There is a return to the principles of the constitution, and to that law of 1842 which had effected its purpose by encouraging education, while leaving the country at peace. Going back

fifty years for their principles, the Conservatives had not gone back a day for their practice. The law of 1842 had been devised for the existing conditions; and so the law of 1884 was devised for other existing conditions. Though the "Loi de Malheur" was a bad law, and the law of a narrow majority, not backed by the country, still it had inaugurated a system, binding in some respects on an honorable people, and satisfactory to a minority. By the new law the rights of this minority are protected, and the moral obligations of the State are admitted. Take the matter of the teachers. When Frère-Orban passed his law in 1879, he declined to make any provision for those who would be thrown out of employment by the enforcement of the section by which all teachers were required to be graduates of State normal schools. Men long in the service, and yet not long enough to be entitled to the legal pension, were sent adrift, as though they had no claims on the State. Not so under the Malou law; they are made a charge against the State and Commune until they have found other employment.

Freedom of instruction is again assured, not only freedom of non-religious or irreligious instruction, but freedom of religious instruction as well. The 500,000 children who wish to study the catechism, the ten commandments, and the laws of the Church, are placed on an equality with the 300,000 that seem not to wish any of these things. No one religion is protected or persecuted by the law which, recognizing no particular form of religion, still recognizes differences, and guarantees to each citizen his constitutional right to freedom of conscience.

The family is acknowledged as the foundation of the State, and protected in its natural rights. To the family, not to the State, belongs the education of the children. The collection of families most closely united to form a society, and a body politic,—the commune,—is recognized as being, after the family, the chief factor in the constitution of the State. To the commune is given its rights, its liberties. The State assumes its proper rôle of overseer, of helper, of protector of the citizens. In as much as control is necessary, in order that all the families and all the communes shall work harmoniously, yet freely, according to their lawfully free opinions, in so much the State controls, but no farther. The State preserves order, encourages and protects the citizens, fosters education, and assures the utmost constitutional liberty.

One would imagine that the Radical, the Grand-Orient, the Liberal, could grant no less than this. But they did grant less. They were not satisfied with the protection of all rights, and the largest liberty for all. Belgian Liberalism, as we have seen, meant liberty

for a sect, a class, to impose its views on a majority that differed from it. In the debates on the law, Frère-Orban himself had voiced the Radical idea. He protested against the liberty which the bill accorded; to him such liberty was a contradiction. "You detest the State-instruction," he cried out, "you oppose the principle of the 'neutre' school, you look upon it as pestilential, and yet you propose to leave to the commune the right to establish such a school, if it please." To have lived eighty years, and suckled Liberalism in the lodge itself, and still to be unable to understand true liberality! Liberty, in the estimation of Frère and his party, was the Liberal's, the Radical's will. Wherefore this law, which recognized the equality of the citizens before the law, and granted to all the fullest freedom, was obnoxious to the Radical-Liberal.

It was "a law of the convents"; "a Jesuit *coup d'état*"; "a return to the Spanish epoch." It gave rights to the communes which did not belong to them. Not to the commune, but to the State belonged the control of primary education. Were we not right in saying that the "Liberal" wanted less liberty than the law allowed? Here are the convents, the Jesuits, Alva's ghost, charged with the un-Liberal aim of treating all the citizens as equals, and the government reproached because its lack of anti-Liberal spirit led it to refuse to seize the communal liberties, in order that the vain and variable thing, Liberal liberty, might be the better assured.

No sooner had the bill been passed than an organized agitation against it was begun. Were school committees formed throughout the country to assure the diffusion of irreligious education? Were contribution boxes for the "Non-Catechetical-Schools-Pence" set up in the Lodges and the places of public resort? Was a literary propaganda organized? No, there was no occasion to do any of these things. The opposition was better protected under this law than under the law of 1879. An agitation of the kind would have been ridiculous, more than all, it would have been moral. Besides, the Radical-Liberals had their own peculiar and established system of agitation. This system was based on the same idea as was their system of government, on force. They resorted to riot.

In the use of this as a political contrivance they were adepts; and by its use they had again and again attained their ends. The riot, as a means of overturning a ministry, frightening a weak majority, strengthening a minority, intimidating a king, forcing a dissolution, carrying an election, was introduced with the Rogier-Frère-Orban ministry of 1857. In that year, as well as in 1870, '71, '72, '75, '77, '78, the larger cities had been again and again

scenes of violence and of bloodshed. The "uncatechized" city rough was well trained in the business of window-breaking, threatening, assaulting. Why waste time on committees and books, when means of action so powerful and progressive were ready at hand?

While the Chambers were discussing the school-law, intimidation was attempted. The streets about the parliament houses were day after day filled with a crowd of students, idlers, and roughs, who hooted and abused the members, and above all the ministers, as they passed. The police of Brussels, controlled by the Liberal burgomaster, M. Buls, an eminent Mason, made no attempt to repress the disorder. Finally, the Conservative deputies called upon the ministry to protect their dignity and independence; and Jacobs, the minister of the interior, determined to place the keeping of public order in the hands of the governor of the province. However, as the burgomaster begged that the communal council might be spared such a humiliation, and promised to preserve the peace for the future, Jacobs did not carry out his purpose.

What had heretofore been done by crowds, was now done by groups and individuals. Insulting cries against the king were not uncommon. The Radical press encouraged the excitement, its columns were filled with threats and calumnies. Soon, the street disturbances were renewed.

Meanwhile, the bill had passed; and the Radical leaders, neglecting ministers and deputies for the time being, turned their attention to the king, in whose hands the bill lay. The agitation was kept up, in the hope of intimidating the king, and so extorting from him a refusal to sign the law. Processions were organized; violent speeches were made by the leaders; there were bands of music, flags, mottoes. The 31st of August was selected for a final demonstration. On that day, 33,095 Liberals marched to the palace, carrying to the king a petition against the law.

The Conservatives, excited by this unseemly opposition, determined to give the king support, and to show the popularity of the new law. They therefore arranged to present, on the same day, a petition favoring the bill. This the burgomaster forbade them to do, giving as a reason that he feared *lest the public peace might be disturbed.* He agreed, however, to permit them to select some other day. Thereupon they chose the 7th of September, and on that day mustered to the number of 94,500. While marching through the streets, they were attacked at a favorable point by crowds of men, armed with clubs. The way was barred; they were beaten, battered, and eighty of them being seriously injured, their ranks were broken, and the procession compelled to disband.

M. Buls had evidently not provided against the disturbance of the public peace.

There was but one more card to play. Forty-eight Liberal burgomasters were gathered together, and in a body they went to the king, begging him not to sanction the law. When we remember that there are twenty-six hundred communes in Belgium, the forty-eight burgomasters will recall the Tooly street tailors. Still, the tailors were for popular rights, while the forty-eight burgomasters, the official representatives of their communes, were opposing a measure by which thousands of communes were to regain their stolen liberties.

What answer was the king to make to such a petition? The burgomasters' appeal was to an autocrat; Leopold was only a constitutional king. There was but one answer for him to give: "He had promulgated the law of 1879 in accordance with the wish of the Chambers; he could not but do the same in the case of the new law; it was not for him to make distinctions between Belgians. If he accepted the address they presented, it was only fair to tell them that he had received addresses from a great number of communes expressing the very contrary wish." The king might have said to them: I signed the law of 1879, which was carried by a majority of seven in the Chamber of Deputies, and of two in the Senate. By what reason can a Belgian ask me to refuse my signature to this law, which has been carried by a majority of thirty-two in the one house, and of fifteen in the other?

The bill was signed, but the agitation did not cease. In October the communal elections were to be held; the new law must serve party purposes. It might be made of use to rally the drooping spirits of the Liberal organization, for the organization was in danger. An always malicious press became violent: "The law was infamous;" "it put the treasury of the State in the hands of brotherlets and nunlets;" "it was a law favoring public ignorance, a law reducing Belgium to the lowest rank among nations." On the ministry and the king insults were heaped.

Again were the streets resorted to: "Long live the Republic," "Down with the King," were not uncommon cries. A permanent committee was appointed, whose charge it was openly to unfurl the republican flag. Manifestoes, pamphlets, exciting and abusive, were scattered broadcast. "Monsiuer Cobourg" was the king, and, sorry joke, "Madame Co-bourgeoise" was the queen, or, more seriously, "the Austrian woman."

The effect of all this demagogy was apparent when the results of the communal elections of the 19th of October came in. "Ce n'est pas une défaite, c'est une désastre," said one of the most

prominent Radicals. Malou was vindicated; the people had set their seal upon the school-law, and rejected Radicalism and the mob. While the Radicals held their own in Brussels, Antwerp, Ghent, Liége, Namur, and Ypres, the Conservatives carried Bruges, Courtrai, Nivelles, Grammont, Alost, Termonde, Saint Nicolas, Audenarde, Thielt, Roulers, Malines, Furnes, Tongres, Bastoyne; the four last being gains from Radical rule. Of 2585 communes in which elections were held, the Conservatives were victorious in 1658; 261 were divided, and only 642 were left to the Radicals. Two hundred and forty-four communes had put out Radical administrations, and gone over to the Conservatives. If we take the popular vote, the Conservative victory was no less decisive. The Radical vote amounted to 2,473,960, while the Conservatives polled 2,872,459 votes, having a majority of about 400,000.

Toujours l'Audace! The Radicals claimed a victory. They telegraphed us that the country had rejected the school-law and the ministry, and our daily papers forthwith printed editorials on the "unmixed blessing of the Liberal triumph," and on wicked clericalism, which had been "following the paths that lead to civil war"; and whose "meddling with the question of education drove the people to revolt." Now and then it looks as though some Van Humbreck or Bara tapped the keys in foreign news-bureaus at odd hours. However, we are easily fooled when we wish to be, and, no doubt, the Van Humbrecks know us. So we need not be surprised at the telegrams, nor at the well-meaning but mistaken editorials; and yet we cannot but wonder at the audacity which could claim, before Belgians themselves, that this sound drubbing was a victory so substantial for Radicalism that there was nothing left for the king to do but to dismiss the ministry and to order new elections. This was the claim of Radical leaders and press, iterated and reiterated. The machinery of the riot was again put in motion; the mob was gathered; the ministers were hooted; the king and queen were hissed at a public distribution of prizes, where, too, the cry of "Vive la République" was applauded. This cry, and other cries more insulting, were repeated under the very palace windows.

Thus far Leopold had acted like a man and a constitutional king. Now he privately sent for two of the old Frère-Orban ministers, Bara and Rollin-Jacquemeyns, to consider the situation with them. Learning of this consultation from the journals, Malou called upon the king, represented to him that his action was opposed to the usages of a parliamentary government, and asked an explanation. The king answered that the manifestation of opinion in the communal elections seemed to require that something should be done to calm the popular excitement. To this Malou rejoined

that the excitement was temporary, and without consistence; that, besides, the communal councils were not political bodies, that only the two chambers had a political character, and that their opinion was not doubtful; that no law had ever been carried by a larger majority than had this school-law; that to bend before the present clamor would be subversive of all constitutional ideas; and that he, the Premier, was ready to assume the responsibility. Still the king insisted, and finally disclosed his plans, saying that he considered it indispensable that Jacobs and Woeste should resign. Malou protested, and tried to make the king understand the gravity of his request and the difficulty of justifying it on any ground whatsoever. The king being obstinate, Malou withdrew to consult with his colleagues. The first resolve of the ministry was to stand or fall together, but at a second meeting Jacobs and Woeste asked permission to resign, *under the king's injunction.* Their view was, that the ministers owed it to the majority, to the electors who had so recently sent them to the chambers, to the Conservative party, to the great interests engaged in the contest, and to respect for the constitution, not to hand over the country to the Radical party and a new dissolution. Finally these views prevailed, but Malou announced that, having formed the ministry, and being responsible for it, he would go out with his two colleagues. It was then determined that Bernaert should take Malou's place in the new ministry. Having informed the king of this action, Malou called a meeting of the Conservative senators and deputies, and acquainted them with the position of affairs. Naturally the meeting was an excited one; the tendency was to resent the king's interference; but, in the end, the ministry's policy was agreed to, and a request was made to the king to reconstitute a Conservative cabinet, under the premiership of Bernaert.

This was not what the king had been aiming at; his purpose was to get a mixed or compromise ministry. But the Conservative position was too strong for him, he took all he could get, and accepted Bernaert, who completed his ministry by the appointment of MM. Volder, Thonissen, and Chimay to the vacant portfolios.

There was no further pretext for rioting, though it did not cease at once. The Radical leaders had reached the end of their tether. Either they had to accept the situation or to proceed to revolution.

To explain the king's action is not difficult; to defend it, not easy. The riots, the violence of the Radical press, the open insults to himself and the queen, the threats against the throne, implied by the cries of the roughs favoring a republic, had intimidated the king. He feared for himself and his dynasty. The political education he had received from his father had made him a man of

peace and of compromises. When he came to the throne, in December, 1865, the Liberal leaders had tried to strengthen their party and to prejudice the king by charging him with Catholic leanings. His policy for many years has proved the very contrary, unless he be one of those whose love is shown by chastisement. In 1871 he had played the same part with Baron d'Anethan that he now played with Malou. Then, as now, the riot had been used as an argument, and by it the king had been convinced.

Practically the action of the king in 1884 altered nothing. It removed all excuse for disorder, but there was no excuse for it; to the law belonged the maintenance of order, to the law its maintenance should have been left. The ministry was the choice of the country; the king had no constitutional right to interfere with that choice. Fresh from the people, with a large and secure majority, the ministry was in its right. The communal elections were not political, as Malou had fairly stated; but, in as much as they voiced the popular will, they only served to strengthen the position and policy of the ministry. To concede, in the face of sedition, was to weaken the crown and to encourage sedition; to concede, at the expense of the constitution, was to offer a premium to anarchy and to make a claim for despotism. Time will tell the consequences of the king's action; but, if the logical consequences do not follow, it will be for the reason that a Conservative ministry, better than the king, loves and knows the country, and by wise and courageous means determines to preserve it to him and his heirs for its own happiness.

What did the Radicals gain? Nothing, but to endanger the constitution and their own party. The school-law remains the law; a Conservative ministry still holds a Conservative majority; the king is on the throne; but in what position are the Radical-Liberals? Hardly had the political difficulties been resolved when the less radical Radicals undertook to reform the party. Their defeat by the people they attributed to the adoption of the policy of the irreconcilables. None were more irreconcilable than the Masons, yet it is Brother Van Humbreck who leads the movement against the extremists.

Did the Conservatives lose anything? No, not politically. The crown invaded their rights, infringed upon their powers, hurt their dignity. Their loss was a moral one. Wise politicians, they accepted it, holding to the real things they had, and trusting to time and the country to repair the indignity which the king had so inexcusably placed on them.

The ten commandments and the laws of the Church are good for a country: they make a religious people, and that means, as the first Leopold so well said, "a people easily governed"; but they

are bad for a party. They limit the means of political action to honest means, while the party that has advanced so far in the way of progress as to have relieved itself of them, enjoys the beautiful freedom of conscience which permits men to adapt the means to the end. Unfortunately for the Belgian Conservative, he is, and is likely to continue to be, a "nullifier" of this kind of progress, and he is face to face with an opposition whose conscience is freed from the bonds of commandment and law. The contest is not over, the issue is not certain. But no one who values religion and liberty can withhold his admiration from the Belgian Conservative Catholic. Intelligence, courage, patience, sacrifice, pluck,—these manly qualities he has shown for sixty years. The men of to-day are true sons of the fathers of 1825. Conservatives throughout the world, while admiring them, encouraging them, and hoping for them, may at the same time learn from them a lesson—in prudence as well as zeal, in patience as well as action, in toleration, in courage, above all, in moderation.

ANNE CATHERINE EMMERICH.

Life of Anne Catherine Emmerich. From the German of V. Rev. K. E. Schmoeger, C.SS.R. New York: Fr. Pustet & Co. Two vols., 8vo.

THE only account of Sister Anne Catherine Emmerich given to the public, previous to F. Schmoeger's Life, was a brief biographical sketch prefixed to her revelations on the "Dolorous Passion of Our Lord," published by Clement Brentano, in 1833, and not long after translated into French. But this scanty notice of the holy nun only increased the desire of pious Catholics for a fuller account of the virtues and wonderful life of this privileged servant of God. This longing was not gratified until the year 1870, when F. Schmoeger published his work, with the approbation of the Bishop of Limburg. He had meanwhile had access to many documents connected with the civil and ecclesiastical commissions that had been appointed to investigate the alleged preternatural state of the holy sister, also to the copious notes of Brentano's diary, who had spent six years in daily attendance upon her and had been the amanuensis to whom she dictated her revelations.

F. Schmoeger's book is as thorough and complete as could be desired, though sometimes lacking in order and precision, where precision is most necessary. Thus we have occasional accounts from Sr. Emmerich's own mouth of her interior life and of the invisible world, given in quotation marks; but to whom uttered or by whom reported, the author has forgotten to tell the reader. The English translator, who is understood to be a Religious of the Visitation Order in a neighboring State, has done her share of the work very commendably.

The great sanctity of Sister Emmerich, her love of holy poverty, of mortification and suffering, her profound humility in the midst of so many divine favors,—most touching and beautiful in its child-like simplicity,—with her many other virtues, are amply set forth in these volumes. Though not a model of biographical style, we have no doubt that they will interest and charm the Catholic reader to such an extent that he will find it difficult to lay down the book once it is taken up for perusal. Her expiatory sufferings for the persecutions and scandals that troubled the Church in her day, for ecclesiastics in high position or in immediate charge of souls, for her own enemies and persecutors, for sinners, for the sick and dying, form quite a prominent chapter in Sister Emmerich's history. This peculiar development of lively faith and ardent charity is not found in the lives of many saints, though analogous cases occur in the accounts that have come down to us of several sainted heroines of the Middle Ages. So intense was her faith that God rewarded it by a special privilege. He bestowed upon her soul, while yet surrounded by its bodily veil, not only the most vivid conceptions, but what may be called the actual sight of grace in its mysterious workings upon the human soul. She beheld and felt, more clearly than the senses do physical objects, the regenerative power of the Sacraments and the efficacy likewise of those things that are merely external helps to the Christian soul during its earthly sojourn, such as the priest's blessing, holy water, the sanctity, beauty, and power of relics, etc. In a reliquary she could discern instantly any relic that was not genuine; and where they were authentic, she felt sensibly their presence, though not exposed to view, and saw intuitively to what saints they belonged, their first gathering, their translation, and other subsequent vicissitudes.

But what is peculiar to this humble virgin of Dulmen is the frequency and wonderful character of the visions and revelations vouchsafed to her, even, it would seem, from infancy. These will strike the fancy and gratify, perhaps, the curiosity of some readers; but Catholic theologians, as did the saint herself, consider them as trivial and insignificant by the side of the solid virtues, as charity, obedience, humility, and others. They are but *gratiæ gratis datæ*,

that is spiritual favors given by God gratuitously out of the superabundance of His goodness. No one can claim them as his right, and the true saint, instead of desiring them, dreads them as a burden, a possible snare and source of temptation. So it was with Sister Emmerich. Besides, these visions and revelations rest solely on the authority of the one who receives or relates them. Hence, though they breathe nothing but the most exquisite piety, and can have no other result than to promote edification amongst Christian readers; though we know that this holy, guileless, simple-minded servant of God was absolutely incapable of wishing or attempting to deceive others, yet her visions and revelations can only command such belief as is commensurate with the authority on which they are based. This is only human; such, consequently, is the only faith which we are allowed to place in them. They are by no means to be received with that infallible certainty of divine faith with which we receive the truths revealed to us by God through His holy Church.

This is the explicit teaching of all Catholic theologians. It will be enough to quote Benedict XIV., in his magnificent work on the Beatification and Canonization of Saints: "Resolvitur ergo in humanum testimonium ejus qui refert aliis suam privatam revelationem; quare, cum illis desit objectum formale fidei divinæ, assensus non potest esse nisi solius fidei humanæ" (*Prati*, 1839, vol. iii., p. 609). "The truth of any such alleged heavenly communication resolves itself into the human testimony of him (or her) who relates to others his (or her) private revelation; hence, since they have no formal object of divine faith, their assent can only be that of human faith."

We would not have added this remark unless we judged it necessary. For we have known some good Catholics innocently to entertain the opinion that the revelations of Saints Bridget and Catherine of Sienna, Blessed Hildegard and Colette have, by the fact of their canonization, the sanction of Church authority and must be believed accordingly; and so too those of Sister Emmerich, were she admitted to the honors of the altar, would stand on the same footing. Nothing could be more unfounded, nothing more at variance with the teachings of sound theology.

Even when such revelations have been examined and approved by the Holy See, the term "approbation" is only used in a technical forensic sense. It implies no added weight of sanction, no witnessing on the part of the Church to their truth. It is simply a "permission to publish them for the instruction and advantage of the faithful" (Benedict XIV., De Beatif. and Canoniz. SS., vol. ii., p. 300). "Sciendum est approbationem istam nihil aliud esse quam permissionem ut edantur ad fidelium institutionem et utili-

tatem." He adds that to revelations thus approved the assent of Catholic faith cannot and ought not to be given (Ibid.). Again, speaking of such revelations, he says "that it is lawful for any one to withhold his assent from them, provided it be done with becoming modesty, not unreasonably nor contemptuously" (vol. iii., p. 610.) And he notices the fact that Cardinal Torquemada, who gave his official approbation to the revelations of St. Bridget, afterwards wrote a book to refute a theological position contained in those very revelations (Ibid.).

Many who are conversant with the history and hagiology of the Church, and other branches of sacred and profane science, will see in the visions and revelations of Sister Anne Catherine certain opinions and statements from which they cannot but strongly dissent. Out of many we select one example. It is stated (vol. i., p. 349) that St. Anne had several children long before the birth of the Blessed Virgin. This opinion, drawn from apocryphal or uncertain sources, was held by some in the Middle Ages. But it has been reproved and refuted by the illustrious Cardinals Bellarmin and Baronius, Salmeron, Suarez, and the Bollandists; and in our day the *consensus fidelium* has made it offensive to pious ears. Doubtless she had imbibed this notion from old Lives of the Saints, which, in her youth, she was ever in the habit of reading and relating to others for their instruction (see vol. i., p. 108 and 109), and the subjective impressions lent their color to her objective visions. (See the great Bollandist, Papebrochius, in his answer to F. Sebastian à S. Paulo, quoted by F. Cuperus in the Acta Sanctorum, sixth vol. of July, p. 242, where he explains the vision of B. Colette, in which she relates having seen St. Anne with her three children, each the child of a different husband.) No Catholic reader need be disturbed by these visions, or frightened by them into renouncing his previous opinions, if he will only bear in mind the sensible conclusion of the same Papebrochius. "In talibus (sanctarum mulierum visionibus) nihil esse præsidii ad quæstiones pure historicas, seu sacræ illæ seu profanæ sunt, prudenter dirimendas; proinde nihil ipsis sanctis detrahi cum talium veritas citra ullum ad illas respectum, vocatur in controversiam, aliunde probanda vel infirmanda" (Ibid.). "Such (visions of holy women) can be of no help in deciding with prudence on merely historical questions, whether sacred or profane. Hence no wrong is done the saints themselves when the truth of such opinions is controverted, and decided on other ground, without any regard whatsoever to aught that has been said by these holy women."

One word more (and we think it seasonable, if not necessary) as to the visions and revelations of Sister Emmerich. They teem with denunciations of the lax disedifying life led by so many

ecclesiastics. And for these denunciations there was abundant reason. The Church in Germany was slowly going back to that state of corruption and degradation in which it was sunk at the era of the "Reformation." Its condition in our day would have been the same, or worse, if possible, had it not pleased God to remember His former mercies, and for the sake of His servants Aphra, Boniface, Henry, Elizabeth, Gertrude, and other saints, to rescue from utter ruin the land watered by their blood and tears. In His infinite wisdom He made use of His enemies to accomplish His purpose. It was done step by step. The tyrannical oppression of the Church by Joseph II. was seemingly the beginning of better days, and still more, the unscrupulous despotism of Bonaparte, whose imperial sway extended to the left bank of the Rhine. But the dawn of quite a new era for Catholic Germany dates from 1837, when the Prussian government so signally outraged liberty and justice by the imprisonment of the Archbishops of Cologne and Posen. This high-handed measure awakened a feeling not only in Prussia, but throughout the whole of Germany, that of itself alone would have led gradually to the entire redemption of the German Church. But Divine Providence, wishing mercifully to hasten the completion of the good work, sent Bismarck to give the finishing stroke to whatever of evil yet lingered in the clergy and laity of Germany. No Attila, nor other divinely commissioned rod of iron, ever did the Great Master's work more successfully. By his cruel, brutal injustice, masked under forms of law, his attempts to annihilate free speech at home and abroad, his wicked, systematic persecution of the clergy by imprisonment, fines, and banishment, he has succeeded in creating a united Catholic Germany, of orthodox faith, of exemplary life, of heroic courage, as thoroughly devoted to the Holy See as Ireland or the Tyrol—in a word, a body that may well be a source of pride and envy to the whole Catholic world.

In the days of Anne Catherine Emmerich, however, it was far otherwise. Indifferentism, which had grown up with rationalism and false philanthropy amongst the sects, had penetrated the Catholic body and found adherents amongst churchmen and the more learned of the laity. Catholic princes grew tired of Rome's supremacy, and had no difficulty in finding ecclesiastical scribes whose pride or venality made them willing enough to aid their rulers in making war upon what they called Rome's pretensions. The mean, beggarly spirit that led Protestant men of letters in Germany to despise their own noble language, and strive to bring to perfection their literature by thoroughly Gallicizing it, made its way into Catholic theology. The true meaning of revealed doctrine, of discipline and Church jurisprudence, was no longer sought for in

their true sources, but in the muddy streams of Pierre d'Ailly, Launoy, Fleury, Richer, and, still worse, of Nicole, Gerberon, and Quesnel. Thus originality, national pride, and self-respect fared no better than orthodoxy.

Where Catholic faith is wantonly abandoned, or treated with contemptuous indifference, a corresponding decline in good morals is sure to follow. Luther had often complained bitterly, that whereas he had expelled one devil by changing the old faith of Germany, seven other devils worse than the first had come in with his new gospel to occupy the ground he had won by his labors. So it was with these reformed Catholic ecclesiastics of the last century. They had got rid of all reverence for the Pope and his supremacy; they had brought themselves to believe that Protestants, and especially the Pietists, were as good as Catholics, if not much better; but they had not the honesty to leave the Church which they had ceased to respect. They retained its wealth, and dishonored it by their shameful lives. To use Luther's style, the devil of the Pope's pretensions was gone, only to give place to other devils, dishonesty, covetousness, rapacity, unbridled lust, and, in some cases, total unbelief. The ecclesiastical principalities, Cologne, Mayence, Treves, Salzburg, and others (Würzburg formed a noble exception), as they were first in dignity, held also the first place in worldliness and immorality. To give one instance out of many, the Elector and Prince-Bishop of Mayence, Frederic Charles, Baron von Erthal, was an enlightened hater of Rome and its primatial rights; but he was a liberal patron of the arts, of the chase, and of the theatres, one of which he supported out of his princely revenues, and where he frequently appeared with the *ladies* of his court (Hofdamen). He ground his subjects to almost starvation by his exactions to keep up his state and magnificence as a worldly ruler, forgetting all the while that they were his spiritual flock, and he their consecrated, divinely appointed shepherd. Whilst in public he affected the role of a Mecænas, or Augustus, or Leo X. in his patronage of art and science, and framed novel plans of education by the advice chiefly of Protestant counsellors,[1] in private life he was the slave of his titled harlots, whom he kept in his palace and paraded before the public so unblushingly that the whole city caught the infection and became the prey of im-

[1] In justice, however, we must add what Karl Adolf Menzel says of one of these Protestants, Nicholas Vogt, afterwards Professor of History in the projected University, that in his lectures, like John von Müller, he showed what Europe owes to the Catholic hierarchy in a more favorable light than has been done by Catholic writers of that day or of later times: "Doch hat gerade dieser protestantische Geschichtslehrer, wie Johannes von Müller, die Verdienste der Hierarchie um dis europäische Menschheit günstiger als viele der damaligen und der späteren Katholischen Historiker beurtheilt." Neuere Geschichte der Deutschen, Breslau, 1847, vol. xii., p. 300.

morality.[1] When Heinse published a filthy obscene novel, he received twenty Louis d'or as a gratuity from the prince-bishop. A rascally Jew, who kept a circulating library of the dirtiest, vilest literature in Mayence, was safe under the protection of the prince-bishop's police. And while all this was going on, as if to show his utter contempt for Catholic doctrine and morals, he sneeringly offered a prize to authors for the best essay on the excellence of celibacy.[2] But enough of this detestable prince-bishop of Mayence; we have only mentioned him that the others may be judged accordingly. *Ab uno disce omnes.*[3]

While corruption was so rampant in these high places and amongst the great dignitaries of the Church, what wonder is it that their demoralizing influence was felt throughout all Germany, in bishoprics, parishes, convents, monasteries, and amongst the laity, for whom all religious and devout confraternities and associations of piety and benevolence had been forbidden by so-called Catholic reforming princes, as savoring of superstition.[4] This was the state of things in Germany, though partially modified, when Sister Anne Catherine received her revelations.[5] We cannot be surprised to find from her Life by F. Schmoeger, that when the condition of the Church in Germany was revealed to her, this holy nun should be filled with just indignation in seeing God's ministers rebelling against Him and serving in the ranks of His enemies. That she received such revelation we have not a shadow of doubt; but we cannot bring ourselves to believe that the revelation came in the shape in which it is presented by Brentano and F. Schmoeger. The poet and the Redemptorist, though most excellent men, like all children of Adam have their human weakness, and without detriment to their character and reputation may be suspected of occasionally allowing their zeal to outrun their judgment; but nothing of the kind can be suspected of a pure, holy soul that communes with the invisible world, and stands face to face, as it were, with angels and saints and Deity itself. In that

[1] "Er spielte Leo X. begünstigte Wissenschaften und Künste, unterhielt aber seine Maitressen so öffentlich, dass vom Beispiele des Hofes angesteckt ganz Mainz liederlich wurde." Wolfgang Menzel, Geschichte der Deutschen bis auf die neuesten Tage. Stuttgart, 1855, vol. iv., p. 232.

[2] Ibid.

[3] These "sacred principalities," sinks of moral and social corruption, and bitterly hostile to the Holy See, were in the year 1803 swept out of existence by God's avenging justice, and their territories handed over to Protestant rulers.

[4] Yet so strong is the human mind that these pious associations, when driven out of existence, soon revived in a human or pagan form, as societies for the promotion of worldly gayeties and profane amusements. See J. Burton Robinson in Memoir of Moehler, prefixed to his Symbolism. New York, 1844, p. 48.

[5] Anne Catherine Emmerich was born in 1774, the very year in which Baron von Erthal was elected to the bishopric of Mayence.

presence she could never forget the precepts of Christian charity, nor lose sight of God's commandment to Israel, "*Principi populi tui ne maledixeris.*"[1]

There may be nothing very uncharitable in her mention by name of the priest Wessenberg, the leader of the anti-celibataire party in Baden; but what good was to come of it, unless her warnings were published in Baden rather than in Münster, we cannot imagine. But what is most atrocious is the contumely heaped on the head of Cardinal Consalvi, who is almost invariably mentioned by name. In these alleged revelations he is a good-for-nothing (Taugenichts); "he does much harm, he hates his Father (Pope Pius VII.), but he is so mixed up in affairs that they cannot get rid of him. He is perfectly entangled by the secret society (the Carbonari or Weishaupt's Illuminati), that wide-spread association which works more quickly and still more superficially than even the Freemasons" (vol. ii., p. 346). She saw him "seizing her by the shoulders and endeavoring to prevent her from adoring the Blessed Sacrament" (Ibid., p. 350). She struggled to free herself and by physical force dragged him before the altar. He tried to burn down the old "Nuptial house" (the Church founded by Christ our Lord) in order to build up a new Church "which was to embrace all creeds with equal rights, Evangelicals, Catholics, and all denominations, a true communion of the unholy" (Ibid., p. 352, 353). Even the Pope is not spared, and his weakness is referred to in a way that no good Catholic likes to hear. Besides his want of firmness in the discharge of his Apostolic office, he is charged also with undue attachment to earthly ties (Ibid., p. 302). This is simply abominable. Pius VII. was an illustrious Confessor of the Faith, for which he suffered years of hardship and imprisonment. If in an unguarded moment, deprived of all counsel and deceived by false representations, he unhappily yielded to the pressing demands of his imperial jailer, it was the only fault of his life, and he nobly repaired it.[2] His memory is venerated by the whole world as that of a saint and confessor of the faith. As to Cardinal Consalvi, of whom this pious nun is alleged to have spoken so bitterly, he lived and died respected and highly esteemed by both Catholics and Protestants. From his first entrance into public life

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[1] "Thou shalt not speak ill of the Angels, and the prince of thy people thou shalt not revile." Exodus, xxii., 28. For *angels* the Vulgate, Anglican, and Douay Bibles read *Diis, the Gods*. The Revised Version has God, and very correctly in the margin *judges*. We see no harm in adopting the euphemism (Angels for Elohim) of the LXX. in Psalm viii., 6, found likewise in the Vulgate, Anglican, and Douay Versions. The meaning, as we learn from our Lord's own interpretation (John x., 35), is "judges divinely appointed."

[2] For a full and most interesting account of the Pope's error and his glorious avowal and reparation of the same, see Cardinal Pacca's Memorie Storiche, Roma, 1830; or its English translation by Sir Francis Head.

till his last hour, as long as Pius VII. lived, he was prized and honored by that Pontiff. And if the friendship and esteem of holy personages are proofs of a man's good character, so, too, is the hatred of the wicked and of the enemies of the Church. Napoleon hated Cardinals Pacca and Consalvi more than any other members of the sacred college, because he regarded them as the Pope's most trusty counsellors and authors of the energetic measures which he took to defend the rights of the Church. He used to say of the latter that, "though he did not look like a priest, yet he had more of the priest in him than any of his colleagues." His liberality to the poor, his truthfulness, so rare in personages renowned for diplomatic ability, his rigorous observance of all ecclesiastical duties, fasting and frequent confession, are mentioned by all his biographers.[1] Theiner, while condemning from a historical point of view the written memoirs of Cardinal Consalvi,[2] does justice to his character. He calls him "cet illustre prince de l' Eglise, non moins remarquable par les vertus privées que par son talent diplomatique."[3]

And it is of this holy and exalted personage, this illustrious churchman and "prince of God's people," that Sr. Emmerich is made to speak in the harsh language of reviling and contempt, denouncing him as an outcast from the Church, and to behold him in vision as "surrounded by a fog, cut off by a wall of separation, as if under the ban of excommunication."[4] If we really believed that Sister Emmerich had uttered such unchristian language, we should feel disposed to treat her words as the hysterical ravings of a pious, nonsensical woman. But we believe nothing of the kind. Sister Emmerich was a Saint, as is very evident from her life, and in her speech was not like one of the unbelieving foolish women[5] rebuked by Job and Tobias. The fact is, we have very little confidence in either Brentano or Schmoeger, as exponents of the holy woman's revelations. Brentano was a noble, poetic soul, but he

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[1] Franz Werner, art. Consalvi, in Herder's new edition of Wetzer and Welte's Kirchenlexicon.

[2] Memoires du Cardinal Consalvi, Secretaire d'Etat du Pape Pie VII., avec une Introduction et des Notes par J. Crétineau-Joly, Paris (Plon), 1864. Two vols. in 8vo.

[3] Histoire des deux Concordats de la République Française et de la République Cisalpine, par Augustin Theiner, Préfet des Archives du Vatican. Bar-le-duc, L. Guerin et Co., 1869, vol. i., Preface, pp. ix., x. It is natural to inquire what motives can have induced Theiner to attack the accuracy (defective memory he politely calls it) of the Cardinal, to accuse him of prejudice and bitterness, to see in Napoleon a loyal and zealous son of the Church, and to cover up his wicked persecution of the Church and its Visible Head by the soft name of "fautes echappées à la faiblesse humaine" (Ibid., p. viii.). But we can discover none, unless it be antipathy to whatever was written or published by Crétineau-Joly.

[4] Schmoeger's Life of Sister Anne Catherine, vol. ii., p. 351.

[5] "Quasi una de stultis mulieribus locuta es." Job ii., 10, cf. Tobias, ii., 8, 15, 22, 23.

could not tie himself down to the plain prose of what she uttered. The gaps (or what he thought such) in her communications he filled up from his own imagination, and where personages, especially churchmen, were introduced, the same fertile source supplied their names. Though born in the Catholic Church, he had wandered off into the desert of unbelief, and when he came back to the Church of his baptism, his ardent temperament fired him with all "the fury of a convert's zeal." He was especially severe on the German ecclesiastics who favored novelties and on the remissness of the Roman authorities in not condemning them with the rigor he desired, as if the Roman Pontiff and his counsellors were not better judges of such matters than a layman who had been just saved by divine mercy from utter shipwreck of faith and morals.

This is partially admitted by Father Schmoeger. Here is his account of Brentano's committing to paper Sr. Emmerich's visions. "He had, it is true, planted diligently (that is, in beginning a new Christian life), but many weeds yet remained to be rooted out. His rich, lively imagination was as yet (when he began his task as her amanuensis in July, 1820) too undisciplined for the reproduction of Sister Emmerich's visions in their native simplicity, and it cost him a struggle (did he succeed? That is the question) not to embellish them with his own poetical ideas. The interpretations he gave them were infallible in his eyes, and he hesitated not to introduce them freely *without specifying their origin.* This happened *principally* during the first year, when Sister Emmerich's labors for the Church formed the greater part of her communications. He had repeatedly been told that the invalid had asked Almighty God as a special favor not to be informed for what special individual among the clergy she was called upon to pray and suffer; yet it was not without difficulty that Brentano could be dissuaded from introducing the names of persons to whom he fancied certain visions particularly applicable" (vol. i., pp. 427, 428). When he undertook afterwards to rewrite his miscellaneous notes and put them into a more orderly shape, his old habit got the better of him. He again indulged his inventive, poetical fancy; and even F. Schmoeger has to confess that he could make no use of this "revised record," because it did not "faithfully accord with the original notes" (Preface to vol. ii., p. viii.)[1].

[1] We would not willingly say a word to detract from the merits of such a thorough Catholic as Clement Brentano, nor appear to lend a voice to the chorus of his Lutheran, Evangelical, and infidel haters. As long as he was estranged from the Church of his baptism, he had numerous admirers everywhere amongst the literati of Germany. But as soon as he came back repentant to the faith of his fathers, a wild howl of execration, as if hell were groaning over a rescued soul, was heard from all quarters. Foremost among them was the Lutheran, Voss, a pompous old bigot who, without a spark of Christian faith, had outraged in the same way the return to the faith of such noble

Of Father Schmoeger's share in recording these visions, we cannot speak very highly. He has done credit to the saint's memory by giving the substance of her examinations, by commissions civil and ecclesiastical, which redounded to her honor, and covered her infidel enemies (Catholics, so called, and Protestants) with shame and ignominy. But as to her visions and revelations, he has only drawn from Brentano's notes, "selecting what he deemed necessary for the present biography" (vol. ii., Preface, p. vii.). We are thus driven back on Brentano's authority; and in his Life of the Saint (we use this word in a technical sense, and with all due reverence to the constitutions of the Holy Apostolic See) F. Schmoeger does not always let us know whether it is Brentano, Dean Overberg, or Father Limborg, or some one else, who received from her mouth the revelations. If the case of Sister Anne Catherine ever is referred to Rome, this will form an insuperable difficulty. She may be canonized, for her heroic virtues deserve the honor, but her visions and revelations will find no approbation, unless they rest on safer authority than that of Brentano or Schmoeger.

Far be it from us to disparage, by anything we have said, the value of what is good, useful, and authentic in Sister Emmerich's revelations. We think that clergy and laity can learn from them a great deal to their advantage. The sanctity and value of relics, the importance of priestly blessing, and the holiness of those fingers that handle daily the Holy of Holies, the advantage and necessity of prayer for the faithful departed, even for living heretics and schismatics, and for children yet unbaptized, with other matters that she treats of as one evidently "taught of God," cannot fail to edify all readers, lay and clerical, and encourage them to remember their Christian duties, and take their allotted share in what they daily profess to believe, the "Communion of Saints."

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souls as Stolberg and Schlegel, and the beastly Jewish-Lutheran cynic Heinrich Heine. Here is a specimen of the way in which his conversion was ridiculed by Evangelicals, who would have preferred to see him become an Atheist rather than return to the Church of Christ. In the "Poetischer Hausschatz" (Leipzig, 1844), a thick and very interesting volume of more than 1300 pages, the editor, O. L. B. Wolff, a Jena professor (Evangelical or Infidel, or probably both), has the following spiteful, sneering notice of Brentano, some of whose poems are given in the volume. "Brentano Clemens, geb. 1777, zu Frankfurt a M., lebte einige zeit als thätiges mitglied der Propaganda zu Rom und privatisirt jetzt in Frankfurt a M." (Verzeichniss der Dichter, p. 1146.) This is a special, malicious notice accorded to no one else but Brentano. All other authors are merely set down as Catholic priests (Spee, Diepenbrock, etc.), Lutheran ministers, State counsellors, etc.; but the fiat had gone forth from Freemason headquarters to write down Brentano, and parsons, professors, and unbelievers of every kind obeyed it without scruple.

It must, however, be stated in fairness that Protestants like Bohmer and Wolfgang Menzel remained faithful in their admiration of the illustrious German poet, even after his conversion, and fearlessly expressed themselves in his favor.

BOOK NOTICES.

History of the United States of America from the Discovery of the Continent. By *George Bancroft*. The Author's Last Revision. Volume III. 8vo. D. Appleton & Co.: New York.

The great history of the country is unequally divided. The picture of the earlier exploration of successive colonies, their settlement and growth, is unfolded to the reader in two volumes, yet here half that space, devoted to the annals of two centuries and a half, is given to a period of eleven years, extending from 1763 to 1774, a period not full of events or stirring transactions; in fact, a lull between two great wars. Eminently a philosophical historian, seeking to study the springs of action, and the successive phases of thought as schemes of statesmen grow, develop, modify, under the pressure of events or of public opinion or prejudice, Mr. Bancroft has in this period a task peculiarly suited to him, and for which he brings eminent qualities. A man who has himself borne his part in the highest councils of the nation, who in foreign embassies enjoyed the closest relations with the greatest statesmen of our time, with his mind stored with a mass of information bearing on his topic, the richness of which is almost incalculable, Mr. Bancroft in this volume traces with great skill and power, and with a vivid and clear narrative, the development of the anti-American action of the English ministries and the king, the apathy of the English people and the great mercantile community, which, too gross to look beneath the surface, beheld without alarm the progress of a policy which was to strike a deadly blow at the great commerce of England. Even self-interest, usually so keen of sight, was blind. On the other side Mr. Bancroft depicts the development of the sturdy opposition of the people of the British Colonies, clinging to their British liberties, still full of respect for the Crown and Constitution of England, but bolder even than their political leaders in their resolution to resist oppression in its very commencement. It is the period of the successive steps by which the English Government sought to tax the unrepresented Colonies, by the Act of a Parliament where even their representation would have been a mere ceremony, without power for good. It is the period of the Acts of Navigation, the Stamp Act, the establishment of military force in the Colonies, the Tea Duties. Step by step the purblind statesmen of England drove the people of each Colony to study, to question, to resist, and finally to unite with each other for deliberation and action in a representative body, which was the nucleus of a new government. The Stamp Riots, the Boston "Massacre," the Boston Tea Party, the Regulators' battle at Alamance, the burning of the Gaspee, were the few indications of the fierce volcanic fires burning beneath the surface. In the Colonies, themselves, there were few events not connected with the political question of the day,—the brief but tragic Pontiac War, the hard-fought battle with the Shawnees.

In the eloquent pages of Bancroft we can follow, too, the keen watch which the statesmen of France kept on the Colonies, and the accurate estimate which they formed of the temper, tendency, and determination of that British community which had grown up beyond the Atlantic. Shrewder than the English statesmen, the French Ministry sent its secret agents to America to traverse the Colonies, study and report. A Prime

Minister in France sat down from time to time to read, with experienced eyes, extracts from newspapers, sermons, political pamphlets, and letters received from America, and rose from his table better informed, by far, than the Prime Minister of the sovereign whose rule extended over those American Colonies.

The volume closes with less than a page devoted to the Quebec Act. In this, and a subsequent allusion to it, we think the great historian has misunderstood that legislative enactment. The Act was one to carry out the capitulation of New France,—a tardy but honest step. The Province of Quebec, created by it, was identical with the New France which capitulated, and which held by a line of forts from Du Quesne to Niagara the country northwest of the Ohio. It is fallacious to say: "In disregard of the charters and rights of Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, and Virginia, it extended the boundaries of the new government of Quebec to the Ohio and the Mississippi, and over the region which included, besides Canada, the area of the present States of Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin." That territory, so far as its settlers went, had been part of New France; its local government and officers were appointed by the French Governor of New France, its clergy by the Bishop of Quebec; its laws, its ordinances, its tenure of real estate, all were those of New France. There was not in the territory any hamlet of English origin, any vestige of authority established by Massachusetts or Connecticut, New York and Virginia. It fell into the hands of the King as part of New France, and the Quebec Act did not include it "besides Canada," but as part of Canada or New France. Even after the recognition of our Independence, in 1783, the claims of Virginia, though reinforced by the occupation of that territory by Virginia troops, with the full consent of the inhabitants, were so little recognized by the other States, that one of the acts of the Continental Congress, after the war, was a substantial following up of the Quebec Act, after refusing to guarantee the claim of Virginia. The States yielded up their shadowy rights, and Congress, April 23d, 1784, adopted its "Ordinance for the government of the Northwestern Territory," an imperial act of the nation, like the Quebec Act, which had been in force unrepealed for ten years, and was necessarily adopted, except in so far as it was in conflict with the Ordinance.

The Quebec Act deserves more space than has been given to it. A storm of anti-Catholic prejudice was evoked by it, as may be seen in the newspapers and pamphlets of the day. More serious topics soon overshadowed it; but the minds of the people and of some extremely narrow-minded public men, like John Jay, were influenced throughout by it. We see this in the Address Jay penned to the People of Great Britain, which, with the conduct that inspired New England troops in Canada, lost us that Colony. We see traces, too, in the errors of Jay, at Paris and Madrid; and we see the influence of the bigotry even in the Declaration of Independence. In a study of the public mind the Quebec Act is necessarily an important element for consideration.

Life of Anne Catherine Emmerich. From the German of Very Rev. *K. M. Schmoeger*, C.SS.R. New York: Fr. Pustet & Co. 1885.

The Life of Anne Catherine Emmerich is known to thousands in Germany, Italy, and France. On its first publication the late Pius IX., of blessed memory, ordered an Italian translation to be made from advance proof-sheets of the German. The French translation was in like manner made from proof-sheets furnished by the Very Rev. Author. The

translation into English has been made from the German edition of 1870, under the conviction that a book which has proved highly useful to readers in other lands will not be less so to those of English-speaking countries.

The question of the reality of the supernatural ecstasies of Anne Catherine Emmerich, and of the visions with which she was favored during those ecstasies, has been subjected to successive rigid examinations, by eminent theologians and distinguished prelates, and are dealt with elsewhere in this number of the REVIEW.

In the light of faith there is nothing strange in the fact, that here and there there are chosen ones of God's children who are called to endure supernatural sufferings on earth, to endure in their persons the agony of the Cross and to be favored with special visions and revelations. Almighty God at all times selects certain souls who, either secluded from the world or amid the hurry of secular life, shall serve as instruments in suffering and combating for His Church, in testifying through their own experience, while still in the flesh, to the constant presence of the supernatural with us and to the realities of the spiritual world. The lives and sufferings of such chosen ones are often very different. Some appear as victims in the body, suffering excruciating physical torments, whilst others combat and suffer for the Church spiritually. Yet, as their lives are a perpetual sacrifice, a course of constant endurance in perfect abandonment to the will of God, they closely resemble one another.

But it is easy also to see that Anne Catherine Emmerich had also a special mission from God to fulfil. It was hers to bring before the German people the Gospel in its most minute details just at a time when the Divinity of Christ and other Gospel truths were most strenuously denied by the so-called philosophers of the day. These skeptics, "wise in their own conceits," could explain away, each to his own satisfaction, though not to the satisfaction even of other skeptics, the miracles and all the other evidences of the Divinity of our Blessed Redeemer, attributing them to natural or imaginary causes. But here was a poor, entirely uneducated girl, who without any natural means of knowledge endured over again in her own life His sufferings on the Cross, carried His wounds upon her own person, described even in their smallest details the various circumstances and situations in which the Sacred Person of our Divine Lord figures, at meals, at marriage-feasts, on journeys, etc.; and does it in a way in which not the least trace of anything unworthy of His Divinity can be found. Moreover, she describes the scenes she witnessed, the various places she visited in her ecstasies in the Holy Land and in different other far-off countries as regards the physical features of these countries, the various languages, manners, and customs of their people, and various other circumstances relating to the geography and archæology of those countries in times long past, and all with a minuteness of detail which the most observant travellers and distinguished scholars have never surpassed, if equalled, and with an accuracy that defies all their efforts to find a defect in.

Here is a fact which sets at defiance all the attempts of skeptics to resolve the supernatural into the natural, and to explain the former by the latter. Thus it is that God constantly chooses "the foolish things of the world to confound the wise, and the weak things of the world . . . . that He may confound the strong . . . . that no flesh should glory in His sight."

This to our mind is one of the lessons taught in this narrative of the sufferings and visions of Anne Catherine Emmerich. There are many

other obvious lessons for the encouragement and edification of the faithful and devout which need not here be referred to.

A History of the People of the United States, from the Revolution to the Civil War. By *John Bach McMaster*, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. In Five Volumes. Vol. II. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1885.

The second volume of Mr. McMaster's *History* embraces the period extending from 1790 to 1803; thus beginning after the organization of the Federal Government under Washington and extending to the fall of the Federal party and the election in which Jefferson, after a long struggle, defeated his fellow-candidate, Burr, and secured the presidency. It is the period when the influence of Revolutionary France was potent in forming a new set of political ideas, against which those who clung to the old system of English liberty strove manfully. The violence of partisans and of newspapers was excessive, and Washington lost his well-earned popularity, and received insults from Congress, from the press, and from individuals. The treaty with England, negotiated by Jay, aroused a storm of unpopularity against him, and drew upon the country the hostility of France, resulting in a brief war on the ocean; yet the treaty, with all its concessions, did not save us from a more serious war with England.

At home the necessity of direct taxation led to the Whiskey Insurrection and to a petty disturbance by Fries.

The author brings vividly before us, by his use of the newspapers of the day and the remarks of travellers, as well as letters and other sources, the social and domestic life, the amusements, dress, fashions, opinions, and ideas of the time. The political affairs, of course, in such excited times occupied no little of the public mind, but we can follow with interest the progress of the country, the decline of slavery at the North, the growth of the mail system, the increase of paper-mills and other manufactures, the invention of the cotton-gin and the impulse it gave to southern agriculture. It is curious to study here the decline of New England Puritanism, and the breaking away from the old strict rule, as well as the commencement of camp meetings and extravagant forms, the appeals to the feelings and the senses, instead of the old hard and dry system. Then began the tendency everywhere to make religious services more attractive. The old and conservative party in most denominations opposed it steadily, but the younger wished better music—the organ or other instruments. The Dutch and German began to give place to English in parts where new generations had grown up to whom the language of their fathers was a dead tongue.

The history of this period is familiar to few except professed historical students, but Mr. McMaster presents it in its most attractive form, and, what is not included in his scheme, the details of some important public events, is very generally familiar. The service rendered by the work is not confined to an entertaining picture of the past. It is full of instructive lessons, for it is impossible to look upon this picture of the past without feeling less complacency with our own times than self-love induces us to feel.

Summa Philosophica Juxta Scholasticorum Principia, Complectens Logicam et Metaphysicam. Auctore *P. Nicolao Russo*, S.J., in Bostoniensi Collegio Philosophiæ Lectore. Bostoniæ: Apud Thomam B. Noonan et Socium. 1885.

In this age of rampant error, when human thought is still running riot in the domain of philosophy, scattering its vagaries broadcast for the

poisoning of men's minds, there is urgent need of orthodox thinkers and writers to supply the human intellect with healthy food. The name of the erroneous scribblers who undertake to make public the fancies of their disordered imaginations, is legion; and the majority of readers, unfortunately, are misled by the specious and hollow pretence of learning which they give to their ephemeral effusions. A great advantage which error has is, that it may be of infinite variety, and thus mislead the superficial by a pleasing novelty in its theories; while the truth is one and indivisible, capable of variation only in the peculiar manner one may assume in presenting it and the style of the language he may use. This is a strong reason why Catholic writers should take great pains to cultivate a good literary style, which is a garb always becoming to the truth and never too precious to clothe it with. In refuting error, Catholics must necessarily use arguments that have been availed of for ages; but they should not simply repeat the words of their predecessors. They must adapt themselves, in phraseology as in social customs, to the age in which they live, and meet on their own ground the propounders of erroneous interpretations of the latest discoveries in science.

As it is in our higher schools and colleges for the laity, as well as in ecclesiastical seminaries, that the future champions of the Church are trained, the text-books used here should meet the requirements referred to above. Works, therefore, that served as guides to a former generation cannot be expected to be entirely suitable to the present. New works on the same old subjects, or new editions if the old works be so recast as to suit the changed circumstances, should always be welcomed by Catholic scholars, teachers, and students, provided they possess the requisite amount of intrinsic merit.

It is with unfeigned pleasure that we find these conditions fulfilled in the octavo volume of 440 pages whose title appears at the head of this notice. The contents of this book Father Russo has taught for years to the graduating class of Boston College, where he is Professor of Philosophy. It is a thorough treatise on logic and metaphysics, written in a clear, elegant style, arranged in the most natural order, and with its parts properly proportioned. Armed with the knowledge of Logic, —both dialetical and critical,—Ontology, or General Metaphysics, Cosmology, Anthropology, and Natural Theology, or Special Metaphysics, contained in it, a student of ordinary intelligence should entertain no fear in the battle against error. A fit supplement to this work would be a treatise of like or even wider scope on Ethics or Morals, from the same practiced mind and hand. The paper, letter-press, and binding are of a very superior order,—in perfect keeping with the contents.

THE LIFE AROUND US: A Collection of Stories. By *Maurice Francis Egan*, Author of "Songs and Sonnets," "Preludes," etc., etc. Fr. Pustet & Co.: New York and Cincinnati. P. F. Cunningham & Son, 817 Arch Street, Philadelphia.

We sincerely wish that we had, and hope that we shall have, more volumes of such stories, not only from the pen of the writer, but from other pens cultivating the same field. For the field is large and there is abundant room in it for a number of workers.

The stories are fictions, so far as the persons and particular incidents are concerned, but in other respects are true descriptions of what is occurring every day around us, and true pictures of the lives and surroundings and characters of persons we are constantly meeting. Then, too, they are pure and healthful. While there is abundant action in them, it is not the action of imaginary men and women but that of every-day life, which is constantly weaving its web of mingled sorrow and

enjoyment, adversity and prosperity, and is as full of all the elements which can stir deepest emotions in human hearts, as any incidents or scenes which the most powerful imagination can conceive.

Were writers of novels and stories to cultivate their powers of perception and observation more, and strain their inventive faculties less, their productions would be more interesting as well as less unreal and extravagant.

Consciously or unconsciously, Mr. Egan, we believe, has adopted this principle ; and this constitutes one of the excellences of his stories. He is a close observer of life around us, a keen analyst of character, and possesses large descriptive power. Along with this he has a vein of quiet humor which sometimes takes the form of keen satire, yet is without venom or malice.

The influence of his stories upon their readers is always good. There is a moral in them. But the moral is not lugged in nor preached to the reader, nor is the story written for the sake of the moral. It grows out of the story, and emanates from it as fragrance exhales from the flower.

We would be glad to see more Catholic stories from Mr. Egan's pen, and especially more such stories whose scenes and characters belong to this country. There is no need going abroad to find materials for tales of deepest interest. Those materials lie immediately around, in rich abundance, in the varying incidents and scenes of American life.

THE TRAINING OF THE APOSTLES. Part IV. By *Henry James Coleridge*, of the Society of Jesus. London: Burns & Oates. 1885.

This volume concludes the first half of the "Public Life of our Lord" by Father Coleridge, and forms the fourth part of "The Training of the Apostles." The title, "Training of the Apostles," which is given to the four volumes of which this is the last, is not intended to imply that our Lord did not begin to train His Apostles before the time at which these volumes begin, or that He did not continue their training afterwards. But it was during this period of time, especially, that that teaching of their souls by the Providential action of the Eternal Father, of which we hear so much in the Gospels, was at work in raising their minds to a recognition of the great truth of our Lord's Divinity. It is the Confession of that Divinity by St. Peter, which closes this period by the great promise made to him by our Lord in return for his faith. And it is the selection of St. Peter as the rock on which the Church is to be built, which makes the point at which this volume closes the very centre and pivot of the Gospel history.

Of these volumes of Father Coleridge's it is almost impossible to speak too highly. They are painstaking, critical and devout studies of the Life of our Divine Lord as recorded by the Sacred Evangelists, in the course of which Father Coleridge calls to his aid an extensive and profound knowledge of what the Church Fathers have said on the same subjects.

ASSYRIOLOGY: Its Use and Abuse. By *Francis Brown*, Associate Professor of Biblical Philology in the Union Theological Seminary, New York. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1885.

This little volume has appeared none too soon. Long, indeed, before the address of which it is an expansion was delivered, now over nine months ago, the need of some such warning to and check on rash theorizers was felt. Quacks of all kinds do irreparable injury in their way, and much of the evil consequences of empiricism in the matter of Eastern archæology cannot be undone ; but yet the warning and advice here given should be heeded and taken, and repeated until all interested parties have heard it.

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